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Abstract 
This research into my organisation commenced with a desire to understand, from a participant’s 
perspective, how certain organisational culture themes impacted leadership. It commenced as 
an ethnography with the focus upon telling a story through the lived experiences of managers 
and leaders in my organisation. As the research progressed, things were revealed that shed light 
upon a more pervasive organisational phenomenon that offered a broader insight into an 
organisational challenge, and at the same time, an opportunity for individual and organisational 
development. This opportunity encouraged me to reflect upon and then adapt my methodology 
resulting in a thesis performed as action research. 
The study reveals a dissonance between the assessments of leadership experiences as reported 
by staff in the same organisation yet separated by only one managerial layer. It highlights the 
challenges and tensions felt as the leaders became aware of the dissonance and describes an 
organisational alignment initiative aimed at improving the coherence between the leadership 
and the organisational culture within a multinational military setting. The story reveals how 
leadership is often affected through previous experiences, experiences that were contextually 
unique, dated, fulfilling and effective at that time, yet potentially limiting and perhaps only 
partially effective in their current multinational leadership role. This reveals how insights and 
research were combined to create the catalyst for individual and organisational learning; it 
describes how personal development interventions were carefully crafted in order to 
specifically appeal to senior multinational leaders and managers. These leaders and managers 
were asked to confront and articulate their own values and beliefs about leadership and, in some 
cases, modify them in light of new learning; to become even more authentic leaders. 
Cognizant through academic research that leadership and organisational cultures can have a 
profound effect on performance (Denison and Mishra, 1995: Harris and Ogbonna, 2000), aware 
through staff feedback and an organisational change that will be described in detail I was deeply 
curious to try and discover “did the way in which leadership is practised change in some way 
as a consequence of the organisational culture awareness activities”? 
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Chapter 1 – THESIS CONTRIBUTION, PURPOSE, RATIONALE and STRUCTURE  
 
In this Chapter, I set out to provide an overview of the study aims, to justify the reasons behind 
the research and to outline the structure of the document.  
1.1 Contribution 
This study contributes to the literature on military leadership and organisational development 
through the examination of an organisational culture change initiative that took place within a 
multinational military setting. It provides a case study of an attempt to develop the leadership 
culture in a military training and education entity of NATO, from a traditional command and 
control influenced setting, into a softer more inclusive form of leadership. It illustrates the links 
between organisational culture and leadership and highlights the particular constraints and 
opportunities of bringing about organisational change in a multinational military setting.  
From a practical perspective, the thesis contributes to actionable knowledge about how to plan 
and implement authentic leadership development in a multinational military environment and 
proposes a process. This thesis is written then with the aim of contributing to the academic 
debate in this field, supplementing existing research exists and offering a culturally contextual 
model for leadership and organisational development. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this action research is to investigate leadership as practised and experienced by 
senior members of staff in a multinational military organisation. The thesis builds upon a 
research field said to be only lightly touched in academic literature (Gerras et al., 2008); that 
of organisational cultures of military commands and centres. Indeed, there appear to be very 
few academic offerings discussing the relationship between multinational military leadership 
and the associated organisational culture (Redmond et al., 2015).  
The outcomes of this action research investigation can be considered along three lines of 
development: 
• to co-create the conditions for leadership development in my organisation, 
• to bring about organisational development through the action research process, 
• to contribute to actionable knowledge that may be beneficial for leaders and managers 
in similar organisations considering organisational change.  
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In fulfilling the purpose of the research, the thesis explores leadership/organisational culture 
synergies and interdependencies. It highlights how individual leaders, many with career-long 
exposure to national, single service influences, perform leadership and goes on to explore how 
personal histories and organisational contexts affect these leaders and consequently their 
followers and how that affects organisations. The research was initially premised on the 
proposition, informed by internally and externally developed and facilitated staff surveys, that 
there could be a misalignment or mismatching between the NATO Joint Warfare Centre’s 
transformational mission and the way in which leadership is practiced by many of its members; 
nominally a practice driven from transactional approaches and strongly influenced by 
Command and Control (C2) mindsets (Oprean, 2012).  
1.3 Military Related Rationale 
According to Roxborough (2000: 367), military organisational dynamics have been more the 
subject of historical and political research rather than of sociological research. What research 
does exist, appears to locate military organisations as conservative and struggling to innovate 
(Ibid: 369). Cadle et al. (2014; 6065) claim that within “hierarchical bureaucracies” power and 
influence “derives from a person’s position”; he goes on to add that organisations such as these 
can be highly effective in stable contexts, but are “slow to adapt” when that stability is 
challenged. Gerras et al. (2008: 14) make the point that many military challenges “stem from 
an outdated over-reliance on hierarchy” and “processes with limited one-way participation and 
communication”. Meijer (2012: 17) in his research on the effects of a more comprehensive 
approach to military operations revealed profound challenges to traditional long-standing 
definitions of military C2 and yet, despite these challenges military organisations resist 
evolution are considered to be very hard to change (March, 2008). 60 years ago, Marshall 
(1956: viii) made the point that “What has never before been tried within the profession of 
arms invariably invites more opposition than support.” and this appears as true today, as it was 
then.  
Militaries operate under formal remits regularly referred to “Command and Control” (Oprean, 
2012) and are typically associated with “hard” power and asymmetric use of influence (Grint, 
2008: 14), often exemplified by their reliance of the rank structure. Militaries, for the most part, 
are managed through the application of “hard command power” (Nye, 2004:5). Howieson and 
Kahn (2002: 13) raise the issue of “hard” and “soft” approaches when stating “military style of 
leadership, management and command training has often focussed on “hard” skills such as 
planning, organising and directing, all within an impersonal hierarchical structure”. However, 
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current thinking is now shifting towards an awareness of, and an increase in the importance in 
“soft” skills (Andriopoulos et al., 2008; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Raelin, 2003; Verhezen, 
2010; UK MOD, 2014). Soft power “co-opts people rather than coerces them” and is 
“associated with intangible power resources” (Nye, 2004:5); it is the realm of the heart rather 
than the head. Soft power though is said to be highly vulnerable to “heavy handed 
unilateralism” (Ibid: 8) which is potentially a by-product of authoritarian organisations that 
favour command and control.  
Despite the apparent resilience of C2 some military academics studying recent military 
operations have raised the issue of the application of C2 and question its continued relevance 
and validity for some missions. Meijer (2012: 17), in his paper on the “Consequences of the 
NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control”, concluded that “the 
implementation of the comprehensive approach presents a variety of consequences to 
traditional command and control”. Curts and Campbell (2006: 15) also suggest that an 
alternative approach to C2 is perhaps required, stating that “concepts of Command and Control 
are in need of serious re-evaluation if not overhaul”. As the Commander of a US warship hints 
at the limiting effect C2 can have on an organisation if applied inappropriately when he remarks 
that “helping people realize their full potential can lead to attaining goals that would be 
impossible to reach under command-and-control.” (Abrashoff, 2002). NATO’s own research 
and technical organisation (RTO, 2005: 6) claims that a military leader’s skills must adapt to 
include “coaching, teaching, counselling, motivating, negotiating, conflict resolution and 
empowering” and go on to say that new leaders must be “able to understand other’s feelings 
and beliefs”, these are clearly skills that encroach upon a subtler, softer approach than that 
typically associated with C2 paradigms.  
According to Whitney et al., (2010: 5) “The practice of leadership is on the brink of a paradigm 
shift as it moves from authoritarian to collaborating, from talking at people to engaging in 
dialogue with them”. That philosophy appears not to be lost on those educating future leaders 
who are just starting out on their military leadership development where lessons on how to give 
orders to servicemen and women are being replaced with lessons on how to enable servicemen 
and women to think and speak their thoughts freely (UK MOD, 2014). This is also recognised 
by some scholars of militaries (Howieson and Kahn, 2002) that future officers will have to 
begin to accept that subordinates will “question old practices and propose new solutions” (Ibid: 
14) and in their view a new cadre of future leaders will create an environment that prioritizes 
“trust, respect and empowerment”, an altogether softer approach; trust and respect can be 
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neither commanded nor controlled. McChrystal et al (2015: ix) claim that a that a whole new 
approach is required to change traditions concepts of what it is to be a leader stating that “the 
leader becomes creating the broader environment instead of command-and-control 
micromanaging.” 
Howieson and Kahn (2002: 16) also claimed that servicemen of tomorrow will be focused on 
“alignment, creativity and empowerment”. They indicate that in a post-bureaucratic era, leaders 
who are able to encourage healthy dissent, leaders who appreciate followers and who are 
courageous enough to voice counter views will take the laurel. “Successful leaders” they claim 
“will have – not the loudest voice – but the readiest ear.” (Ibid.). A position repeatedly 
mentioned by leaders at the very top of military organisations but there is little evidence of that 
making its way through the resilient and multiple management layers beneath. Denning 
(2007:49) makes the challenge for C2 based entities clear stating that people “habituated to the 
practice of hierarchical command-and-control management” are due a fundamental shift in the 
way they operate, claiming they will require a profound understanding of self and “exhibiting 
more than a little humility, and being able to level with others and speak from a genuine point 
of view.” (Ibid.) 
1.4 Leadership and Culture Related Rationale 
Leadership and organisational culture as academic research domains have a certain academic 
theoretical history with a number of prolific researchers becoming increasingly published 
through journals and also in more easily digestible forms through books that have become well 
known and well used in practice. These sources will be cited throughout the thesis. Leadership 
and organisational culture have long been related; some academics being convinced that 
leaders determine an organisation’s culture (Argyris, 2010) and others claiming that, although 
leadership is certainly important, organisational cultures are also responsive to the operating 
environment or rather dependent upon the mindsets of the members of the organisation (Schein, 
1990). Jackson and Parry (2010:71) claim “the linkage between leadership and culture to be 
one of the most intellectually satisfying areas to explore.”  
Academic literature (Antonacopoulou and Bento, 2004; Heifitz, 1998; Rost, 1993; Zaleznik, 
1992) and business literature (Abrashoff, 2002; Blanchard, 2010; Fox, 2011; Marquardt, 2005; 
Novak, 2012; Sharma, 2010) are dominated by the popular shift to embrace ‘softer’ approaches 
to leadership and management and the leaders of my centre decided to try and adopt more of 
these in an attempt to move the staff from organisational compliance to organisation 
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commitment (Covey, 2004). In exploring further “hard” and “soft” leadership I review the 
concept of organisational culture which is often described as being difficult to quantify being 
“a soft, holistic concept with, however, presumed hard consequences.” (Hofstede et al, 2010: 
47); and in a multinational military training organisation these hard consequences show up in 
how effective we are in delivering an output that involves preparing people to deal with the 
uncertainties of military operations and their inevitable deployment into harm’s way. This 
research is then premised on research claiming that there is a synergistic relationship between 
culture and leadership and that when this relationship is right, it has the potential to deliver 
performance improvements (Denison, 1984; Semler, 1997). 
1.5 The Structure Of The Thesis 
Overview 
The thesis is offered from my position as a “researching professional” (Anderson et al., 2015) 
and is presented following the dissertation format guidance contained within Coghlan and 
Holian’s Chapter 9 “The dissertation: contribution to practical knowing” (Anderson et al., 
2015). It represents my account as an insider researcher and reflective practitioner (Semler, 
1997). A “reflective practitioner” (Semler, 1997: 26) is claimed to be “the greatest source of 
knowledge about organisational performance improvement” and Bath (2009: 215) offers that 
“the practitioner-as-researcher occupies a central position as an interpreter-of-practice”.  
Chapter 2 - Context 
In Chapter 2, I describe the research context as it pertains to my organisation, describing briefly 
NATO as an overarching organisation before delving more deeply into the JWC’s mission, 
leadership and culture. I describe how an initiative to consider leadership and organisational 
culture in the JWC led to an awakening in the leaders and fuelled an organisational 
development programme that contributed to significant organisational change. I explain how 
the evolving global environment drives changes in NATO’s operational readiness and the need 
for preparedness and training; the role of the military centre at the core of the research. I 
consider two significant contextual influences upon the leadership and culture experienced 
within the NATO Joint Warfare Centre; those being associated with national influences and 
service influences and go on to introduce the organisational development project the JWC 
embarked upon that considered both organisational structure and organisational culture 
changes. 
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
The majority of the supporting literature appears in Chapter 3 although literature was accessed, 
reflected and acted upon throughout the research period through two focused periods 
sporadically reinforced as new observations and insights occurred. Occasionally, and where it 
makes sense to do so, I relate to new literature as part of the story in Chapter 5. Chapter 3 
exposes the literature in a way that reflects the two major action research cycles. Firstly, by 
researching leadership and organisational culture within a command and control setting; a 
setting that I posit favours transactional leadership approaches. Secondly, and informed from 
insights emerging through the research, I describe the literature informing my second major 
iteration through a focussed action research cycle. I review the research related to authentic 
leadership and authentic leadership development leading to the creation and application of an 
intervention in my organisation and that was subsequently used outside of my practice in other 
military organisations.  
Chapter 4 – Methodology and Methods 
In Chapter 4, I introduce and position the research in terms of the methodology followed and 
describe why certain research methods were privileged over others. I briefly qualify my start 
point as an ethnography associated with my approach during what I would later recognise to 
be my first significant action research cycle. I then go on to describe how the research became 
more focused as I become more associated, personally integrated, with the research and the 
researched. In this Chapter, I also consider the ethics of this type of research revealing risks to 
both the researcher and the researched before describing the methods used during interviews 
and subsequent analysis. I also describe action research as a methodology closely related to the 
“dual imperatives” (McKay and Marshall, 2001) of understanding organisations and bringing 
about change in organisations (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010) and, along with my own personal 
development, helping my organisation achieve the change it desired was important to me.  
Chapter 5 – The Story and Outcomes 
The story of the research is expressed in Chapter 5 and can be summarised as being the 
convergence of two distinct but overlapping and dependant research phases. The first part of 
the story builds upon the context and describes how the literature and context combined to 
provide the research platform for my ethnography to take place. It describes the interviews, 
analysis and fuzziness from which new insights occurred. The story describes how the focus 
of the research evolved and explains why I decided to engage with an additional literature 
review whilst in the middle of my research. It tells how this additional literature review delayed 
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significantly my planned research timeline but informed my understanding, thinking and 
actions. It describes how an organisational discovery encouraged me to adapt my approach to 
the thesis and also informs the reader how a contextually relevant authentic leadership 
development intervention was created and implemented in JWC. In this Chapter I also consider 
my contribution and also reveal that leadership and organisational culture have taken a much 
more prominent role within NATO commands and provide evidence to support this claim. I 
describe where the authentic leadership development model has already been used as a 
developmental exercise on NATO leadership development courses.  
Chapter 6 - Personal Reflection 
I reflect and disclose personally my own journey in Chapter 6 and also consider “second and 
third person learning” (Coghlan and Holian, 2015) before highlighting a number of research 
concerns I pondered upon and that continue to remain sources of curiosity for me. I reveal and 
disclose my personal research journey; a journey that saw me leave the organisation that 
revealed itself in a different light through the lens of the research. I describe the personal risks, 
losses and benefits the research brought and indicate how my decision to move away from 
organisational culture themes to look at creating an action learning intervention occurred. 
Finally, I explain what I think was my research legacy and how that created a leaderful moment 
for some of the members of staff remaining. 
Chapter 7 – Organisational Reflections, Legacy and Summary  
In Chapter 7 I reflect upon the legacy of my research and summarise the journey. I reflect upon 
whether my research and actions left my organisation in a better place and also look to consider 
why the research was ineffective when that was the case. I also disclose how, although the 
research at the outset was very much focussed on a military context, the findings could also 
translate to other fairly formal organisations of which there appear to be many examples. 
Cameron and Quinn (2011: 812) claim that “Large organisations and government agencies are 
generally dominated by a hierarchy culture, as evidenced by large numbers of standardised 
procedures, multiple hierarchical levels” and so I also consider any applications for broader 
engagement or use.
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Chapter 2 - ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Within this Chapter, I lay out both the macro and micro contexts that define my organisation. 
This description ranges from the wider geopolitical influences impacting NATO, through to 
the unique organisational dynamics associated with NATO’s only operational headquarters-
level multinational training centre. I consider two significant contextual influences upon the 
leadership and culture experienced within the NATO Joint Warfare Centre, namely national 
influences and service influences, and I introduce the organisational development initiative the 
JWC embarked upon that considered both organisational structure and organisational culture 
changes.  
2.1 Contextualising NATO; its Origins and Membership 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a political body with a military arm. It was 
founded on the 4th April 1949 upon the signature from the leaders of the 12 forming nations 
of the Washington Treaty. This treaty and the organisation it spawned represented an 
international attempt to deter a perceived policy of Soviet expansion, discourage nationalism 
and encourage greater European political integration, perhaps a theme that has only recently 
returned to the forefront of international political thinking. NATO is an international political 
organisation that has its Headquarters in Brussels and, uniquely in the context of European 
international security organisations, it has a standing military capacity that can be called upon 
when other forms of international diplomacy have failed. NATO has several fully integrated 
member nations and a number of partners at various stages of membership maturity.  
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Figure 1 - NATO Geographical Representation (2014) 
2.2 Governance and Structure 
 
NATO is governed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is composed of national 
political leaders who authorise and direct the work of various NATO bodies, comprising 8,800 
permanently assigned military and civilian staff and many thousands more operating under a 
NATO mandate. These leaders are represented by permanent members and their delegations 
who provide an interface to the NATO Secretary General, the Chairman of the NAC. 
An important NATO body for my practice that resides under the NAC is the Military 
Committee which is made up of senior military leaders from the 28 (since completing the 
research this number has risen to 29) NATO member nations. This Committee oversees the 
NATO Military Command Structure that consists of two distinct areas of responsibility and 
foci; an operational entity concerned with the conduct of NATO operations and an entity that 
leads organisational transformation initiatives within NATO. The organisational layout from 
2014 can be seen in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 – High-Level NATO Military Structure (2014) 
The operational arm of the NATO military structure is charged with the planning and execution 
of all Alliance operations. It is based in Europe and commanded from SHAPE (Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) located in Mons, Belgium, under the operational title of 
Allied Command Operations (ACO). Residing beneath this strategic headquarters (HQ) are the 
subordinate force commands and other operational entities as depicted in Figure 2. ACO 
conducts NATO missions such as the ones in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the anti-piracy 
operation around the coast of East Africa. ACO has a number of subordinate HQs spanning 
across Europe from Norway to Turkey and from Portugal to Poland and it is these units that 
expedite NATO operations and provide the demand for operational level exercising and 
training which is one of Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT) deliverables.  
ACT, the transformational arm of the NATO military structure, is commanded from HQ SACT 
(Headquarters Strategic Allied Command Transformation) located in Norfolk, Virginia, USA. 
It is responsible for doctrine and concept development, military experimentation, capability 
development, innovation, education and training leading to a formal mission of “promoting 
and overseeing the continuing transformation of the Alliance’s forces and capabilities” 
(Pedlow, ND: 14). It was designed to transform NATO and the “jewel in the organisation’s 
crown” is said to be the NATO JWC (Maisonneuve, 2003). There is an inherent dichotomy in 
the close positioning of the ACO and ACT military entities; military operations encourage the 
use of institutionalised routines, standardised procedures and formalised processes, whereas 
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transformation is inherently non-standard, seeks to refine or challenge existing processes, to 
embrace radical ideas and new ways of working.  
Despite a clear mission differentiation between ACO and ACT the NATO member nations that 
populate these HQs do not differentiate when matching military personnel to the various NATO 
entities. In staffing these organisations, they take little account of the rather different focus of 
the organisations into which their personnel will be embedded. ACO (the operational unit) is 
around 10 times the size of ACT (the unit charged with organisational transformation) and 
consequently, the NATO military structure relies heavily upon C2 and encourages a 
transactional style of leadership, highly appropriate for ACO but antithetical to the objectives 
of ACT. I posit that the organisational culture and style of leadership that exists in an 
operationally focused organisation would be different to the organisational culture and style of 
leadership that exists in a transformational organisation. This will be explored in much more 
detail within the thesis.  
2.3 The NATO Joint Warfare Centre’s Role 
The research was performed in the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) based in Stavanger in 
Norway. It is a centre whose primary role is the provision of collective operational headquarters 
level training and exercising ACO.  
 
The JWC trains and educates 
NATO force headquarters by 
providing “wargaming” 
capabilities that enables 
sailors, air-force, army and 
civilian personnel to 
experience full spectrum joint 
operational level warfare 
(Kucukaksoy, 2012) within a 
synthetic simulated and 
importantly benign 
environment. 
Figure 3 - JWC Simulated Training 
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In performing its role, the JWC enables joint military staffs to learn and grow together as a unit 
before they deploy as a NATO HQ into what might be a perilous area of operation. JWC’s 
internationally agreed mandate is to prepare HQ’s from ACO prior to their deployment on 
NATO missions and it has trained in excess of 50,000 servicemen and women during it’s 
relatively short 14-year lifespan. In any one year the JWC delivers four major NATO exercises 
a year with two in planning or after-action review phases. It trains staff in the art of modern 
crisis management, ranging from humanitarian relief operations (such as training HQ’s to 
prepare for earthquake relief) through to mission rehearsals for standing operations (such as 
the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa) and beyond to exercises as strategic political 
messages that exemplify determinism and strive to defer aggression (such as the recent NATO 
exercises triggered by the events in Crimea and Ukraine). The JWC is the only NATO entity 
that is able to simulate major “joint” (Navy, Air Force and Army) multi-national operations 
and they are significant catalysts for the operational leaders trying to lead and make sense of 
events in a highly complex and rapidly changing world. In order to try and bring order to such 
a dynamic environment Militaries operate for the most part under a management philosophy 
loosely described as “Command and Control” (C2). NATO C2 will be explored in more detail 
with this thesis.  
2.4 The NATO Joint Warfare Centre Operating Mode  
JWC training and exercise portfolio is driven from a document agreed at the NAC entitled the 
Strategic Annual Guidance for Exercises and training (SAGE). The SAGE predicts major 
NATO training and exercises into a 5-year horizon taking into account the forecasted political 
strategic environment in terms or military preparedness and demonstrating solidarity. It is when 
these events are two years out that JWC involvement commences. Twenty four months prior 
to the exercise execution declared in the SAGE the JWC appoints an Officer of Primary 
Responsibility (OPR) who effectively owns that exercise through its two year lifecycle from 
assessing strategic level exercise aims, defining the fictitious context, developing incidents and 
events to trigger responses from the training audience, building the individual and team training 
plans all the way to the execution phase of the event, when thousands of troops might be 
deployed running through a simulated crisis response exercise.  
2.5 The NATO Joint Warfare Centre Operating Challenges 
In order for the OPR to deliver the exercise and all its content, the OPR draws upon the skill 
and will of staff members and subject matters experts (SME’s) for example in cyber defence, 
ballistic missile defence, intelligence or other specific military domains. Interestingly the JWC 
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had no formal job descriptions within their structure for an OPR and consequently, OPRs have 
no formal authority over the SMEs they require. Instead, teams are “cobbled together” into 
functional capability groupings that do not then lie within neatly constrained hierarchal chains 
of command but are more dependent upon the informal application of influence and power. 
They are ad hoc resourced capabilities put together by engaging individuals and teams that may 
actually reside in another branch or division. This type of dynamic resource allocation does not 
fit well with an environment defined by C2 and the organisation is subject to considerable 
internal friction as it builds capacity and knowledge outside of the bounds of a typical military 
headquarters. We are highly dependent upon strong personal relationships and informal 
leaders, on garnering commitment and support from specialists that are not necessarily obliged 
to give it. The organisational realities of generating teams outside of the formal organisational 
structure are challenging traditional understandings of command and control.  
An additional challenge to organisational norms comes from the requirement to accommodate 
and integrate non-military actors (the Red Cross, the UN and many other scenario dependant 
civilian agencies) into the training and exercise events. These NGOs (non-governmental 
organisations) bring the “comprehensive approach” (Meijer, 2012) that NATO member 
Nations insist on and they are embedded into the exercise as exercise role players or as exercise 
training audience. It is critical (sometimes even vital) that we exercise as closely as possible to 
the way we expect to operate in a conflict zone (often referred to in military environments as 
“train as you fight”). That means being inclusive, collaborative and deeply respectful of actors 
outside of our formal C2 environments.  
2.6 The NATO Joint Warfare Centre Strategic Environment 
Responding to the environment in which NATO militaries may be expected to operate leads to 
inevitable adaptations to mission statements and the tasks given to the organisational units. 
These changes can lead to the formal organisational structure coming under pressure, becoming 
less relevant or effective. This was the case in 2012 when the then Commander of JWC, Major 
General JF Berger, aware of the evolving geopolitical context, stated that the JWC was not 
adequately prepared to meet the post-2014 challenges to NATO Training and Exercise. He 
instigated a whole-scale review of the internal structure which evolved into a five-phase 
analysis, design, transition, testing and reporting project lasting three years. I was pulled out of 
my formal position in the organisation to lead the team delivering the latter three phases. 
Coincidentally in 2012, instigated as a side effect of my DBA studies, I had been able to engage 
senior leaders in JWC to consider organisational culture as a theme worthy of intentional 
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investment. Both these significant change initiatives will be further explored later in the thesis 
but for the context, it is important to be aware that whilst JWC had undergone only minor 
organisational changes during the last decade or so, it had not radically changed the vision, 
mission, structure or climate and they had never before purposefully looked to match the 
organisation’s culture to all of these, and we had never considered enabling research to inform 
and drive collective actions towards better framing and aligning the organisation’s culture to 
the evolving mission. (Lobovitz and Rosansky, 1997; Semler, 1997). 
A number of key political motivated drivers, articulated at NATO Summits, exert influence 
upon NATO generally and inform the JWC strategic environment as well as my research 
context within JWC specifically. These are highlighted in Table 1 below:  
Smart Defence 
and the Financial 
Crisis 
Nations are increasingly aware that they are not able to afford full 
spectrum defence capabilities. Deciding instead to “pool and share” 
capability. This means that operations will be increasingly dependent 
upon others and it is considered unlikely that any single NATO nation 
would have neither the ability, nor the will, to act alone in the future 
(Ul-Hassan, 2014; Vershbow, 2014). 
Connected Forces 
Initiative (CFI) 
An increasing demand to test and validate the interoperability of 
NATO and non-NATO militaries through training and exercises and 
to drive forward CFI (Lindley-French, 2012). Operations in 
Afghanistan proved that when partners and coalitions form, sharing 
information and managing in this multination joint operation is a 
challenge. CFI aims to connect and information share before an 
operation begins. Exercises and training are considered to be the 
vehicle to interconnect forces. 
NATO/National 
Defence Postures 
2020+ 
Many Western governments are realising that they cannot afford full 
spectrum defence capabilities, deciding instead to collaborate on how 
their 2% of GDP is spent filling NATO gaps. So, UK may provide 
aircraft carrier capabilities to NATO and Denmark could bring Air 
Defence capability (Albright et al., 2010; UK Government, 2010). 
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Reduction in “live 
operations” 
An “operational pause” is predicted following a decade of coalition 
interventions in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Iraq (Vershbow, 2014). 
Nations are highly alerted to losing the cohesiveness and capabilities 
that operations naturally provide and this generates an increasing 
demand for the simulated exercises and training events. The facilitated 
preparedness being a more palatable and affordable than learning 
through real-world experience during live and inherently dangerous 
military operations.  
More visible 
defence posture 
In response to the crisis in Ukraine NATO’s recently formed 
“Readiness Action Plan” (NATO Fact Sheet, 2014) announced at the 
NATO Summit in Wales, adds another dimension to the NATO 
training and exercise overhead. The generation and commissioning of 
NATO’s “Very Rapid Joint Task Force” (VJFT) will depend upon the 
integration of these units into the already established NATO force 
structure. That integration is tested and validated through the training 
and exercise capabilities at the JWC.  
 
Table 1 - JWC Strategic Environment 
Considering all the factors above it was becoming clear to the JWC leaders that we had mission 
changes that would inevitably lead to organisational developments and drive a requirement to 
operate rather differently in light of our revised setting and “transformational” role. 
2.7 The NATO Joint Warfare Centre Organisational Structure 
NATO applies, through the application of C2, standardization and consistency through policies 
and procedures in order to provide manageable coherence and interoperability when 
multinational coalitions are formed. The headquarters (HQs) that manage these coalitions are 
structured into functional groupings known as “divisions” that can be easily recognised by 
other militaries and are compatible across most western militaries. Consequently, most NATO 
nations adopt and abide by the NATO “J” 1structure when composing HQ staffs as can be seen 
in Figure 4 below.  
                                                 
1 “J” refers to “Joint” when “Joint” depicts the presence of all services – Army, Air Force & Navy. 
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Figure 4 – The Standard NATO “J” Structure  
This creates formal functional groupings around hierarchically managed capabilities; 
capabilities that are highly interoperable and effective when deployed on multinational 
operations or running an operational HQ. However, there is a downside to such an approach 
and even within the ranks these functional groupings are commonly referred by the staff as 
“operational stovepipes” or “cylinders of excellence”. These groupings are rigidly bound 
functionally and protected passionately by their divisional heads who resist any attempts to 
reduce their internally focused capacity or mess with their “chain of command”. Consequently, 
and as often reported within the staff surveys I ran, these structures are far less effective when 
capabilities need to be drawn from across these formal boundaries in order to have the 
appropriate subject matter expertise (SME) come together in order to deliver training and 
exercises. Ironically exactly the way in which the JWC operates most of the time when 
delivering exercise and training output.  
Another complicating factor is the manning of SME roles where, due to the vagaries of national 
posting and manning paradigms, general staff officers may be placed into a role described as 
an “SME” but in reality, they could have no real “expertise” and occasionally very little 
knowledge to rely upon. They typically learn on the way and they may be required to train 
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personnel who have considerably more expertise in a subject area that they have. That requires 
a degree of humility and vulnerability and these traits can be interpreted as weaknesses in a 
military context.  
2.8 Introducing the Problem and Opportunity 
I first became aware of the importance of organisational culture and leadership as I progressed 
through the University of Liverpool’s DBA programme and already in 2011 and sometime 
before my decision to research leadership and culture, I was taking the opportunity with small 
groups to use my DBA learning as a catalyst for discussions on our organisational 
effectiveness. Using knowledge created especially through the Leadership, Crisis Management 
and Ethics modules of the DBA programme and well as countless hours reading business and 
leadership “best sellers” and HBR reviews, I developed, and then sought permission to run, 
small team surveys assessing a number of themes that had been identified through academic 
publications as being associated with high performing organisations. Denison et al., (2014: 
158) offer that organisational surveys “support the practical objectives of organisational 
development and change by serving as a means of feedback and benchmarking”.  
I prepared an early version of a questionnaire that was used four times with different groups, 
from different parts of the organisation, working at various grades and with various functions. 
The grouping was random and all had volunteered to take part in the survey that was 
administered anonymously through a “Survey Monkey” link. The responses were numerically 
analysed through a “Likert” scaled response with results averaged across the range of the 
themes. A raw snapshot of our organisation, as seen through the eyes of randomly selected 
recipients, provided a trigger for a deeper conversation of relevance and engagement. These 
can be seen below along with the sources of the questions, many of them directly taken from 
mandated readings within the DBA program. 
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Table 2 – Initial Organisational Culture Themes 
Over a period of several months I asked these groups of staff questions about what they 
expected to experience in an effective organisational culture for JWC and whether we were 
doing well compared to those themes. I also asked open questions to enable written descriptions 
of what else would they want to experience. The analysis of these surveys provided me with a 
great deal to ponder on, for example: 
• despite these groups being randomly put together, there was consistency in the 
groups regarding how we were doing against certain themes 
• other themes were consistently revealed in the discussions as being important  
It seemed that despite the surveys being relatively simple in both design and analysis, 
something curious and consistent was at play. Despite major staff turnovers and evolving 
missions; the responses when analysed were assessed as low in some areas and high in others, 
consistently over and over again. We had, it seemed, stumbled across an organisational 
phenomenon that presented us with the possibility to develop and to do so with our 
Trait Organisational Culture Developing Question
Literary 
Reference
Organisational “oneness” In the JWC we  have a clear and shared understanding of what we do.
Brief et 
al.,1996
Relationships In the JWC we  have good interpersonal relationships. Chan, 2002
Communications In the JWC we   have effective communications channels.
Andriopoulos 
et al., 2008
Trust In the JWC we  trust and are trusted.
Bijlsma-
Frankema, 
2001
Commitment In the JWC we are committed to completing  our tasks.
Blanchard,  
2010
Recognition In the JWC people are recocognised for their efforts.
Senn & Hart, 
2006
Support In the JWC we have the support of our managers and peers.
Hu & Hang, 
2007
Credibility In the JWC we the managers and peers walk the talk.
Senn & Hart, 
2006
Accountability
In the JWC people raise there hand to help, even if it is not their specific 
role.
Heskett, 
2011
Respect In the JWC people are respectful and tolerant. Kline, 1999
Flexibility In the JWC we are agile and adapt quickly to new challenges.
Hallinger, 
2010
Learning In the JWC we are always on the look out to make improvements.
Harris & 
Ogbonna, 
2011
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transformational mission in mind. I presented these findings to the Commander, and with his 
encouragement, the senior leaders (the JWC Command Group), collectively (but not 
unanimously) decided that this was something they wanted to know more about and, critically, 
do something about. What to do about it was not initially easy to determine; some leaders felt 
that we should not even have asked the questions, others expressed scepticism of the subject 
and the protagonist, others were worried about the additional workload dealing with this would 
bring. I felt that we had the ability internally to develop improvement plans that would aim to 
address our organisational culture development and said as much during a meeting to determine 
the way ahead. In the end though the Commander decided that something was going to be done 
and given the sensitivities involved he determined that we could not manage this change 
internally, as the results needed to be seen as being objective and not tainted by being managed 
by an individual or from a specific area within the organisation. There was also doubt within 
the Commander’s mind that the results showing our lower scoring attributes were complete or 
accurate. The Commander reflected and also stated that he did not want to take the risk of 
senior leaders not taking this effort seriously and also pointed out that we were not able to 
“benchmark” or compare our organisational culture with other international organisations. For 
these reasons, he decided that we would contract an organisational culture consultancy 
company to make an assessment through an all staff survey and to analyse the organisational 
culture of the JWC and to compare that with other multinational entities that had embarked 
upon organisational culture change. To prepare the staff for an organisational survey the 
Commander asked me to write an article for the JWC Magazine in order to start to communicate 
the value of an effective organisational culture and this was first published in JWC and then 
reprinted upon request (Hargreaves, 2012). The article was a summary of relevant academic 
papers researched through the DBA “taught” modules, these papers provided the inspiration, 
catalyst and motivation for the article, and the leadership’s decision to engage with an external 
consultant specialising in organisational culture to prepare and expedite a JWC wide survey.  
The consultancy analysis was achieved through a whole staff survey that involved 
measurement, analysis and recommendations regarding the “fit” of our culture to our stated 
vision and strategy. The survey was anonymous and generated a response rate was over 65%. 
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The results of this survey can be seen below in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 – The 2013 JWC Organisational Culture Survey Results  
These results created a great deal of interest and eventually led to a two-day Organisational 
Culture Awareness Workshop for the leadership which in turn generated a short comprehensive 
programme aimed at raising the awareness of organisational culture generally. The 
organisational culture awareness programme baselined where we were across certain themes 
and through the delivery of the awareness workshops involving cross-sections of the whole 
organisation, the leaders determined to engage with some of the lower scoring themes that the 
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leaders felt were important in order to improve and be better able to support and expedite our 
mission.  
It was also during one of the JWC leadership off sites (Kucukaksoy, 2013) that it became 
evident that the senior leaders considered the organisation and leadership of the JWC 
consistently differently to the way in which many of the members within the organisation 
experienced it. This realisation that there was a gap between how the leadership see the 
organisation and how the other vast majority of the organisation sees it presented a critical 
moment; we had arrived at a fundamental milestone moving us from incubation to precipitation 
(Turner, 1976), an organisational awakening where the leadership became aware that all was 
not as they had imagined, and we now had to decide whether these findings and subsequent 
reflection would provide sufficient momentum to move us to action. It was clear from a number 
of workshops and discussions forums that taking action was not a foregone conclusion, some 
of the leaders were simply denying the results, to others the “so what” was not compelling 
enough but fortunately there was enough desire in the Commander and Chief of Staff to move 
to action.  
During this workshop leaders were also asked to commit and take responsibility for the 
organisation’s culture, they were advised by the Commander that leaders have a significant 
role to play in at least feedback, coaching, being valued and appreciated, for modelling change 
and demonstrating accountability; at least this is what was espoused at senior leadership 
meetings. The Commander asked the leaders to consider what values would our organisation 
have if was to become even more effective and even more aligned with the transformational 
mission. Through a long process, they came up with the JWC Values (Kucukaksoy, 2013); 
values the Commander reminded the leaders that it was their role to “live these values”. During 
this period the JWC created our own organisational values and a new motif that can be seen on 
the upper right of Figure 6 (see Appendix D), this will be discussed later in the thesis. In Figure 
6 you can see the results of the second survey that was taken twelve months later as the 
organisational culture awareness programme was underway.  
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Figure 6 - The 2013/2014 JWC Organisational Culture Survey Results  
I was asked to make my own analysis and make recommendations to the leaders on what to do 
next. The first thing I noticed, reinforcing my own results introduced earlier, was that in spite 
of a 40% turnover of staff during the period between the surveys the general profile was 
remarkably similar. There was a good degree of consistency supporting the view that 
organisations appear to have “personality” type characteristics (Martins and Terblanche, 2003) 
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and that they can be stable enough to be taken seriously as an organisational attribute in the 
same way as structures and missions are (Senn and Hart, 2006).  
The consultancy survey confirmed the presence (or lack of) three of my own and introduced 
two other lower scoring themes - these can be seen clearly in Figures 5 and 6. Feedback from 
the staff survey then identified the following organisational themes as areas for improvement:  
• Feedback and coaching 
• Our ability to change 
• High performance expected but not recognised 
• A feeling of being unappreciated/not valued 
• A lack of accountability 
The Commander’s initial reaction was to encourage me to try to do something about them all, 
across and through the organisation. Conversely, I was aware through my DBA reading, that 
selecting only one or two organisational themes to focus on would be more effective than trying 
to tackle everything at once (Schein, 2010). The organisational culture stream of this 
development involved several workshops (Kucukaksoy, 2013), all staff awareness sessions and 
another article for the JWC Magazine on “The Language of Leadership” (Hargreaves, 2014). 
It also created an organisational culture awareness programme that was provided to all staff 
through a number of facilitated workshops (Kucukaksoy, 2013). It was through this 
organisational culture awareness programme that I decided to observe leadership informed by 
my learning through the DBA and supplemented by my own research to try and identify and 
analyse organisational culture themes that were important for our joint multinational military 
organisation. I looked closely at the themes and inferred from them that most of the lower 
scoring were profoundly related to how we leadership is performed within our organisation.  
2.9 The Contextual Summary  
The NATO JWC is part of a strategic command that has “transformation” not only in its title 
but as its focus. Transformation focused upon adapting to an ever-changing geo-political 
context whilst the operational commands try to deal with the here and now. It is more than 14 
years since the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) was formed; a time before the ISAF mission 
(International Stabilisation Afghanistan), before the NRF (NATO Response Force) was 
conceived and long before the recent events in eastern Europe transpired to drive us to be even 
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more inclusive and comprehensive in our approach to NATO missions 2 (Meijer, 2012). 
Comprehensive approaches are in military terms predicated upon the assumption that 
successful military interventions are increasingly dependent upon a “hearts and minds” 
approach delivered through “the right combination of hard and soft power” (Baumann, 2008). 
Findings from detailed analysis of why international stabilisation efforts struggle to deliver 
effective results were attributed to an inability to “integrate an understanding of cultural 
differences” (Ibid.: 72). 
My practice is not situated in an operational command about to deploy into harm’s way, it is a 
unique entity that resides somewhere between a school, a diagnostic centre, a formal military 
training entity and an experimentation and concept development centre. It is an organisation 
that would struggle with the organisational rigidity that a “J” structure environment actually 
perpetuates (see Figure 4), we embarked upon an organisational redesign that will be a radical 
departure from a traditional military structure. At the same time, Nations are insisting on a 
“zero growth” policy meaning that despite the changing strategic environment our 
establishment manning is not going to change, the staff numbers we have now within the centre 
will not increase, in spite of the increasing workload driven by the external factors shown in 
Table 1. NATO policies and procedures will not allow us to adapt the rules and formal 
practices, what Farr et al. (1997) refer to as the “climate”, to streamline or bypass often 
bureaucratic routines. It encourages the JWC then to look carefully for any areas that might 
provide us with an organisational benefit and respond to the calls for increasing 
comprehensiveness. Two organisational surveys involving over 65% of the staff repeated in 
2013 and 2014 showed areas for improvement and identified low scoring areas. This provided 
me with a research backdrop from which to commence my study of my organisation as we 
embarked upon better aligning our organisation.  
Within the story in Chapter 5, I describe how I supported and at the same time researched my 
organisation and the leaders within it. I explain how the NATO JWC embarked upon a major 
shift in strategy (based upon a shifting mission for our centre), structure (in order to respond to 
the new operational and training environment we find ourselves in) and our organisational 
culture (as informed through organisational surveys I prepared as a consequence of my DBA 
                                                 
2 For example, the ISAF mission involved 42 Nations that made up the governmental organisations (GO’s) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) framework into which NATO had to operate. Some NGOs (e.g. Red 
Cross, Doctors without Borders etc) would not collaborate with people in military uniform, let alone be considered 
as part of a formal C2 environment.  
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study). “Effective organisational change occurs when new climates and cultures are created 
and maintained” claims Schneider et al. (1996:18). I look specifically at the organisation and 
leaders to try and understand “did the way in which leadership is practised change in some 
way as a consequence of the organisational culture awareness activities”. and as the answer 
to this question became clear I developed authentic leadership development interventions that 
have been used within my practice and also utilised in other NATO settings as well. 
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Chapter 3 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Within this Chapter, I lay out the literature in terms of two distinct but overlapping and 
interdependent phases of research, contemplation, action and reflection. The first phase looking 
into research associated with multinational military culture and leadership and the second, 
driven by the findings from the first research and action phase, leading into an analysis of the 
literature around authentic leadership and how it may be developed. I review, reflect and, where 
appropriate for my setting, critique the relevant literature in order to be able to learn and apply 
new contextual knowledge and perform contextual research specifically for my practice. The 
literature review is therefore written up based on these two clear phases even though there were 
many minor iterations when I needed to locate or rereview research literature throughout the 
thesis period. Consequently, and where applicable, some literature is also introduced and 
reviewed with the rest of the thesis where it made sense to do so.  
My initial literature research through Phase 1 was focussed on gaining a better understanding 
of my organisation in terms of its organisational culture and its relationship to leadership in a 
multinational military setting. As mentioned briefly in the introduction and context chapters, 
my “transformational” organisational setting is undergoing significant organisational change 
and is yet heavily influenced, perhaps even characterised by C2, which rather ironically 
encourages stability and resistance to deviations (Merton: 1940). McChrystal (2015: 36) as 
former 4* General states that “Standardization and uniformity have enabled military leaders 
and planners to bring a semblance of predictability and order to the otherwise crazy 
environment that is war.” 
I describe how C2 pertains to my practice in terms of how leadership is enacted and bring 
together the literature on organisational culture and leadership before focussing on authentic 
leadership development. I study how leadership is, or could be, more effective for my 
organisation, looking specifically through the lens of organisational culture as part of the 
organisational construct undergoing change. Whilst the efficacy of culture surveys may be 
considered by some to be unconvincing they do offer an indicator or a snapshot of some 
attributes of an organisation at some point in time; if they are helpful for nothing else they do 
raise an organisations awareness and create an impetus for collective internal reflection 
(Denison et al., 2014). Within the thesis, I reach into the domain of academic research, research 
that is sometimes difficult to translate into something useful for everyday managers (Bartunek 
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et al., 2006) and I also refer occasionally to popular management books. Sparrowe (2005:436) 
claims that corporate leaders’ biographies filling the shelves of bookstores “are the bane of 
academic leadership researchers” and yet, whilst there may be little in terms of rigorous 
analysis in these books, they remain popular for a reason and many have been able to translate, 
into simple practical terms, what academia has been creating.  
Through my research, I become increasingly convinced that organisations that take a holistic 
approach to organisational development looking at the mission, the structure, the organisational 
climate and the organisational culture simultaneously are likely to be more successful than 
those that do not (Labovitz and Rosansky, 1997; Novak, 2012; Senn and Hart, 2006). When 
organisations are able to consider these organisational constructs collectively and evolve them 
synergistically, it is said that these organisations are moving towards greater alignment 
(Andriopoulos et al., 2008; Farr et al., 1997; Lobovitz and Rosansky, 1997). Alignment in this 
case representing a conscious decision to ensure coherence between organisational constructs 
so that the mission is not impeded by the organisational structure, neither by the climate nor by 
the organisational culture. It is claimed that organisations that have alignment along strategy, 
structure and culture are more effective than those that do not (Lobovitz and Rosansky, 1997). 
Misalignment of the culture, or what Cameron and Quinn (2011) call “cultural incongruence” 
is said to drain the energy and focus of the organisation.  
3.1 Informing the first AR cycle – culture and leadership. 
The literature review themes are shown below and whilst this reflects the initial research focus, 
it does not represent the chronology, that being highly cyclical and iterative. The themes 
covered by the research can be grouped together within two phases:  
Phase 1 
• Command and Control 
• Their influences upon Organisational Culture 
• And their relationships with Leadership  
 
As Phase 1 completed I performed interviews and analysis, reflected upon the results and tried 
to make sense of the emergent themes and through this, a new more pervasive organisational 
phenomenon emerged. This is disclosed and discussed more fully in Chapter 5 as it informed 
the direction my next major action research cycle and literature review took through Phase 2:  
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Phase 2 
• Leadership “Say/Do” Gap 
• Authentic Leadership  
• Authentic Leadership Development 
3.1.1 Command and Control (C2) Influence 
It would be naïve, maybe even negligent, to consider leadership and organisational culture 
within a military context without exploring the literature around C2; an organisational 
phenomenon that is profoundly prevalent and pervasive in military organisations (Krulak: 
1996). As pervasive as C2 is within military organisations, and as clear in its intent as it may 
be for the Marine Corps (Ibid), to many within the ranks, it is said that it remains insufficiently 
defined nor is it properly understood (Oprean, 2012: 117) and it is consequently subject to a 
host of interpretations and meanings. Schein (2010: ix) makes the point that C2 “has become a 
cultural archetype even as clear descriptions of just what this means have become more elusive 
when we observe organisations carefully”. Howieson and Kahn (2002 citing Moll, 1978) build 
upon this pointing out “One of the least controversial things that can be said about command 
and control is that it is poorly understood and subject to wildly different interpretation” and 
this may indeed be impacting the organisational culture and leadership in a way that invokes 
unhelpful side effects for military organisations who espouse the desire to change.  
Providing a categorical definition of C2 then appears to be a challenge given the wide set of 
definitions that exist (Howieson and Kahn, 2002; Schein, 2010) but for the sake of my research 
I opted to frame C2 based upon three definitions that were specifically associated with military 
contexts:  
Eriksson and Leifler (2010: 158) define C2 as:  
“describing what people commanding others do: directing the work of 
subordinate units and coordinating their efforts toward a common goal 
(command) making sure that orders are carried out monitoring outcomes 
of all actions (control)”  
and Meijer (2012: 3) as: 
“the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission”  
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and Elkins (1998: 2) as: 
“C2, often thought of as a single element is actually two separate processes. 
Subtle in their differences, command is the authority and responsibility to 
give direction to and be responsible for the actions of others. Control is the 
ability to influence the outcome of individual or group actions. In the 
military, command and then control go together as hand and glove.” 
C2 is implemented in NATO, and thereby across the militaries of the NATO nations, to enforce 
standardisation and consistency in order to encourage conformity within NATO militaries 
(McChrystal: 2015). C2 attempts to deliver predictability so that NATO does not appear as a 
collection of individual militaries, but rather one where forces are connected, interoperable and 
operating under a consistent unity of command (Lindley-French, 2012). C2 emphasises 
leadership as characterised by rank, compliance and coercion; transactional tendencies 
sometimes described as “hard” leadership (Redmond et al., 2015). Schein (2010) describes 
military entities as essentially coercive organisations, organisations that are essentially founded 
upon “commands from high” (Groysberg and Slind, 2012: 80). C2 environments are said to be 
the domain of “authoritarianism” and of “hard power” (Grint: 14).  
Redmond et al. (2015: 13) identify militaries as working within a context where “seniority 
within the military requires obedience and subordinance” and they go on to reinforce that the 
concept of subordination is an essential characteristic for military operations. Military C2 exists 
in order to “attain a high degree of reliability of behaviour, an unusual degree of conformity 
with prescribed patterns of action.” (Merton, 1940: 562). Highly effective for the battlefield, 
but perhaps “an unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formalised procedures” 
(Ibid: 563) is not fuelling transformation, but rather getting in the way. It is claimed that up to 
the 1960s management theories and practice was attuned to the creation of hierarchical 
bureaucracies. These organisations were based upon uniformity, stability, repeatability, where 
“Clear lines of decision-making authority, standardised rules and procedures, and control and 
accountability mechanisms were valued as the keys to success.” Cameron and Quinn (2011). 
Yet few twenty-first century organisations consider “constancy, sameness, or status quo” (Ibid) 
as an organisational enabler. On the contrary, in the “white water” environment where leaders 
now ply their trade, transformation has become the norm (Antonacopoulou and Bento, 2004). 
Jackson and Parry (2010:75) state that “The increasing globalization of trade, finance, 
production and consumption presents a complex array of business challenges and opportunities 
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that require an unprecedented level of intercultural competence and understanding.” Few 
would argue that it is not the role of the military to ensure that they keep up with society as it 
becomes ever more complex, interconnected and multicultural.  
The Sandhurst leadership guide (UK MOD, 2014: 6) states that Command has legal status “as 
the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of 
military forces” it goes on to say that “Unlike command, the power of leadership is not 
established through military law and vested authority rather, leadership achieves ends 
by ‘example, persuasion and compulsion. It is dynamic and inspirational.” (Ibid: 6). It is 
also starting to sound much more “leaderful” (Raelin, 2003), pluralistic and empowering 
(Abrashoff, 2002; Manz and Sims, 1991; Novak; 2012).  
3.1.2 C2’s Pervasiveness and Power 
C2 then is not just a noun, a passive descriptor of a leadership system or management paradigm, 
it is also a verb, people “perform” C2; consequently, it influences to a large extent how leaders 
lead. It shows up over and over again with some leaders so dependent upon it that they claim 
C2 is bigger than the organisation. The Commandant of the US Marine Corps in his doctrinal 
publication states that “Organisation is an important tool of command and control” (Krulak: 
1996, 87) and goes on to purport that C2 “is essential to survival and success in any competitive 
or cooperative enterprise. Command and control is a fundamental requirement for life and 
growth, survival and success for any system” (Ibid: 36). In the military, it is very clear that C2 
is a way of life.  
Looking again as the C2 definition Eriksson and Leifler (2010: 158) the link between leadership 
and management as practised in the military and C2 is evident:  
“Describing what people commanding others do: directing the 
work of subordinate units and coordinating their efforts toward 
a common goal (command) making sure that orders are carried 
out monitoring outcomes of all actions (control)”  
A military organisation can be described as “a coercive hierarchy”, reinforced through 
elaborate rules, rituals and power classifications (Redmond et al., 2015: 13) where high power 
distances can be reinforced authoritatively (Schein, 2010: 164), commanded and controlled. 
Gerras et al. (2008: 21) make the point that “of all the Army’s underlying cultural assumptions, 
the one that is most misaligned with the contemporary environment is “power distance”. 
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(Hofstede: 1980). It will also, he claims, be very difficult to change since a highly controlled, 
regimented organisation trying to adapt and change creates real tensions for leadership (Cadle 
et al., 2004; March, 2008). 
Hofstede’s (1980) definition of “power distance” can be summarised as the range of the delta 
that any society or organisation accepts between those at the top and those at the bottom of that 
organisation or society. In organisations with a high-power distance, authoritarian leadership 
and a more autocratic decision-making process are more likely to be accepted and expected. In 
lower power distance organisations members would anticipate more autonomy and expect to 
have a more input, more participation and room for manoeuvre. Considering explanations like 
these there can be little doubt that military commands operate as high-power distance entities.  
3.1.3 Criticisms of C2 
Despite some of the obvious military advantages of C2 and the pervasiveness and resilience of 
C2 organisations generally (Lindley-French; 2012), there seems to be a price to pay for this 
approach. It is not without criticism and some academic researchers and military scholars have 
been more critical of the cultures and leadership paradigms found within typical military 
organisations. Jackson and Parry (2010: 61) offer the view that hierarchical C2 based 
organisations are not as effective as flatter cross-functional and networked organisations. A 
challenge reiterated by Van der Voet (2014: 386) who informs that typically within public 
sector organisations, like defence, that “a high degree of formalization can also be expected to 
impede processes of adaptation and learning”. An increasing amount of academic and practice-
based literature predicts, if not C2’s demise, its fall from grace (Abrashoff, 2002; Manz and 
Sims, 1991; Novak; 2012; Raelin, 2003) yet it appears to be alive and well and particularly 
resistant to change in NATO. Hardly surprising since C2 based organisations are designed to 
be highly robust and consequently hard to influence (Cadle et al., 2004; March, 2008). This 
makes it a real challenge to get a military organisation to what Lewin (1947) describes as an 
“unfrozen” stage (Quinn and Weick, 1999), ready to consider how leadership is done today, 
based inevitably on yesterday, might not be the most effective leadership for tomorrow.  
Oprean (2012: 117) states that “C2 undoubtedly reflects the essence and nature of every military 
system”. C2 profoundly influences the “rules of interaction and interpretation” (Kalou and 
Sadler-Smith, 2015: 12), in particular in how one might consider who speaks first, for how 
long, the approach to turn taking, organisational silence (Morrison and Milliken, 2000) and the 
potential to interrupt. Within a C2 environment lower down the “chain of command” that you 
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are, the more likely it is that you would have the opportunity to practice speaking last, being 
silent and dealing with interruptions rather than daring to make any. Leadership has the ability 
to challenge this, to include somehow the voices of all in order to enrich the sense within the 
organisation often limited through the “suppression of alternative meanings” (McClellan, 
2011: 470). Leadership has the power to be able to manipulate, marginalisation or stifle 
altogether the voices of the followers (Grant and Hardy, 2004: 7). The Australian Army wanted 
to do something about the suppression of alternatives meanings and introduced “anecdotal 
circles” (O’Toole et al., 2008) as a process to try and enable people used to keeping quiet to 
speak up and be heard, it was an attempt to deal with “an organisational need to encourage 
flexibility and adaptability at all levels” (Ibid.: 29). 
3.1.4 Alternatives to C2 
The military is certainly not immune to the effect of this evolving leadership context but 
existing research suggests that traditional military leadership and management thinking is 
overdue a transformation (Alberts and Hayes; 2006; Cebrowski and Garstka, 2004). Military 
C2 hardware and the omnipresent eyes of the networked connected world means that C2 
methods of old are rapidly being discovered lacking. Challenges that are thought to be 
redefining how militaries operate as technology enables the potential for decision making at 
much lower levels than previously possible (Alberts and Hayes, 2003) and this factor needs to 
be considered in the way that leadership is enacted. Abrashoff, (2002:104), himself a senior 
military man at the time, makes the point when stating the C2 approach “is far from the most 
efficient way to tap people’s intelligence and skills” and goes on to claim that, in his experience 
in transforming the culture on board the USS Benfold, controlling less led to him being able to 
lead more. Interestingly modern military doctrine, taught to perspective new military leaders 
takes this into account (Various, 2012:60) indicting that “If you lead well, you will not need 
your rank.”. Leading well is something that all military organisations would like to claim as a 
core attribute.  
There are a few examples where, in spite of C2’s pervasiveness and resilience to change, some 
military entities who appear to have been able to evolve their understanding of C2 as Curts and 
Campbell (2006: 15) report a transition in definition of C2 related to military operations in Iraq 
from a “Command and Control – Command and Collaborate” mindset. “Command” according 
to Grint (2008) being more appropriately applied to “critical” problems, problems that imply 
short timeframes between decision making and action (Ibid: 13) making standardised processes 
and planning stages that leave little room for uncertainty; yet transformation is all about the 
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exploration of uncertainty, of pushing the boundaries of what was previously known in order 
to evolve. Denning (2007: 217) illuminates the issue when he states that “Leadership, the 
ability to connect people to meaningful goals without hierarchical power to compel 
compliance, will become a requirement for organisational survival”. Gerras et al. (2008: 16) 
claim that the US Army “will fail to be a high-performance organisation in the twenty-first 
century if leaders fail to encourage thoughtful dissent”, and many young leaders are more than 
ever ready for a change (Danahy, 2017).  
It seems somewhat ironic, that when very many military leaders reach the “top” of their 
profession, they often espouse the values of modern, pluralistic and inclusive leadership and 
appear to distance themselves from the behaviours of middle level leaders still grappling with 
the C2 mindset (Dempsey: 2013; McChrystal: 2011, 2014; Myers: 2012; Powell: 2011; Welsh: 
2013). Although one might be sceptical about just how sincere, how authentic, they are being; 
as Chisholm (2012: 9) points out “The contemporary military pays considerable lip service to 
initiative and discretion, but in practice afford subordinate officers relatively little such”, 
hinting at an organisational phenomenon of authenticity that emerged through my research and 
which I will come back to in detail within the thesis. Sparrowe (2005: 419) claims that a lack 
of authenticity is close to the “heart of the crisis in contemporary corporate leadership”. 
Hofstede et al. (2010: 332) warn that “leadership theories that do not take collective 
expectations of subordinates into account are basically dysfunctional” and this “bottom-up” 
influence is often discussed but rarely seen, its talked about but not implemented. Interestingly 
Hofstede et al. (2010: xx) claim that it is not untypical that when “foreign theories are taught 
to leaders they are often ‘preached but not practised’” reaffirming Chisholm’s (2012) view that 
the talk is all too often not translated into the walk.  
3.1.5 National and Service Influences 
Clearly military understanding of C2 impacts leadership profoundly but there are also other 
significant influences that make their presence felt. Two powerful influences are continuously 
at play in any joint multinational military organisation; those being nationality based, 
influences from the leader’s place of origin, and service based, influences that came from what 
these leaders experienced within their specific military history.  
3.1.5.1  National Influences Upon Leadership and Organisational Culture  
Demographic factors and national preferences have a profound influence on people in the 
workplace; impacting the norms around speaking out or the ability to challenge the leadership, 
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the latitude to act autonomously or offer alternative views (European Values Study, 2004). Lok 
and Crawford (2003: 334) found that “national culture can produce statistically significant 
moderating effects” on any outcomes. The European Values Study (2014) is a useful resource 
indicating differences across a range of aspects. It is a cross-national, longitudinal survey that 
provides insights into the beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over 
Europe. It is a unique research project on how Europeans think about, inter alia, work, politics 
and society in general. For example, considering only the relationship between work and free 
time across many of the NATO countries the study reveals fundamental differences. Figure 7 
below is taken from the 2004 European Values Study and reveals differences that are typical 
across a number of organisational themes. The study also reveals that how people think about 
leadership, what they do and say are heavily influenced by where they came from well before 
we start to consider the military context.  
 
Figure 7 - Extract from a 2004 European Values Study 
In another example from the 2004 European values study people were asked about 
empowerment in terms of decision making and as can be seen in Figure 8 the analysis revealed 
significant differences within the general populations of those countries.  
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Figure 8 - Extract from a 2004 European Values Study 
It is from many of those countries that NATO attracts its personnel and despite many years of 
increased European integration significant differences exist that influence how people expect 
to be led and how to think about and therefore behave in the work environment. This foundation 
is the basis from which, as young men and women in uniform, their continuing experiential 
development occurs. Development that is now further reinforced as they experience their own 
national flavour of an interpretation of C2 within their military’s. (Romie and Lapadus, 2004).  
It is not surprising then that by the time these leaders and managers occupy a NATO position, 
their understanding of “how to be” within a multinational organisation is to some extent already 
determined. So even though NATO strives for standardization through policy and procedures 
(Davis, 2009) the reality is that narrower national or service contexts can lead to very different 
approaches within organisations. In an operational setting, these differing approaches are 
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sometimes called “caveats”3 and these caveats are clear examples of national influences at 
work. Auerswald and Saideman (2012) in their assessment of how national caveats impact 
military operations make the case that international military operations are influenced by a 
nation’s political/military history.  
Awareness in a NATO environment of the impact of these national cultures is learned largely 
through experiences, sometimes frustrating and time-consuming events where leaders slowly 
realise that how leadership was enacted in their own historically and demographical bounded 
contexts does not work so effectively in NATO. Jackson and Parry (2010: 75) indicate that, 
when considering national cultures influence on leadership that multinational leaders must be 
ever cognizant to “the moderating effect that culture can have on leadership processes.” It 
encourages multinational leaders then to think carefully about their leadership approach and 
creates the need to be intentional about the own organisation’s culture. For as Schein (2010: 
22) puts it, “The bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become conscious of the cultures 
in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them.” Being managed by your 
organisation’s culture doesn’t appear to be within the frameworks that military leaders operate 
under and seems to be at odds with the philosophy of command and control.  
3.1.5.2  Service Influences Upon Leadership and Organisational Culture  
The moderating effects of national influences upon joint military organisations are not the only 
ones affecting organisational behaviours since even the individual services (Navy, Marines, 
Army and Air Force) have their own histories that have shaped their leadership, cultures and 
behaviours. A “joint” command is a command where the Navy, Marines, Army, Airforce and 
increasingly very many civilians are merged into a “joint” organisation. At a recent military 
leadership seminar, I was introduced to the following light-hearted explanation regarding 
challenges in operating “jointly” (across the services): 
“One reason the Military Services have trouble operating jointly is that 
they don't speak the same language.  
For example, if you told Navy personnel to "secure a building," they 
would turn off the lights and lock the doors. The Army would occupy 
the building so no one could enter. Marines would assault the building, 
                                                 
3 Caveats are the rules and procedures which Nation’s decide unilaterally for their personnel 
when they are operating under a NATO mission or within a NATO command. 
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capture it, and defend it with suppressive fire and close combat. The 
Air Force, on the other hand, would take out a three-year lease with an 
option to buy.” 
Single service cultures reinforce the risk of organisational stove piping whereby “exaggerated 
unit loyalty and identity can result in disrespect for, and isolation from, others military units” 
(Davis, 2009: 49). Davis provides a practical example when describing the challenges in trying 
to integrate Canadian single services into joint services culminating in what senior officers 
referred to as “a decade of darkness” where morale and confidence were at an unprecedented 
low ebb (Ibid: 76). “Strong single service cultures do exist” claims Davis (Ibid: 48) and she 
makes the point that they can impede transformation, ironically an important feature of a 
“transformational” command like the JWC.  
3.1.6 Why Research Organisational Culture? 
In additional to the influences of national culture and service type upon leadership, 
organisations are also said to have cultures of their own and it is said that one of the major 
features distinguishing leadership from management is a concern for the organisation’s culture 
(Schein, 2010: 195). Schein (2010: 3) offers that organisational culture and leadership could 
be considered to be “two sides of the same coin” and goes on to remark that “Organisational 
culture is ultimately created, embedded, evolved, and ultimately manipulated by leaders.”. The 
dynamic process of organisational culture creation, sustainment and evolution are “the essence 
of leadership” (Ibid). 
More than 20 years ago Schein (1996) offered that too little research attention had been given 
to understanding how culture impacted the functioning of organisations. It seems that this 
charge may now be somewhat dated as research and practice have raised the profile of 
organisational cultures academically and practically. Dauber et al., (2012) report that 
organisational culture is “recognised as an essential influential factor in analysing organisations 
in various contexts” (Ibid: 1). Cameron and Quinn, (2011: 307) make the point that “Most 
organisational scholars and observers now recognize that organisational culture has a powerful 
effect on the performance and long-term effectiveness of organisations.”. For good or bad 
organisational culture is now considered to have a significant impact on how an organisation 
fairs, and what the organisation focusses on. Gardner et al. (2005: 344) bring our attention to 
the “recent ethical meltdowns by leaders of a host of Fortune 500 companies” and increasingly 
it is not the strategy, the structures, nor even the policies that end up being highlighted as having 
failed, but rather the culture prevalent within the organisation (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). A 
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view supported by George and Sims (2007) where they express that the last decade has been 
one characterised with failures for multinational organisations who, once the analysis was 
completed, blamed much of the outcome on inappropriate leadership and organisational 
cultures; examples include BP, ENRON, the IOC and more recently FIFA and VW (Örtenblad 
et al., 2016). Indeed Cameron and Quinn (2011: 229) claim that culture may be attributed to as 
much as 75% of failed organisational change efforts. Several studies reported that the most 
frequently cited reason given for failure was a neglect of the organisation’s culture. In other 
words, failure to change the organisation’s culture doomed to failure the other kinds of 
organisational changes that were initiated (Ibid.). With some organisational culture issues being 
touted as creating problems serious enough that the survival of the organisation was even 
threatened (Cameron, 1997). 
3.1.7 Organisational Culture 
Despite an apparent surge in interest from practitioners and academics alike, there is little 
agreement on how we might conceptualise the phenomenon of organisational culture (Jung at 
al., 2009: 1087). According to Cameron and Quinn (2011: 499) more than 150 interpretations 
of culture already existed in the early 50’s. Parmelli et al., (2011: 1) characterise organisational 
culture as an “anthropological metaphor” hinting at how challenging it might be to define 
uncontestably this phenomenon. Challenges in defining organisational culture creates 
difficulties for researchers, the organisational culture field is recognised as being a complex 
and volatile subject to research and even seasoned academics consider it to be challenging to 
study organisational culture systematically (Schein, 2010). This often leads to studies in this 
field being performed interpretively which in itself brings challenges and risks for the 
researcher. Organisational culture is a metaphorical phenomenon that directly or indirectly 
affects all other organisational constructs (Dauber et al.: 2012; Schein: 1985 and Farr et al.: 
1997). Mumby (2011: 1156) for example informs that “any interpretive analysis will essentially 
be partial and incomplete; cultural meaning in systems are infinitely complex and will defy any 
analysts attempt to fully capture them.” 
Time has not helped to clarify what is described as a “complex metaphor” (Meek: 1988; 
Smircich: 1983) although there is some agreement in the literature that organisational culture 
refers to the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, and definitions 
that characterize organisations and their members. Cameron and Quinn (2011) claim that a 
“key ingredient” and the “most powerful factor” in differentiating successful and failed 
companies is the organisations culture (Ibid.: 291). It follows then that culture is both an asset 
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and a liability for as we have seen, culture is a powerful influence on an organisational 
behaviour because the shared beliefs and values to represent basic assumptions and preferences 
that guide such behaviour. Further, the influence of an organisation’s culture is subtle because 
many of these underlying premises remain outside of people’s awareness. Nonetheless, an 
organisation’s culture can provide a “lens through which an organisation can be understood 
and interpreted” (Parmelli et al., 2011:2) and is profoundly related to the organisation’s 
leadership. There is it seems an important coexistent relationship between leadership and 
organisational culture; one end of the spectrum claims that culture is shaped by leadership, 
indeed many believe that an organisation’s culture is tied fundamentally to the founder’s 
purpose exemplified through shared leadership values and beliefs exposed during an 
organisation’s early years (Hofstede et al., 2010). Others do not limit the ability to shape an 
organisation’s culture to only the leaders; Jackson and Parry (2010: 73) claim that many 
academics now recognise that organisational culture is “always in the process of being created, 
not exclusively by leaders but by everybody concerned with the organisation”. Schein (2010: 
3) claims that culture impacts the “here and now” of organisational life as a “coercive 
background structure that influences us in multiple ways.”. Organisational culture is said to 
reflect “the prevailing ideology that people carry inside their heads”. It conveys a sense of 
identity to employees, provides unwritten and often unspoken guidelines for how to get along 
in the organisation, and it helps stabilize the social system that they experience.” (Cameron and 
Quinn, 2011: 514). Culture is constantly re-enacted and created by our interactions with others 
and shaped by our own behaviour (Schien, 2010: 3). 
Organisational culture is said to “epitomise the expressive character of organisation” (Martins 
and Terblanche, 2003: 65) and it represents the organisation’s collective historical values and 
beliefs. Gerras et al., (2008: 2) state that “While military culture is often used effectively as an 
overarching label for the military’s personality, way of thinking, or values, there is little 
literature that defines the term military culture”. Organisational cultures are based upon 
assumptions held by organisational members (Martins and Terblanche, 2003), tested through 
personal experience, that have become propagated sufficiently to inform how the 
organisational members “perceive, think, and feel” their way through organisational life 
(Schein, 1990: 111). Organisational cultures influence how people interact, Schein (2010: 17) 
makes the point that “Culture is pervasive and influences all aspects of how an organisation 
deals with its primary task, its various environments, and its internal operations.”. Yet it is also 
hidden from view (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), its powerful yet subtle effects normally 
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escaping the attention of the people it affects most (Sathe, 1973). Organisational cultures exert 
often unseen influence within the workplace and are considered to be significantly linked to 
“areas such as performance and commitment” (Lok and Crawford, 2003: 323; Kotter and 
Heskett, 1992).  
3.1.8 Organisational Climate and Culture 
Organisational climate and organisational culture are sometimes represented as being one and 
the same thing and there is not always alignment in academic circles regarding the concept of 
climate. There is a growing trend to research climate and culture differently with climate being 
available for research through quantitative methodologies being “comparative and nomothetic” 
in nature. Culture, on the other hand, has traditionally (although not exclusively) been 
researched qualitatively, “contextualised and idiographic” in nature (Denison, 1996: 625). Farr 
et al. (1997) developed a conceptual model (shown in Figure 9 below) that demonstrates 
visually the climate/culture relationship.  
 
 
Figure 9 - Organisational Culture and Climate Conceptual Model (Farr et al., 1997) 
Dauber et al., (2012: 9) relates an organisation’s formal policies and procedures as “strategies”, 
Schein (1985) refers to the same phenomena as “espoused values”, what is written or spoken, 
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and Farr et al. (1997), refers to this as the organisational “climate”. In order to provide a 
conceptual framework and aware that diverse views that exist in the literature I needed to 
identify a conceptual framework that I felt worked for my context. Within the research, I found 
that the most relative approach for considering climate in my organisation is expressed within 
Farr et al.’s definition as supported by Schneider et al. (1996:8) that organisational climates are 
“based on the policies, practices, procedures, and routines that they are subject to”. I also 
wanted to find a conceptual model that offered and understanding of culture and its influence 
upon performance and its relations with other organisational attributes like structures, 
performance and leadership. Here I found that Semler’s (1997) model below encapsulated these 
attributes and the relationship between them. This model appears below as Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10 - Leadership, Structures And Culture Impact On Organisational Output 
(Semler, 1997) 
Another difference that encourages me to decompose culture and climate into separate but 
interrelated phenomena is that the individualised, hidden from view attributes of culture means 
that “organisational culture is a contested reality” (Denison, 1996: 640 citing Jermier, 1991). 
Climate, on the other hand, are represented by tangible artefacts, documents, policies, seating 
arrangements etc. An organisations climate drives the conversations in the corridors, the stories 
that pervade an organisation, it informs the descriptions “that happen to and around employees 
that they are able to describe” (Schneider et al., 1996:12). Organisational cultures on the other 
hand are “informal social structures and collective sense making” capabilities, they are held in 
the minds of organisational members in such way as to “guide behaviour and facilitate shared 
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meaning” (Denison et al., 2014: 146). Schein (2010: 400) offers that organisational cultures 
are learned solutions for understanding and stabilizing our environment and these norms and 
values are related to how things get done in an organisation.  
3.1.9 Studying Leadership and Organisational Culture Health Warnings 
Jackson and Parry (2010: 71) warn against studying leadership and culture together, claiming 
it is akin to “asking for trouble as culture has been defined, debated and disputed to an even 
greater extent than leadership”. Still, despite the obvious warnings regarding empirical 
evidence generation organisational cultures offer intriguing windows from which to view and 
potentially change an organisation; Jung et al (2009: 1087) claim that “organisational culture 
is widely considered to be one of the most significant factors in reforming and modernising 
public administration and service delivery” and the military considers itself a public service. 
Edgar Schein (2010: 363) expresses that leaders more and more need to become managers of 
organisational culture claiming “This need is now greater than ever because globalism and 
information technology are creating a whole new set of cultural challenges”.  
3.1.10 Literature Informed JWC Contextual Model 
At this point, it is worth bringing together the literature and the context to show what the 
literature means in terms of my framing of the investigation. Relating the research context to 
the literature I created a contextual model from which to position how all these organisational 
constructs come together. Informed by Farr et al.’s (1997) model and Semler’s (1997) model 
introduced in the literature along with Denison’s (1996: 640) interpretation of culture and 
climate I develop in the thesis a contextual model that depicts an organisation’s culture as a 
foundational abstract, operating for the most part below the surface of day to day interaction 
but influencing and being influenced by the whole of the organisation. The contextual 
conceptual model attempts to reveal how the different aspects of mission, structure, climate 
and culture come together and create our organisational realities, and consequently the 
environment from which leadership is enacted. Figure 11 is an attempt to visualise this 
contextual model and brings the external forces pressing our post-2014 organisation. It can be 
interpreted in the following manner; the geo-political factors identified in the context 
description create the post-2014 environment for my practice. That post-2014 context 
determines our mission that drives our organisational structures, structures that are also limiting 
the mission if they are not appropriate. This model will be further developed through an 
analysis of NATO JWC specific information within Chapter 5, the story.  
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Figure 11 - JWC Alignment Contextual Model 
 
3.1.11 JWC Environment 
Fiol and Lyles (1985: 804) claim that in order to secure long-term survival “organisations align 
with their environments” in other words the mission of the organisation should be enabled by 
the structure and that structure should be coherent with that mission. The climate and culture 
of the organisation should also be coherent with the mission; for example, an organisation 
whose mission is rapid development might have agile structures; it would value new ideas and 
have a climate where innovation was rewarded and encouraged. Encouraged through policy, 
like some companies (e.g. Google, Hewlett-Packard and 3M) offering days when employees 
can work on anything they like as long as it is shared at the end of the day with the business 
(Pink, 2009). It would have a culture that supported innovation and welcome ideas from all 
levels in the organisation.  
3.1.12 Leadership Defined? 
If organisational culture is somewhat nebulous and difficult phenomenon to define the 
literature on leadership is equally diverse and inconclusive. Leadership appears to be a complex 
construct that has no universally accepted definition, indeed some believe that it is even 
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unhelpful to attempt to try and define it at all (Glazer and Rexrode, 2015). Pye (2005: 32 citing 
Dubrin, 2000) indicated that 35,000 “leadership” definitions already existed in academic 
literature. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995: 220) make the case that despite years of research “and 
thousands of studies” into leadership, there remains a lack of clarity on what it is and how best 
it can be achieved. Avolio et al. (2009: 422) reveal that contemporary leadership research has 
evolved from a focus on individual leaders and their characteristics to a wider perspective 
embracing a spectrum of contextual and follower influences. Leadership has become a much 
broader field of research with both academia and practice expending increasing efforts to 
understanding leadership and its effects within an organisation (Ibid: 423). Increasingly it is 
acknowledged that the historical focus on the “leader” to understand “leadership” is not enough 
and critically context (Blanchard, 2010), followers and their interrelationships (Graen and Uhl-
Bien, 1995: 221) feature as being important factors to be considered by leadership researchers. 
Therefore, instead of trying to defend one or other leadership definition I determined instead 
to look into my organisation and consider what leadership actually does rather than trying to 
describe what it is.  
3.1.13 Leadership Influences Followers 
Most leadership scholars appear to agree with Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995: 225) that “leadership 
is a multifaceted construct involving aspects of the leader, the follower, and the dyadic 
relationship between the two.” So that when one is influential in shaping the behaviour and 
values of others, we think of that as “leadership” and are creating the conditions for new culture 
formation (Schein, 2010: 3).  
Leadership though is not “management on steroids” (Higgs, 2009) and when Higgs reviewed 
“bad” leadership he identified four central themes (Ibid:168): 
• Abusing power in order to hide inadequacies, reinforce self-image or to serve 
personal goals. 
• Bullying, coercion and arbitrary treatment of employees. 
• Limiting employee initiative and over-exercising control. 
• Breaking the rules when it suits them. Not walking the talk. 
Ironically “bad” leadership might be quite tempting for an organisation that has a transactional 
focus since “’bad’ leadership can result in short-term performance success,” (Ibid: 169; citing 
Benson and Hogan, 2008). According to Grint (2008) “bad” leadership is sometimes highly 
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appropriate and is often exactly what is required within C2 environments (see Figure 12). This 
appears especially important for critical situations, ones that are time-bound and un-requiring 
of collaboration or consultation. This appears to be the domain of the transactional and certainly 
a military environment has much more in common with the characteristics identified as 
“transactional”. Yukl’s analysis of leadership concepts (1999: 301) claims that “instrumental 
compliance is most important for transactional leadership”. 
3.1.14 Leadership Influences Organisations Adapting To Their Environments 
Leaders are said to need to align their organisations with the environment (Fiol and Lyles: 
1985) or risk irrelevance. Examples like Kodak, Nokia, Polaroid, Blockbuster Video, XEROX 
and BlackBerry are useful popular case studies in this regard where confidence and 
complacency to the organisational environment are said to have caused profound problems 
leading to, in some cases, existential threats. Yukl (1999: 288) reiterates that it is an “essential 
leadership function to help the organisation adapt to its environment”. As I indicated with 
Chapter 2 the NATO JWC is part of a transformational command that serves through 
development, education and training a transactional command. Considering leadership 
adaptation to the environment one could consider that the transactional command would exude 
transactional leadership and the transformational command would exude transformational 
leadership.  
The transactional/transformation debate is not an either/or issue, it is highly contextual and is 
much more of a spectrum of behaviours that shift across circumstances (Yukl: 1999). 
Circumstances that range from critical, urgent requiring the decisive timely intervention of the 
leader, the transactional; to challenges that are more complex, interdependent and potentially 
developmental, the transformational. Grint (2008) provides a useful guide for leaders to make 
sense of when a particular style across the transactional/transformational spectrum is most 
appropriate. Transactional leadership being within the bottom left domain in red, and 
transformational leadership being located at the top right as shown in green.  
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Figure 12 - Power and Problem Relationship  
Adapted from Grint (2008: 14).  
3.1.15 Transactional Leadership 
Transactional leadership is said to rely upon request fulfilment of the leaders based on their 
“hierarchical status within the organisation” and followers comply based upon a “formal 
obligation to the leader” (Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995: 232). Clarke et al., (2011) classify 
transactional leadership as being related to “content”, where “exchanges and negotiations” are 
used by the leader to specify “goals and conditions” where followers are rewarded for 
achieving those goals. The literature informs that the prevalent leadership approach usually 
found in military hierarchical organisations is transactional and consequently the task of 
delivery “transformation” is made more difficult. Transactional organisations are highly apt for 
“decision making and rule enforcement” and especially for “tame” problems (Grint, 2008: 11) 
or puzzles where there is a “right” answer and it can be located through the application of a 
process. The price to pay for that decision-making ability in critical situations is that they tend 
not to be “innovative”; a rather important aspect to “transformation”.  
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3.1.16 Transformational Leadership 
When considering how a “Transformational Command” might operate it could be assumed that 
such a remit would lead to a prevailing organisational culture that would support an engaged 
and/or distributed style of leadership (Bolden et al, 2011; Heskett, 2011) and that this would 
sit in stark contrast to the prevailing transactional leadership style in the organisation as I will 
make clear from the research. (Gerras et al., 2008; Redmond et al., 2015). Transformational 
leadership is often considered more inclusive and egalitarian than transactional approaches and 
as adding “incremental value to more traditional transactional leadership behaviours” (Hargis 
et al., 2011: 53). Transformational leadership is a “modelled” process based upon the primacy 
of ideals and values aimed at inspiring, stimulating and engaging. It is supported by leaders 
who encourage their followers to “contribute to intellectual stimulation by questioning 
assumptions and challenging situations” (Wodak et al., 2011: 594) which is a far cry from C2 
as it is widely understood, described and enacted.  
Yukl (1999: 291) highlights that transactional and transformation leadership are not really 
opposite ends of a spectrum but that many of the traits overlap and can exist with both theories. 
He goes on to criticise those who appear to claim that transformational leadership is the 
ultimate goal for leaders, remarking that this type of leadership “can have negative outcomes 
for followers in the organisation” citing the emotional connections said to be established under 
a transformational leadership as responsible for creating dependencies, being “unidirectional”, 
leading to “self-sacrifices” and the unsustainable expectation of “exceptional effort” (Yukl, 
1999: 292). “Transformational leadership seems widely relevant, but there may be situations 
where it is unnecessary or have negative consequences along with positive ones” (Yukl, 1999: 
301). Interestingly I was to discover that descriptions of transformational leaders suggest that 
this style also has many overlapping features with authentic leaders (Avolio et al., 2004: 806). 
Transformational leadership and authentic leadership share many of the same components; 
when Avolio and Gardner (2005: 323) compared authentic leadership with transformational 
leadership across 26 different themes they found that 21 of them were “focal components” and 
four others were discussed leaving only one theme to have been absent. There is, it seems, a 
strong correlation between authentic leadership and transformational leadership, a relationship 
I come back to later in the thesis. 
I have summarised these approaches to leadership in Table 3 below and this will be used as a 
backdrop to consider how the military might fare compared with these themes within Chapter 
5.  
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Table 3 – Transactional/Transformational Leadership Contrasted 
(Adapted from Bass, 1990; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Hargis et al., 2011) 
 It seems that “transformational leadership” is increasingly relevant. Marquardt (2005) remarks 
regarding the increasing complexity and global pace of change in the world that “the traditional 
hierarchical model of leadership that worked yesterday will not work tomorrow.” He goes on 
to make the point that leaders cannot possibly hope to master all the intricacies of organisational 
life, he warns that “No one person can master all the data needed to address the complex issues 
that confront today’s organisations.” (Ibid: 24). Cameron and Quinn (2011:301) claim that 
“successful companies have developed something special that supersedes corporate strategy, 
market presence, and technological advantages”, they go on to identify that the “special 
something” is the development and management of a “unique corporate culture”. In this new 
era, it is predicted that organisational cultures will become increasingly important in the future 
(Dillard, 2014). In organisational research involving 34 corporations, Denison (1984) posited 
that there is indeed a causational relationship between culture and performance and argues 
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further that when organisations get their culture right they are able to significantly outperform 
those that do not. An organisation then is much more than an organogram or mission, it comes 
to life through its people. The symbiotic connections between organisational culture and the 
people that perform their roles in those organisations are said to be profound, “organisations as 
we know them are the people in them; if the people do not change, there is no organisational 
change” (Schneider et al., 1996: 7) and if the leaders do not adapt and change then leadership 
does not change either. 
 
3.1.17 Phase 1 Literature Summary 
 
The literature in Phase 1 provided evidence of the historical and pervasive nature of military 
culture and the precedence of command and control as a regulating and normative function. It 
provided a grounding into how multinational military organisations are managed and led, how 
they are commanded and controlled and why this type of approach is as prevalent and 
entrenched as to become an organisational limiter for a transformational entity like the one I 
was researching. Reading into the literature on military leadership and C2 informed me that the 
military’s dependence upon C2 is so profound that to consider leadership without paying 
attention to this phenomenon would lead to an incomplete appreciation or the development of 
later interventions that were irrelevant or ineffective. The literature describes relevant and 
recent research into military organisations that claimed that the time was right to rethink C2, 
and that much of the non-military leadership and management research had already indicated 
its demise many years ago.   
 
The literature review also illuminated an interesting dichotomy revealing that when leaders 
rose to the top of their organisational structures they were, in many cases, fundamentally 
different leaders than they were required to be before they had reached these elevated positions. 
It confirmed that leadership is far from being a static, “born with” phenomenon, but was fluid, 
contextual and developable. This was to be critical in that the NATO JWC is identified as a 
“transformational” command and yet that the prevalent leadership style and the associated 
organisational culture were profoundly “transactional” when compared with the academic 
literature describing these leadership styles.  
 
The literature described the critical role that leaders can play in working within, or helping to 
develop, new organisational cultures. It also reinforced that there is no “one size fits all” 
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organisational culture and reinforced in my mind that organisations with different missions and 
roles (in my case the operational commands compared with the transformational command) 
might be far more effective if their organisational culture and leadership was complementary 
and aligned to their mission. The Phase 1 literature review provided me with a detailed 
appreciation of how organisational constructs, contexts and personal histories affect leadership 
and organisational culture and that leadership can be assessed through the analysis (evidence 
indicating the presence or lack) of certain traits.  The literature exposed the relationship 
between national and service influences and how these come together with the culture of the 
organisation to frame the leadership context; what is accepted or denied, what is encouraged 
or deterred. The literature disclosed and emphasised that organisational culture and 
organisational climate are not the same thing and this led to the development of the JWC 
Alignment Contextual Model that appears as Figure 11. This Phase 1 literature review and the 
major concepts drawn from it are shown below in Figure 13.  
 
 
 
Figure 13 – Phase 1 – Literature Conceptual Framework 
Phase 1 literature on leadership and culture led me to seek out an appropriate methodology; it 
was clear to me that I was delving into management research and that my research would be 
more appropriately facilitated through the use of qualitative methodologies (Denison, 1996; 
March, 2008; Jung et al., 2009; 1088). Methodologies that are interpretative (Lincoln, 2010) 
and informed through interviews and surveys (Tacchi et al.: 2003). Although the research 
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review conceptual framework appears to be logical and temporal in fact these literature topics 
are deeply interrelated; the literature revealed that many authors are of the opinion that culture 
and leadership are symbiotic, that they are indivisible and co-dependent (Schein, 2010; 
Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). This resonated with my own experiences 
as I observed with fresh eyes how leaders led, set the tone for how others behaved, and how 
these behaviours became organisational norms that were imposed and sustained.  
 
The literature indicated that organisational culture and leadership were not only critical success 
factors, but also that for a transformational organisation, certain cultural and leadership traits 
would be more evident than others. It provided evidence of organisations that were successful 
in becoming “transformational” usually had a certain organisational culture profile and were 
reinforced through specific leadership practices (Yukl, 1999; Avolio et al., 2004; Raelin, 2003). 
Through the process of Phase 1 literature review I drew upon the work of several key 
influencers, academics and writers as the process evolved: 
 
 
Figure 14 – Phase 1 – Literature Review Key Influencers 
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As depicted in the conceptual flow shown in Figure 13, subsequently reinforced and discussed 
within the story in Chapter 5, my research was driven from a combination of personal interest 
in the topics, existing experiential evidence through organisational surveys, and the literature 
encompassing these areas of management research. The literature pertaining to leadership and 
organisational culture led me to believe that it should have been possible, through literature 
informed research, to leave my organisation in a sustainably better place than it was before the 
research (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010; Jackson and Parry, 2010). The literature provided me 
with an epistemological grounding (Patton, 2011; Duberley and Johnson, 2000) and awareness 
that action research is not only understanding organisations but is also deeply associated with 
organisational change (Argyris and SchÖn, 1989; McKay and Marshall, 2001; Reason, 2004; 
Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). It shaped profoundly the decisions taken and explained in 
Chapter 4 and provided me with an academically rigorous basepoint from which to start to plot 
an initial course of action, a course of action that ended up being challenged and then adapted 
significantly as the research evolved.  
3.2 Informing the second AR cycle – “Mind The Gap” 
As I analysed the data from the interviews and observed with new insights my organisation, an 
interesting organisational phenomenon surfaced. A phenomenon that led me to perform an 
additional literature review that was directed from insights revealed as the organisation was 
studied, as the data was analysed, and this analysis contrasted with new literature in order to 
make sense of these emerging themes. 
This second period of research and literature review provided me with the knowledge to 
develop meaningful interventions for my practice. The literature in Phase 2 then represents the 
second significant action research iteration and was initiated as the research from Phase 1 
evolved. This journey is described in full in Chapter 5 – the story. As a reminder in Phase 1 
read into Command and Control, Organisational Culture and Leadership.  
Phase 2 literature was focussed on the following themes: 
• Leadership “say/do” Gap 
• Authentic Leadership  
• Authentic Leadership Development 
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3.2.1 The “Say/Do” Gap: Espoused And In-Use Theories 
What leaders say, articulate and communicate are sometimes described as “theories espoused” 
whereas “theories in use” are directly observable as interpretations of a leader’s behaviour, it 
is what leadership does (Argyris, 2010). As will be covered in detail within the story, many in 
my organisation are reporting significant gaps between what leaders are saying and what 
leaders are doing. I draw heavily on the work of academic researchers and particularly Argyris 
and Schön (1974) and Argyris (2010) in order to understand that the “say/do” gap is not 
something unique nor especially rare in organisations. 
Gerras et al. (2008: 15) in their paper on US military organisation culture found there to be a 
sharp contrast “between an espoused goal to have an adaptive, learning environment” and “the 
corresponding culture and climate to enable this adaptation and learning”. There are clear 
benefits to reducing the gap; “when an organisation and its people do what they say they will 
do, this produces trust in the ranks” (Heskett, 2011: 136). There is one description of leadership 
that is claimed to be able to reduce the “say/do” gap to imperceptible dimensions and leaders 
who are able to lead in this way are therefore unlikely to exhibit major gaps between their 
espoused and in use theories. These types of leaders “do not show up as one person one day 
and another person the next.” (George et al., 2011: 175), they are consistent in their thoughts 
and deeds, fundamentally connected to who they are. These leaders are said to be authentic, 
they hold values to be true based upon their experiences confirming them as opposed to any 
social or political force demanding them to do so. In terms of closing the say-do gap, authentic 
leaders are those who base their actions on conviction and profoundly held values. “What they 
say is consistent with what they believe, and their actions are consistent with both their talk 
and their beliefs” (Ibid: 397). Some leaders exhibit clear transactional tendencies and others 
claim to perform transformational leadership but “authentic leaders” are said exhibit 
congruence in terms of living the behaviours that they express are important for the 
organisation, they observably and consistently walk the talk; an embodiment of Polonius’s cry 
of “To thine own self be true," from Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
Authentic leadership theories started to be discussed around 15 years ago and since then the 
topic is said to have generated “considerable theoretical attention and continues to figure 
prominently in practitioners’ treatment of leadership” (Jackson and Parry: 2010, 116). Jackson 
and Parry (2010:117) claim that scholars of authentic leadership “define authenticity as having 
clear and certain knowledge about oneself in all regards” and that authentic leaders “behaving 
consistently with that self-knowledge” (Ibid.: 329). 
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3.2.2 What is Authentic Leadership? 
Authenticity in a leader is said to come from a profound connection to “personal values and 
convictions” (Avolio et al., 2004: 806), authentic leaders exude openness and honesty, 
transparency and vulnerability, they are aware of their own limitations and accept feedback as 
an asset to growth and learning, they are accountable and congruent for what they say and what 
they do (Avolio et al., 2004). Gardner et al. (2005: 344) claim that authenticity is not only the 
process by which an individual owns their personal experiences, including thoughts, values, 
beliefs and emotions, but it also involves acting in congruence with those attributes. In other 
words, a profound and consistent alignment between what people think, what they say and, 
crucially, what they actually do. Avolio et al. (2004: 802) claims that authentic leaders know 
fundamentally who they are, understand what they value and believe and are known to act in 
accordance with their beliefs and values in dealings with others. Authentic leadership rests 
heavily on the “extent to which the leader’s self-concept is expressed in his or her behaviour” 
(Shamir and Eilam, 2005: 395), their “talk and actions are consistent” (Ibid: 397). Authentic 
leadership is said to have another helpful side effect, it is said to be highly effective at building 
“benevolence and integrity” in their followers (Avolio et al., 2004: 810) through engagement, 
openness and the casting of a believable shadow.  
Avolio et al. (2009: 424) claim that of the many concepts associated with authentic leadership 
four factors appear to be crucial and can be recognised by the observation of: 
• “Balanced processing” – the objective analysis and sense-making of relevant data. 
• “Moral perspective” – being guided by values and beliefs that “self-regulate” 
behaviours. 
• “Relational Transparency” – overt information sharing to include feelings. 
• “Self-awareness” – an understanding of one’s skills, capabilities and weaknesses.  
George and Sims (2007) offered five dimensions that mark out an authentic leader: 
• “Purpose with Passion” – enthusiasm bereft of ego. 
• “Practicing solid values” – living and being observed to live the values espoused. 
• “Establishing connected relationships” – the ability to create and nurture 
“meaningful personal relationships”. 
• “Demonstrated self-discipline”– the setting and achieving high standards for 
themselves. 
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• “Leading with heart” – daring enough to care, and to be seen to care.  
Authentic leaders are fuelled by their deeply held values and beliefs and this enables them to 
align their behaviours with their talk. Avolio and Gardner (2005: 319) describe authentic 
leaders as those who “are ‘in tune’ with their basic nature and clearly and accurately see 
themselves and their lives.” Authentic leaders have managed to reduce, perhaps even eliminate 
altogether, the gap between espoused theories and in use theories. They “demonstrate 
transparent decision making, confidence, optimism, hope and resilience, and consistency 
between their words and their deeds” (emboldened by the author, Avolio and Gardner, 2005: 
326) “Their knowing is in their action” (SchÖn, 1992: 56) and their actions are observable and 
can be seen to be coherent. 
3.2.3 Authentic Leadership Development 
Jackson and Parry (2010: 21) summarise leadership development theories as beginning with 
trying to characterise personal qualities or “trait spotting’ moving on to ‘style counselling’ 
theories characterizing certain leadership behavioural styles depending upon “task and 
relationship orientations”. Jackson and Parry (2010:25) remark that “trait approach seeks to 
determine the personal qualities and characteristics of leaders” implying a belief that leaders 
are born rather than made – in other words, nature is more important than nurture. This has 
more recently been challenged by Avolio et al. (2009: 425) who, during research on identical 
twins in Sweden claim the opposite to be true. Leadership can, in the right circumstances, be 
learned and not all great leaders were born with the “right” leadership abilities. Based upon a 
study of identical twins in Sweden, Avolio et al. (2009: 425) claim that most of a leader’s 
ability to lead is not genetically or hereditarily based at all, but are predominantly down to their 
experiences, their leadership history and that opens the prospect of developing leaders and 
developing leadership. Avolio et al. (Ibid) claim that up to 70% of a leader’s ability to lead 
comes from his or her story or “life context” with the remaining 30% being attributed to 
heritability. 
Shotter (2010: 272) claims that “aspects of our utterances are clearly shaped by influences we 
have come to embody from our past experiences”. Jackson and Parry (2010:136) agree and 
claim that most leaders primarily learn leadership through experiences. Our leadership 
experiences therefore define who we are as leaders and that historical context informs what a 
leader believes and values about leading. Jung et al., (2009: 1092) citing Hofstede (2001) claim 
that our values are formed and integrated while we are young, practices on the other hand “are 
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acquired through socialisation at the workplace” and for many in the military, they have 
“worked” nowhere else. There observable leadership practices, their “theories in use” (Argyris, 
2010), as I explained in the literature review informing Part 1, are historically bound in their 
personal story, a personal story that is impacted by their national influences, service influences 
and their exposures to leadership moments throughout their career. 
3.2.3.1 Life Stories and Leadership 
According to Jackson and Parry (2010: 69), our leadership experiences from the past deeply 
influence how we lead in the moment and in the future. “Individual life stories often define 
leadership” claims Denning (2007: 21). George et al., (2011: 164) makes the point that 
leadership emerges through “life stories” and development starts when leaders compare, reflect 
and reframe their life stories. Investigating life stories can provide “moments when it is possible 
for them to ‘regard a given case differently’” (Shotter, 2010: 272) to challenge introspectively 
our basic assumptions and beliefs. Gardner et al. (2005: 345) claim that authentic leadership is 
achieved through a process of self-awareness and self-acceptance. Authentic leadership starts 
with connecting with, relating to and understanding one’s life story (George et al., 2011).  
Leadership then is not at all static but develops through life in even some of the most 
recognisable leaders. General Eisenhower illustrates this point through two quotes made at 
different times in his career from junior officer to the president of the USA.  
“Leadership is the art of getting someone else to do something 
you want done because he wants to do it.” 
Contrasted with this one much later in his career:  
“The supreme quality for leadership is unquestionably 
integrity. Without it, no real success is possible, no matter 
whether it is on a section gang, a football field, in an army, or 
in an office.” 
In the first quote claimed to have been uttered as a relatively young office leadership appears 
to be synonymous with manipulation, task focused, transactional – getting things done. Fast 
forward a number of military ranks and now serving as a very senior military officer it is less 
about task and more about being; he espouses leadership as being founded on integrity, a 
permanently available pointer to doing the right things. It does seem that it is easier to become 
more transformational the more senior you get and I will explore this in detail within the thesis. 
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To lead with integrity is synonymous with leading authentically, and as Sparrowe (2005: 419) 
states “authenticity serves as a moral compass by which the intentions of transformational 
leaders can be determined”. Following on from Argyris (2010) claim that our personal 
histories, our life stories, inform our behaviours then one’s leadership compass is influenceable 
as a consequence of reviewing, reflecting and resetting it to point towards the leadership we 
want to develop (George and Sims: 2007). 
George and Sims (2007) suggest that authenticity in a leader is possible “When you are aligned 
with who you are, you find coherence between your life story and your leadership.” George et 
al. (2011: 165) purport that authentic leaders examine and frame their life stories, not as passive 
observers to events that unfolded, but instead see them as learning events that are still 
potentially rich with learning. Jackson and Parry (2010: 145) claim that becoming a better 
leader starts with reflection and during sessions they studied students were “encouraged to dig 
deep into their own history, investigating their own path as leader and follower”. Their 
engagement with others through exploration and discussion then “becomes the primary source 
of leadership learning”. Facilitating leaders to imagine and then articulate a future desired state 
from which to assess and compare where they are currently is potentially a “pattern breaking” 
activity (Nugus et al., 2012) that encourages the participants to reconnect, reassess and 
potentially revise strongly held personal beliefs. Schein (2010: 367) suggests that feedback is 
the key to learning, along with the associated reflection and assimilation of the feedback; 
feedback said to be more useful if it is asked for by the learner. 
3.2.3.2 Authentic Leadership Development Conceptual Framework 
Allen and Roberts (2011: 67) describe leadership development as “a continuous, systemic 
process designed to expand the capacities and awareness of individuals, groups, and 
organisations in an effort to meet shared goals and objectives”. Creating the right 
developmental environment for senior mature leaders is not a trivial matter. In researching 
leadership development frameworks, I wanted to locate literature that would be contextually 
relevant for both my organisation and the leaders in it. Fiol and Lyles (1985: 811) define 
leadership learning in such a way that it dovetails into authentic leadership development, they 
state that learning is the “development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past 
actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.” Schein (2010:299). Wodak et 
al., (2009: 606) propose that authentic leaders are able to “promote a consistency of behaviour 
by creating links between their commitment to action and their 
organisational/professional/personal identities.” 
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Argyris (1983) proposed a useful distinction between learning that reinforces previous learning 
and leaves the “underlying governing policies or values” intact, and learning that results in re-
examining and changing these “underlying governing policies or values”. He calls the former 
learning context “single loop” learning and the latter “double loop” learning. He goes on to 
indicate that single loop learning is usually related to the “routine, immediate task” and double 
loop being associated to the “long range outcome”; an ability to deal with a specific issue 
compared with growing an ability to transfer this knowledge into other contexts.  
Leadership is claimed to be a journey rather than a destination, a process rather than an outcome 
(George and Sims, 2007), a process influenced and informed by previous leadership enactment. 
Berkovich (2014: 255) proposes eight components that are critical to authentic leadership 
development as “self-exposure, open-mindedness, empathy, care, respect, critical thinking, 
contact and mutuality”. I used this model (Figure 15) to guide my thinking and behaviour when 
trying to facilitate the interventions and learning of these senior leaders in my organisation. I 
remained conscious to support the individual development as depicted by the blue route by 
ensuring I was operating from a mindset shown by the orange route.   
 
 
 
Figure 15 - Dialogical Pedagogy in Dyadic Interaction (Berkovich, 2014). 
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Leadership development then is a lot about mindsets and creating the conditions for reflection. 
In order to move from creating the conditions for thinking, to guiding the things leaders were 
thinking about. Gardner et al. (2005) introduce a conceptual authentic leadership development 
process as shown below in Figure 16. This was used to help me create a guided leadership 
development experience for the senior leaders and through Chapter 5, the story, I will describe 
how the process evolved from conceptual modelling to practical intervention. 
 
  
Figure 16 - Authentic Leadership Development Process 
3.2.3.3 Antecedents 
In terms of an authentic leadership developmental process, many theorists believe that the 
starting point should be their own history. A leader’s personal history and the trigger events 
that occurred can be considered to be the leader’s story, and all leaders have a story. 
Introspective reflection into that story has the potential to create a “concordance with respect 
to core values, identity, emotions, motives and goals” (Jackson and Parry, 2010: 145). It comes 
from individuals directing their consciousness to self and by learning or confirming “who they 
are and what they value, authentic leaders build understanding and a sense of self that provides 
a firm anchor for their decisions and actions” (Gardner et al., 2005: 347).  
Gardner et al. refer to this starting point as an antecedent, an activity that logically and 
influentially precedes another. Gardner et al. (2005: 347) consider that the leader’s trigger 
events and personal history as necessary precursors for authentic leader development. 
According to Avolio et al., (2009: 426) “trigger events induce self-focussed attention, self-
assessment, and activate a leader’s working self-concept”, their “theories espoused” (Argyris, 
1995; 2010; Raelin, 1994) by another name. Some believe that these trigger moments can be 
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future paced and as such enable a leader to develop new responses within a simulated 
environment (Avolio et al., (2009: 426).  
3.2.3.4 Self-Awareness Stage 
Achieving “authenticity” involves leaders being committed to “self-awareness” and “self-
acceptance” (Gardner et al., 2005: 345). Avolio and Gardner (2005: 317) point out that 
authenticity starts with a profound understanding of self and “self-awareness occurs when 
individuals are cognizant of their own existence”. Self-awareness comes from a personal 
understanding of their “unique talents, strengths, sense of purpose, core values, beliefs and 
desires.” (Ibid: 324). They go on to offer that becoming self-aware is a continuous process and 
not a destination point. Orem et al., (2007: 41) propose that an awareness of our past is critical 
for our transition into the future when they state that “a person’s self-awareness and destiny 
are interwoven”. 
Self-awareness enables developing leaders to become and remain aware of their own patterns 
of thinking. According to Manasse (1985) leaders who think about how they lead, to reflect 
and be ready to be open about that reflection are set apart from those who do not. This setting 
apart according to Manasse appears to come from an ability to communicate what is important 
to them, and before you can communicate that you need to understand it and be profoundly 
connected to a sense of self. Locating and truly owning self, locating “one’s voice and aligning 
behaviour with one’s values engenders credibility in the eyes of the followers” (Sparrowe, 
2005). Gardner et al. (2005: 344) in their research focussed on leaders (and followers) 
experiencing growth through becoming increasingly authentic; “authenticity involves both 
owning one’s personal experiences (value, thoughts, emotions and beliefs) and acting in 
accordance with one’s true self (expressing what you really think and believe and behaving 
accordingly).  
A leader’s thinking then becomes so important in terms of informing their behaviours. 
Thinking about their thinking becomes a potential catalyst for personal awareness and change. 
Change in a human system is said to begin with a loosening of the grip of earlier formed values 
and beliefs, what Lewin (1947) describes organisational settings as an “unfreezing” process 
before moving through organisational change and refreezing. A precondition for any lasting 
change then is the “unfreezing” (Lewin, 1947) process on which any serious organisational 
change process must be based. However, before organisations can change, the people in them 
have to develop and change (Schneider et al., 1996), and senior leader and manager 
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development are more effective when reflection and critical reflexivity are component parts 
(Cunliffe, 2004).  
Berkovich (2014: 249) believes that self-narrative authentic discovery has less potential to 
develop individuals than methods that facilitate dialogically intersubjective narratives. The 
latter being more effective at breaking previously “complacent or ritualistic” thinking so as to 
“transform old ways of theorizing and managing” (Cunliffe, 2004: 408). Cadle et al. (2004) 
indicate that help in becoming self-aware and ready to change can be enabled by the 
engagement of others; “Part of the unfreezing stage could be setting up an investigation to 
collate data that could be fed back to people to show the importance of a change.” Cadle et al. 
(2004) 
3.2.3.5 Self-Regulation Stage 
Self-regulation is the process that enables leaders to become consonant so that words and deeds 
are coherent. Sparrowe (2005) suggests that self-awareness does not have to be only down to 
“self” and offers (citing Luthans and Avolio, 2003: 248) that “self-awareness and self-
regulation” require input from others, that “true self is not discovered absent of others but is 
constituted in relation to others”. Self-regulation creates an opportunity for leaders to separate 
themselves briefly from reality and think deeply about that reality from a distance, to take a 
meta-position observing self and context as though for the first time (Cunliffe, 2004). Chen 
(2008: 551) reinforces this historical linkage when he states that “Patterns and interconnections 
are identified from descriptions of communicative acts and activities examined after the fact, 
which relies heavily, though not exclusively on history getting the answer”.  
Having someone else look with you into your reflection in the mirror not only improves self-
awareness but also impacts “relational transparency” (Avolio and Gardner, 2005: 326). Susman 
and Evered (1978:593) describe the emergent properties of interventions like these as “acts of 
communications between two or more self-reflecting subjects” and this is a critical phase of 
the “authentic leadership” component of the development cycle shown on Figure 15. It is 
during this stage that news ways of conceptualisation and reflection can occur (Ibid).  
The latest Sandhurst guide to young officer starting their journey to senior leader positions 
warns them that “No leader is ever quite as good as they might be.” (UK MOD, 2014: 3) and 
looking back at the self-awareness phase perhaps fewer are as good as they think they are. The 
self-regulation phase offers a potential narrative route to address this. Preparing new leaders to 
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be ready for self-reflection and regulation is a “continual process that requires humility and a 
willingness to recognise mistakes and take remedial action” (Ibid).  
Berkovich (2014: 248) claims that authentic narratives can be the outcome of a “structured 
interaction with others”. He goes on to offer that the “relational aspect is essential for 
developing authentic leadership”; although reflection and study of self may be only part of a 
more comprehensive process. Enabling an environment where leaders can explore their own 
leadership story and re-reveal their formative experiences might offer a venue for not only 
looking in the mirror, but also having that reflection witnessed, even commented upon by their 
peers. Self-regulation then is the process that enables leaders to become consonant so that 
words and deeds are coherent. Locating and truly owning oneself, locating “one’s voice and 
aligning behaviour with one’s values engenders credibility in the eyes of the followers” 
(Sparrowe, 2005).  
3.2.3.6 Outcome Stage 
Constructive leadership development as described by McCauley et al., (2006: 635) is 
concerned with a leader’s personal “construals, constructions and interpretations” of 
experience. Reconnecting and reassessing those previous experiences in light of a new wholly 
unique context offers new possibilities and choices of response and repertoires for leaders. 
Susman and Evered (1978) claim that it is the shared deconstruction of previous experiences 
and re-examining them, redefining them and future pacing them is development in action. They 
claim that “Knowledge is gained dialectically by proceeding from the whole to its parts and 
then back again. Each time an incongruence occurs between the part and the whole, a 
reconceptualization takes place” (McCauley et al., 2006: 595). As McCauley et al., (Ibid: 636) 
point out, once a new “order of development has been constructed, the previous order loses its 
organizing function, but remains as a perspective that can now be reflected upon”. It is no 
longer buried in our unconscious patterns of thinking and behaviour, but, through a process of 
revealing, evaluating and realigning new options, creating new outcomes, these patterns 
becoming apparent and ready to reassess. Making these internal programs overt and 
highlighting the mismatches that are said to reinforce defensive routines and limit 
organisational growth, releases people from being “unaware of the mismatch, and involved 
denial, cover-up and refusal to talk about the denial and cover-up.” (Anderson et al, 2015: 82).  
 
 
 
73 
3.2.4 Phase 2 Literature Summary 
The literature in Phase 2 was driven by the revelations, analysis and reflection following the 
direction and methods influenced directly by the literature exposed during the Phase 1 review.  
The analysis of the results generated in Phase 1 clearly revealed that there was little in terms 
of alignment between how the managers reported experiencing the organisation, compared 
with how the leaders reported experiencing the organisation. The lack of organisational 
alignment around the themes that the literature in Phase 1 indicated would be evident, stopped 
me in my tracks and prompted me to ask myself what was really going on in my organisation.  
Consequently the Phase 2 literature review started with my desire to understand authenticity 
and authentic leadership since the organisational and leadership themes predicted to be 
important were just not evident in the disclosures and analysis. The Phase 2 literature was 
focussed upon discovering whether the situation being described; namely the rather different 
view of leadership from those separated by just one managerial layer, was something that 
academics had studied before; whether there were academically sound precedents that I could 
build upon, not only to better appreciate the phenomenon but also influence and position the 
next phase of the research alongside the literature.  
 
The Phase 2 literature review was also based the discovery of a phenomenon commonly 
reported, that leaders were not “walking the talk” and I needed to understand whether this too 
could be explained by reviewing existing research literature. The review in this phase provided 
me with a new appreciation of the phenomenon of an evident “say-do” gap and led me to return 
into the domain of the early research into these areas (Argyris and Schön, 1974; Manasse, 
1985) through to more recent publications in this area (Argyris, 2010; George et al., 2011; 
Gerras et al., 2008). The key academic influencers for the Phase 2 literature review are shown 
below in Figure 17: 
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Figure 17 – Phase 2 – Literature Review Key Influencers 
 
The literature review performed Phase 2 revealed a gradual shift in what many academic 
scholars were researching and reporting on the subject of contemporary leadership, reinforcing 
this through the use of various case studies (Gardner et al., 2005; George and Sims, 2007 and 
Örtenblad et al., 2016). The literature review confirmed that organisations were becoming 
increasingly interested in and in some cases dependent upon the existence of authentic 
leadership (Raelin, 2003; Avolio, 2004) and much less dependent, or defined by, the presence 
of certain themes or traits (Huczynski, 1993; Yukl, 1999). It provided me with an academic 
thread that connected the say/do with a possible solution supported by academia; that of 
authenticity and the benefits of truly authentic leadership. The Phase 2 review also enabled me 
to create an authentic leadership development framework and how the literature informed my 
direction and focus is conceptualised in the flow diagram that appears as Figure 18 below: 
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Figure 18 – Phase 2 – Literature Conceptual Framework 
 
Good theories are said to be highly practical and are said to begin with practice in mind (Van 
de Ven, 1989; Semler, 1997). Indeed action research is primed to deliver “actionable” theories 
(Coghlan, 2007: 298) but getting from a theory of action to something “actionable” and on to 
“actioned” is not trivial. In the later stages of my literature review I delved into the literature 
to investigate how I might be able to create something practical, experiential, memorable; 
something that would fulfil the requirements to be considered to be “double loop” (Argyris, 
1983) and “mode 2” learning (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Huff and Huff, 2001), learning that 
goes beyond contributing to current knowledge for a specific gap but rather paves the way for 
wider learning, learning that could leave a legacy. “Knowing” authenticity in leadership is 
important is one thing, being able to facilitate the development of that in others, within my 
context, is another. The last part of the literature reviewed during Phase 2 provided me with 
the knowledge baseline from where to migrate into contextual theory building on authentic 
leadership development. The literature offered views into how leadership might emerge in 
individuals (Rost, 1993; Clifton, 2012), where it comes from and how it evolves. The literature 
on authentic leadership development (Avolio et al., 2004; Gardner et al., 2005; Shamir and 
Eilam, 2005; Avolio et al., 2009) provided me with a rich source of evidence and 
methodologies for designing a contextually appropriate intervention. It provided me with 
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insights, knowledge and then processes that I needed to develop contextually relevant 
interventions that would create the possibility for authentic leadership to emerge (George and 
Sims, 2007; Berkovich, 2014; McCauley et al., 2006; Susman and Evered; 1978). These 
contextually relevant action research interventions are fully disclosed within Chapter 5 – the 
Story.   
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Chapter 4 - METHODOLOGY and METHOD of INQUIRY 
 
Within this Chapter I describe how I investigated the areas of interest and the methodologies 
adopted. It attempts to justify the methods based upon the context and research themes and 
shows how the research methodology was selected and performed. It reveals the ethical and 
political influences under which the research was performed and sets the scene for the iterations 
and change of direction the research took. It also describes my approach to research quality 
and how this approach was maintained throughout the research period whilst trying to ensure 
that relevance and pragmatism were not lost in the application of the methodology. 
Specifically, within the setting of an organisational development initiative, the methodology 
and methods are utilised to examine the declared experiences of the people occupying the most 
senior layer of the organisation (known as the “Command Group”) with the people occupying 
the organisational layer directly beneath them (known as the “Branch Heads”). The research 
was intentionally performed as the organisation went through an organisational culture 
awareness programme in order to identify and make sense of any changes in leadership that 
occurred.  
4.1 Methodology 
The research envelope that my study of leadership and culture was performed within can be 
characterised as “management research” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008) which is a stream of 
research that appears to have become increasingly important and relevant of late. In the early 
90’s Astley and Zammuto (1992: 443) indicated that management researchers were producing 
findings that had limited significance for business practices and held little value for business 
executives; the findings or the presentation of the findings appeared to lack relevance or 
transferability and failed to create sufficient interest from practice (Bartunek et al., 2006). By 
2010 however, researchers of management are said to have generated a “virtual tsunami of 
important critical work” (Lincoln, 2010: 4) and the growing appetite for learning in this area 
continues to drive researchers and also fill the shelves of management and leadership sections 
in bookshops and magazine stores (Ibid). I tried to remain true to contributing to the critical 
work that does exist and to satisfy somewhat my own appetite for learning in this area by the 
application of my methodology and methods.  
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It is said that one of the most effective ways of developing insights and awareness of 
organisational systems is through a process of trying to change it (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010; 
Anderson et al, 2015: 168) and this consideration remained a key feature of the research. 
Research credibility is enhanced through a rigorous approach and Creswell (2007) offers a 
process model that identifies distinct phases as “determining the specific research question, 
determining the outcome and then selecting the appropriate research methodology”. Jackson 
and Parry (2010:135) claim that it is possible, and in some cases desirable, to blend research 
with organisational learning claiming that “Some of the more astute leadership researchers 
have attempted to exploit potential synergies between research and development activities.” 
This duality was also something that I remained cognizant of and factored into the development 
of my qualitative methodology and methods.  
4.1.1 Qualitative Research 
March (2008: 4) states that although organisational researchers are able employ the full array 
of “quantitative and statistical tools of social science” his position is that qualitative research 
is more appropriate, indicating that many important studies are ethnographic in nature. Jung et 
al., (2009; 1088) offer that the most appropriate methods for researching organisational culture 
and leadership are qualitative in nature. Qualitative researchers lean towards the 
phenomenological, they are often “interpretivist” (Lincoln, 2010: 8) and are advised to go about 
their research sense making reflexively. Qualitative researchers are often required to be 
involved with the subjects of their study and one branch of qualitative research, action research, 
goes yet further by “using managers themselves as collaborators and sharing the collection and 
analysis of date to ensure the implementation of findings.” (Thorpe and Holt, 2008: 4). 
Easterby-Smith et al., (2008: 9) describe this type of research as “mode 2” research where 
knowledge is produced “through direct engagement with social practice and problems.”  
4.1.2 Constructivism 
Organisational research is “fuzzy” (Anderson et al., 2005) and Holman and Thorpe (2003) 
claim that “management and the way managers work and learn with others is best explained 
by a relationally responsive version of social constructivism”. Social constructivists consider 
“the person as actively engaged in the creation of their own phenomenal world” in other words, 
everyone perceives their world uniquely and derives their reality accordingly (Burr, 2003: 19). 
Constructivism leads to researchers exploring how research participants experience the world 
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anticipating that “there are ‘truths’ rather than one truth” where social realities are profoundly 
individual, emergent and relative (Cunliffe, 2011: 656).  
4.1.3 Interpretivism 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991: 447) offer that an “interpretive perspective and ethnographic 
approach” can generate “activities that are simultaneously symbolic and substantive, involve 
reciprocal processes of cognition and action, and entail cycles of understanding and influence”. 
Theories based upon interpretivism are said to be “fat with the juice of human endeavour, 
human decision making, zaftig with human contradiction, human emotion, human frailty” 
(Lincoln, 2010: 6). Interpretivism is a research leaning that prioritises and integrates the 
subjective experiences of people into the research context and requires researchers to interpret 
elements of the study, thus interpretivism integrates human interest into a study. Research 
carried out in this way may not be able to be generalised given the approach’s subjective nature, 
and no organisation is the same, however, making collective sense of multiple individual 
perspectives requires interpretation and interpretivism has academic support as a methodology. 
It is acknowledged that “interpretivist qualitative research” has much more than purely 
anecdotal value (Wainwright and Waring, 2008) so long that the interview data is codified 
based upon “the theoretical position of the research” (Ibid:86.). Bell and Thorpe (2013: 62) 
warn that interpretivist researchers need to be ready and able to “cope with uncertainty and 
take calculated risks”; that they are prepared to generate theory through cyclical and iterative 
processes whilst being prepared for “a change of direction as the research progresses”. 
4.1.4 Axiology 
Qualitative researchers are advised to make it clearly evident what the researcher values and 
believes in regarding the research (Ponterotto and Grieger; 2007). In terms of my research my 
values and beliefs, driven from my own personal biases, are made evident in Chapters 1, 2, 5 
and 6. My own values and beliefs effectively shape my ability to notice, interpret and make 
sense of organisational life. It is important to remember that the researcher’s “accounts of their 
reality are themselves constructions of reality and not reality itself” (Mercer 2007: 12 citing 
Anderson and Jones, 2000: 44). The values and beliefs of those researched are also paramount, 
rich with information to be able to better understand organisational phenomena. Conger et al. 
(2000:761) indicate that a researcher’s sensitivity to both the environment and the people in 
that environment has a reciprocitous quality (Bradford and Cohen, 1989; Gouldner, 1960). 
Reciprocity as an acknowledgement and acceptance of the research based upon a “genuine 
understanding by both parties of the value each has the potential to offer the other” 
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(Antonacopoulou, 2010: 220). In relation to personal drivers, SchÖn (1992: 53) reminds us that 
when a researcher determines an area of research he “decides what he will attend to and what 
he will ignore”, thereby already setting the course for the “direction for action.”. That direction 
of action will inevitably lead to impacting the lives of others somehow as well as that of the 
researcher. Shifting from “looking in on” to “being part of” (Anderson et al., 2015) contrasts 
methods posing “researchers as objective and neutral” and rather treat consequences of 
research not as “bias or unintended effects” (Luscher and Lewis, 2008: 238) but as planned, 
and being meaningful and purposeful. 
4.1.5 Research Alignment 
The table below developed from Ponterotto and Grieger (2007: 410) outlines the decisions I 
took about the research and shows how they dovetail into a credible approach and 
methodology. 
Consideration Explanation Composition 
Approach Type of research from a 
researcher and a 
researched standpoint. 
Constructivist and interpretivist approach 
enabled through an ethnography.  
Ontology What do I believe about 
knowledge as it exists? 
Multiple, equally valid, socially constructed 
realities. That many unique realities coexist 
together.  
Epistemology What do I believe about 
knowledge as it is 
created? 
Interactive researcher-participant 
development roles: potency of interaction 
uncovers deeper meaning and insight. That is 
co-created and dynamic.  
Axiology What the researcher 
believes about the 
research? 
Researcher interested in biases, views them as 
inevitable and worthy of exploration. Believes 
that the organisation and I can learn from the 
research. 
Rhetorical 
Structure 
How is this type of 
research most 
Description in the first person, relaying and 
relying “extensively on participant voices”. 
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appropriately written 
up? 
Prose tends to be emotive; subjective and that 
there are stories within stories.  
Method How will my research 
be performed? 
Qualitative, naturalistic, deeply interactive and 
collaborative. Reveals meaning through 
discussions, words and text.  
 
Table 4 – Research Alignment 
4.1.6 Ethnography 
One qualitative methodology stood out for me as I reflected upon how leaders lead within our 
organisation’s culture, and that was the qualitative research methodology described as 
ethnography. Ethnography literally translates to “write or represent a culture” (Tacchi et al., 
2003: 9). The methodology has, at its core, the research and investigation into a “culture sharing 
group” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008:78) and so it is an appropriate match for the research 
question. Jung et al., (2009) suggest that data creation methodologies for researching 
organisations includes “comparatively unstructured and emergent ethnographic approaches” 
and my research commenced from this perspective. 
Ethnography is a form of social research that features exploration on the nature of social 
phenomena, it works predominantly with unstructured data and “involves explicit 
interpretation of the meanings and functions of human actions, the product of which mainly 
takes the form of verbal descriptions and explanations” (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991: 435) consider ethnographic research as immersive and interactive 
and indicate that “interactions and experiences” constitute data that can be examined both from 
within and outside of the context. According to Jarolmack and Khan (2014: 237) ethnographers 
analyse and interpret data “in relation to observations of actors’ situated behaviour across a 
variety of social settings”.  
Some believe that ethnography falls under the broad umbrella of action research (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2010; Pedler, 2008), this covers a broad spectrum of research methodologies that 
have “pragmatism” as a core attribute (Eikeland, 2007) and “explicitly include both a problem-
solving interest cycle and a research interest cycle” (McKay and Marshall, 2001). Action 
research’s authenticity and credibility are wrapped up in utility and pluralism claim Greenwood 
and Levin (2007: 63) that offers an appropriate coupling to an “insider’s” ability to flow across 
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functional boundaries and operate at multiple layers in the organisation in order to improve 
some organisational phenomena. Ethnography is also a research method that emphasises the 
“co-creation of meaning” (Anderson et al., 2005:6) that was a critical axiological factor for me 
in terms of lasting organisational development. 
4.1.7 Ethnography And Its Relation With Action Research 
In a UNESCO funded research initiative Tacchi et al., (2003) found that combining 
ethnography and action research was useful in that they used “ethnography to drive the research 
process” and “action research to link the research process back the project’s plans and 
activities” (Ibid: 1). Bath (2009: 214) proposes that instead of trying to avoid slipping 
unintentionally from ethnography into something more interventionist that instead, one does 
so intentionally, thereby characterising “the methodology of an entire project as having an 
‘ethnographic action research’ methodology”. Jarolmack and Khan (2014) for example claim 
that careful ethnographers realise that the interview is part of the action that unfolds. They 
recognise the value of “ethnographic interviews”, not just as a form of data gathering, but also 
as being part of the action that is potentially embedded within an organisational context. 
Oquist (1978: 145) highlights the potential synergies available to researchers of practice when 
he describes how knowledge uncovered through the research process guides the “reality” of 
practice and how perceptions of “reality” are open for modification as a consequence. It is 
within action research, claims Oquist (Ibid.), that “knowledge is produced and reality modified 
simultaneously; each occurring due to the other.”. Bath (2009: 213) claims “the starting and 
finishing points for the action in an action research project become muddled and inevitably tied 
to the planning and evaluation stages” and she suggests that an “elision” between ethnography 
and action research exists. 
4.1.8 Action Research 
Action research is said to start with a desire to investigate “what we don’t know” in an attempt 
to “find out what we don’t know” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010: 141), a sustained emergent 
inquiry driven by what is investigated, revealed and illuminated and striven to be understood 
through research. Brannick and Coghlan, (2010: 4) describe the broad characteristics of action 
research as being; “research in action, rather than research about action, a collaborative 
democratic partnership, research concurrent with action, a sequence of events and an approach 
to problem-solving.” Action research takes place within executives’ natural work settings and 
has the potential to develop “self-help competencies in organisational members” (Coghlan, 
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2007: 294). “Excellent action research” has a central “emergent development form” where 
practical issues exposed democratically through intimate knowledge of the practice are 
researched in order to pursue “worthwhile purposes” (Reason, 2004: 270).  
Coghlan and Brannick, (2010: 6) claim that action researchers embrace the “epistemological 
assumption that the purpose of academic research and discourse is not only to describe, 
understand and explain the world but also to change it.” Action research also encourages the 
researcher to see themselves “as part of the problem that they wanted to resolve” (Pedler, 2008: 
46). It is cyclical, iterative and reflective, blending seamlessly periods of action, interpretation 
and analysis all informed by rigorous research. Quality in action research revolves around a 
clear demonstration of the enactment of cyclical transitions through research, reflection and 
action; reflection and action within a collaborative setting employing multiple data sources 
with the aim of creating the potential for co-generated insight, awareness and knowledge to 
emerge. 
McKay and Marshall (2001) offer a process model that shows how the real-world problems are 
researched and reflected upon in an interactive cyclical way.  
 
 
Figure 19 - Action Research Process Model from McKay and Marshall (2001). 
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Where P = real word problem or area of investigation, MR’ = action research, MPS = options 
and outcomes, A = issues and challenges associated with researching within the organisation 
and F = theoretical framework. When described in this way the two cycles (imperatives) are 
shown; “one cycle representing and focused on the problem-solving interest in AR, and the 
other cycle representing and focused upon the research interest in AR.” (McKay and Marshall, 
2001:57). I understand this as a model that advises reflection that is focussed on the current 
knowledge and how it relates to the research and the issues associated with it to then relook 
and/or revise the research themes, and at the same time a reflective cycle focused upon the 
actual problem and the potential outcomes all iterating through to come together to create the 
findings. Chapter 5 will show I followed this process model and my themes were revised and 
new ones were located that revealed new findings.  
Insider action research shifts seamlessly through iterative periods of organisational intimacy 
where the researcher is engaged in the problem through to periods of reflexive “withness-
thinking” (Shotter 2006), where the researcher is with the problem, and periods of detached 
academic analysis, where the problem is observable from a detached perspective. This flow 
can shift in the moment as the researcher and researched create new connections from emergent 
discoveries available if we “allow ourselves to be spontaneously responsive to the temporal 
unfolding of their expressive movements” (Ibid: 588). It is research which emphasises “meta-
competence over competence” where the ability to learn and adapt to situations beyond the 
one(s) currently presenting themselves (Anderson et al: 2015, 68). 
Friedman and Rogers (2009: 32) state that action research represents an appreciation and 
understanding of the world as the participants do, and the potential to create new realities. They 
also offer insights into what “good” action theory is comprised of (Ibid: 35-37) and using these 
and integrating additional important features and core characteristics from Greenwood and 
Lewin (2007), I created a research “checklist” that I used regularly to confirm that I was staying 
true to a credible action research process.  
• It is bound in real life context (Greenwood and Levin, 2007) 
• It is cognizant of, and sensitive to, the “meaning making” of the participants 
(Friedman and Rogers, 2009) 
• It takes participants inputs seriously through a process of collaborative 
communication. (Greenwood and Levin, 2007) 
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• It challenges “tacit processes, unconscious motivations and unawareness of 
unintended consequences “and creates, through inquiry, new previously hidden or 
unknown concepts” (Friedman and Rogers, 2009) 
• Its credibility and validity are judged upon workability and emancipation of 
participants (Greenwood and Levin, 2007) 
• It enables reframing, reinterpretations and resetting of core thinking strategies 
providing a framework for “disconfirmability” (Friedman and Rogers, 2009:37) and 
placing the responsibility for causal effects at the feet of the participants.  
4.1.9 Voices Against Action Research 
Action research is not unilaterally accepted as a research paradigm as disputes over its validity 
remain and although it may no longer deserve the branding of being “highly controversial” 
(Oquist, 1978: 143); it is nonetheless open to be contested and especially in the area of 
methodology. McKay and Marshall (2001) for example make the point that there are 
“comparatively few guidelines” describing how to put action research into practice, as they 
say, “how to do” action research (Ibid: 49). Frankham and Howes (2007: 628) warn that action 
research has no “blueprint” and consequently it is difficult to determine where a research 
project will go given the unpredictability of the “unfolding action as a joint production”. 
Argyris and SchÖn (1989: 612) lay out the challenge laid at the action researcher’s feet as a 
balance between “appropriate rigour without sacrificing relevance”. Whilst concerns over the 
efficacy of action research remain in some quarters the outcomes generated through the action 
research process are said to have significant potential. Action research represents an 
appreciation and understanding of the world as the participants see it, and some writers claim 
that theories emerging from action research are “subordinate to practical outcomes” (Friedman 
and Rogers, 2009: 32) whereas others suggest that it is the theories that not only influence but 
also can determine outcomes (Van de Ven, 1989). 
4.2 Ethical Considerations 
In this part of the thesis I describe the ethical approval process through the University of 
Liverpool’s committee on research ethics. This process was sponsored by my thesis supervisor 
Dr Lisa Anderson. The process was started upon completion of my application for approval of 
a project involving human participants, human data or human material that was dated 13th July 
2013. Approval to proceed with my research “An ethnographical analysis on the impact on the 
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interactions of senior leaders within a military HQ as they/we progress through a major 
organisational culture alignment process.” was received on 29th October 2013.  
Prior to my completion of the ethical approval process I needed to be sure that I would have 
the support of my own organisation and in a military organisation that starts very much at the 
top. I wrote requesting permission to study my organisation from the JWC Commander through 
the Chief of Staff and needed to repeat this twice as the Commander rotated out of the JWC. 
Once permission was given I then needed to ensure that all participants were considered. Each 
of the participants completed a consent form for participation in the research as well as 
participant information sheet (Appendix E) that was sent as a read ahead package, additionally 
I reiterated the information at the beginning of each of the interviews.  
The information sheet explained the purpose of the research, why they had been asked to 
participate, explained their “opt out” and that this option that could be initiated at any stage of 
the process. The sheet also explained how I would share and report on any findings, the 
confidentiality agreements and storage and eventual deletion of any data generated and that 
they were invited to contact my supervisor, at any time, if they had any additional concerns. 
Interviewing is a valid ethnographic process (Jarolmack and Khan, 2014: 237) but great care 
should be taken to ensure that the story is not unduly influenced in some way by the interviewer. 
I acknowledged and tried to prevent myself being “selectively inattentive to data incongruent 
with their theories” (SchÖn, 1992: 55) but am not able to assure myself I was successful. 
Frankham and Howes (2007) warn that attempts to “present other people’s understandings 
creates them as deficient and therefore should be avoided”; in effect, I found it unavoidable.  
Apart from the clear need to attain a formal ethical approval from the University it is also 
incumbent on the researcher to stay within the boundaries of that approval process throughout 
the research period and beyond. It is said that it is within action research that “politics and 
ethics combine” (Nugus et al., 2012: 1947). An insider researcher, especially one operating as 
a “complete member” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010), is in a negotiated privileged position that 
requires careful, sensitive handling. It comes with some risk (Mercer, 2007) and a significant 
ethical responsibility falls upon the shoulders of the researcher to reduce the risk that neither 
the research process nor the research outcomes, create harm to those involved. I prepared the 
information sheet with sufficient lack of detail in terms of what outcomes I was expecting to 
leave the participants freedom to manoeuvre, cognizant of Mercer’s (2007: 11) advice that 
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researchers should “avoid ‘contaminating’ their study by revealing too much about the 
expectations”. 
I also tried to maintain a level of objectivity regarding my own relationships with those who 
participated and in Appendix C, the Consolidated and Aggregated Interview Results, I felt that 
some of the participants had some sort of respect for what I was trying to achieve, their 
responses were more supportive and encouraging than others. Equally a vocal minority were 
not so supportive and wanted to highlight that it had been a somewhat foolhardy venture. I 
made a note of the relationship as experienced during the interview and also as I knew them to 
be, aware that an action researcher enjoys a fluid relationship with the researched (Mercer, 
2007). Coghlan (2007: 297) states that “friendship and research ties can vary in character from 
openness to restrictiveness” creating a risk of influencing the data in one way or another, a risk 
I feel is unavoidable but has to be recognised and made clear. Tacchi et al. (2003: 28) indicates 
that “people are normally willing to talk about themselves, their work and their life, with 
reasonable openness and honesty, provided that they perceive the researcher’s sincerity of 
interest, feel that they understand the researcher’s agenda, and trust the researcher’s statements 
on confidentiality” (Walsham, 2006: 323). As Argyris (1995: 115) identifies, researchers may 
make the claims that their research methods are neutral; “this claim does not stand up to careful 
scrutiny”. Insiders possess a “biography” that provides a “lived familiarity” with the 
individuals and organisations being researched (Mercer, 2007: 3). I determined to record these 
relationships and familiarities in the last column of Appendix C – the Consolidated and 
Aggregated Interview Results. 
As my research unfolded it became clear an ethnographic study focussed on leadership and 
organisational culture was not going to create the outcomes I had wanted in terms of 
organisational development. A more prevalent organisational issue emerged through the 
research and as the research developed it became clear that a change of tack would be advisable, 
I needed to supplement my ethnography with something more interventionist. This change of 
direction and focus was discussed at length with my supervisor, as was the potential 
requirement to initiate a new ethical approval process but since little else had changed other 
than an awareness that even during the interviews (already approved) action was already 
underway then it was determined that I was not required to start the ethical approval process 
again despite the methodology evolving into action research.  
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4.3 Method of Inquiry  
4.3.1 Interviews 
Qualitative research can have challenges around the “adequacy of data” purports Ponterotto 
and Grieger (2007: 414) which can be overcome through the use of “sufficient information-
rich cases (e.g. interviewees)”. They go on to recommend that the selection of those being 
interviewed are those with “in-depth experience with the phenomena under study” and who at 
the same time are able to “effectively express these experiences”. I kept this in mind as I 
selected the interview participants. According to Cadle et al. (2014) one to one interviews 
remains one of the main analytical and elicitation techniques used by organisational researchers 
and business analysts in search of information. Interviews are considered as “a key way of 
accessing the interpretations of informants in the field” (Walsham, 2006: 323). They are 
valuable as an approach towards elicitation, for “examining the mental models and establishing 
mental maps” and consequently claims, Dijkstra and Van Eijnatten (2005: 146), “theories in 
use” that was to become a key theme emerging as my research unfolded.  
As far as the interview structure is concerned Mercer (2007: 10) claims that semi-structured 
interviews are preferred to more formally structured processes and states that an 
“interactive/conversational approach may yield more extensive data” as long as the interviewer 
is prepared to cope with “digression and reordering of questions in the interest of establishing 
rapport”. This was to become an important aspect as my questions and the interview process 
evolved through the research period. It is within interpretivist research that “semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews” are utilised to begin to “explore different meanings, perceptions, 
and interpretations of organisational members” Cunliffe (2011: 659). Interviews as 
conversations, where participants reflect together both issues and insights, are potentially more 
informative and have greater potential for evolving into action (Cunliffe, 2011). Shotter’s 
(2006) position is stronger still, he warns against meeting the interviewees in anything other 
than “a situation of open-ended dialogue” and indicates that following check-lists or 
predetermined questionnaires risk humiliating the interviewee leading to a missed opportunity 
in the cocreation of a “dynamically unfolding inter-activity from within which relevant ‘action 
guiding call’ can emerge” (Ibid: 593). Interviews as conversations are also claimed to be able 
to become catalysts for new ways of thinking and also to generate actionable knowledge for 
both the “interviewer” and the “interviewee” as they operate within a “mutual learning 
situation” (Greenwood and Levin, 2007: 51). Interviews in this way have the ability to impact 
both the research and any ensuing actions.  
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4.3.2 Questions To Start The Conversation 
Based upon my experience and initial research I developed a list of questions overtime with 
the focus on confirming or otherwise the presence of specific organisational themes as 
described in Chapter 2. These questions were used as triggers to gain insights from the 
interviews and record how many times or how important the interviewee’s thoughts these 
themes were to our organisational effectiveness. The questions were created merging academic 
literature with my own knowledge of the context as reinforced through previous assessments. 
This initial list of questions was drawn from the context explained in Chapter 2 and the table 
below shows the questions and flow that I started my interviews off with as well as the main 
sources that encouraged these questions over others.  
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# Question To Illuminate Derived/Informed From Which Source 
1 In terms of your leadership is there anything that 
you do differently as a consequence of the 
organisational culture awareness process?  
If the interviewees notice any changes in their 
styles as a consequence of the cultural 
awareness process. To start to look for any 
common themes emerging within my context.  
Research showing the link between leadership 
and organisational culture (Kotter and Heskett, 
1992; Schein, 2010). 
2 In terms of your leadership and the way you 
communicate has anything changed as a result of 
the organisational culture awareness process? 
If the process had affected the methods of 
communication within the JWC. 
Staff surveys revealed that lower scoring 
attributes had communications as an apparent 
common thread (Hargreaves, 2012). 
3 In terms of your leadership and the language you 
use has anything changed as a result of the 
organisational culture awareness process? 
If the anecdotal reports of a “common 
language” appearing, was supported by the 
Command Group and Branch Heads.  
Research showing linkages between leadership 
and language (Denning, 2007; Marquardt, 
2005). 
4 In terms of your leadership what would you say was 
the most impactful part of the organisational culture 
awareness process? 
To identify any popular themes that seemed 
to resonate with the JWC and be able study 
these with a view to advising other similar 
organisations.  
Leadership as defined by personal traits or 
popular leadership themes - how to be/how to 
do (Jackson and Parry, 2010). 
5 In terms of your leadership what would you say was 
the least impactful part of the organisational culture 
awareness process? 
To identify any unpopular themes that 
seemed to resonate with the JWC and be able 
Leadership as defined by personal traits or 
popular leadership themes - how to be/how to 
do (Jackson and Parry, 2010). 
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study these with a view to advising other 
similar organisations against their use.  
6 Is there anything else that comes to mind regarding 
leadership and the organisational culture awareness 
process?  
To reveal anything that was missed, to 
identify blind spots and create a redirect for 
my research if required.  
A desire to reduce the impact of my research 
leading the interviewees in certain directions, 
to reduce confirmation bias and the inherent 
power of the interviewer (Hammond et al., 
1998; Bazerman and Moore, 2008). 
 
Table 5 – Intermediate Interview Questions 
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4.3.3 Data Analysis 
Within ethnography multimodal sources are encouraged, rich data is integrated and 
“relationalising” performed (Tacchi et al.: 2003) so as to reveal a holistic picture. Surveys are 
not performed and analysed separately from research journals and interviews are not isolated 
from physical observations. Ethnographers “try to look at all this knowledge and experience 
together and in relation to each other” (Ibid: 12), they try to make sense of it. They do so in the 
full awareness and appreciation of multiple realities, experiences and interpretations (Cunliffe 
et al., 2015) that has the potential to create copious amounts of data. If “adequacy of the data” 
is critical and important then “adequacy of interpretation” is equally critical and important 
(Ponterotto and Grieger, 2007: 415). To some extent, the reiterative nature of action research 
lends itself to thorough interpretation by the “deep immersion” of the researcher to lead to an 
“intimacy with the data” coming from cycles of analysing, interpreting and researching (Ibid). 
Semler (1997: 27) claims that solid theory starts with a broad analysis of “observational and 
case study data to identify any patterns of themes that seem to emerge from the phenomenon 
under study.” Interpreting qualitative data can be challenging (Bazerley and Jackson, 2013) 
and has been questioned in terms of its rigour, auditability and transparency. Thematic analysis 
attempts to make qualitative interpretation more auditable and transparent (Wainwright and 
Waring, 2008), altogether more rigorous. 
4.3.4 Thematic Analysis  
Walsham (2006: 324) insists that “Theory can be used as an initial guide to design and data 
collection” and as described within the paragraph on my interview questions I used practice 
and theory as the source of my questions, and the questions and responses were transcribed 
from the recording of each of the interviews performed.  
Analysing transcriptions effectively involves a number of critical tasks (Ryan and Bernard, 
2003: 85): 
• The discovery of themes 
• “winnowing” the important themes to “a manageable few” 
• creating theme hierarchies and 
• connecting the themes to established theoretical models.  
 
 
 
 
93 
Themes are intended to locate key things that are important within the data relating to the 
question being researched, “the ‘keyness’ of a theme is not necessarily dependant on 
quantifiable measures – but rather on whether it captures something important in relation to the 
overall research question” (Braun and Clarke, 2008: 82). Gioia et al., (2012: 21) reinforce the 
importance of this foundation; “No data structure, know nothing” they claim indicating the 
significance of analysing data in a structured, logical, inductive and illuminating manner.  
Tacchi et al. (2003) are not alone in thinking that thematic analysis is not simply generating a 
list and fitting them into genres, it involves interpretation and it is incumbent upon researchers 
to “demonstrate (through a transcendent story line) how the themes relate to one another and 
how the gestalt of the findings sheds light on the phenomena under study.” (Ponterotto and 
Grieger, 2007: 413). Researchers have an important responsibility to identify critical, relevant 
themes as the exploration unfolds. As the unfolding research journey, informed by those 
themes, follows a trajectory guided by those themes (Ryan and Bernard, 2003: 86). Themes 
may be revealed and developed through the interviews in the moment, and/or later on “pawing 
through the texts” to expose repetitions, metaphors and multiple accounts of similar 
experiences (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). Effective analysis of themes “involves searching across 
a data set to find repeated patterns of meanings” (Braun and Clarke, 2008: 86).  
Wainwright and Waring (2008) warn against being overly reliant upon coding as this may lead 
to may lead to incomplete or stifled analysis as a researcher is seduced into fitting loosely 
coupled themes together and missing the richer picture (Bazerley and Jackson, 2013: 8). Others 
claim the opposite, that thematic analysis is useful because its ability to summarise key 
characteristics of large data sets, it enables a “thick” description to emerge, is particularly 
useful “with participants as collaborators” and is said to have the potential “to generate 
unanticipated insights” (Braun and Clarke, 2008: 97). “Thick” descriptions described as being 
the “linchpin of qualitative writing” according to Ponterotto and Grieger (2007: 415). It was as 
a consequence of the “thick descriptions” that emerged, that drove a change in the methodology 
as the first research iteration ended.  
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4.4 Summary 
My research was performed as qualitative research, initially based upon ethnography given its 
relevance into researching cultures and leadership. As the research matured it became evident 
that what I was looking at was no longer a somewhat disassociated analysis into leadership 
themes but rather the analysis of an emergent leadership phenomenon that was hidden, in plain 
view (Shotter, 2010). In trying to really understand what was going on in my own organisation 
I sensed an opportunity to help it evolve. Cunliffe et al., (Chapter 4, 2008) advise that it is futile 
to avoid the effects of “the situated experience of researching” and I have realised that even in 
asking questions in the initial informal workshops I was already performing action research to 
some extent; bridging the academia/practice divide.  
4.4.1 Individual and Organisational Learning  
Jackson and Parry (2010:35) advise that trying to figure out “what is going on here?” is likely 
to dominate and drive the way that the research evolves. That may involve inductive insights 
as one sees “connections between aspects of one’s circumstances that one has not seen before 
– connections that might provide one with action guiding anticipations” (Shotter, 2010: 271). 
According to Bell and Thorpe (2013; 112), due to the dynamic and often interpretative nature 
of management research, it is not uncommon for researchers of management to only really 
understand their research methods after the research is completed. The research then will be a 
collaboration between me as a researcher and my management practice, or as Coghlan and 
Brannick (2010) refer to it as the “system” and my aim is to allow the development of both 
parties as shown on page 86: 
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Where my 
organisation was 
prior to the 
research 
  
 
Where I want my 
organisation to 
be afterwards 
 
Figure 20 - Focus of Researcher and System Continuum (Coghlan and Brannick, 
2010: 103)  
In this diagram Coghlan and Brannick, (2010, p. 103) show in quadrants the interdependencies 
and approaches associated with organisational and personal learning. My aim was to take my 
own personal learning through the DBA period and hopefully enable and encourage my 
organisation to develop alongside me to move from an environment where little organisational 
(system) study and learning was evident to a place where organisational learning and 
development, the study of itself and reacting to the results of the study, would be embedded 
into the organisation’s procedures as well as the mindsets or the organisation’s leaders.  
4.4.2 Methodology and Methods Mapped Across The Wider DBA Timeline 
Bell and Thorpe (2013: 133) articulate that “Management research is an area where a great deal 
of the skills, knowledge and competence that goes into doing it, is acquired tacitly, rather than 
explicitly.” In Figure 21 below I display across a timeline, both the research and subsequent 
interventions and the impact of the research through time. The green timeline represents 
specifically the thesis-related activities and the blue timeline the phases and activities where 
the impact was felt; either as a consequence of immediately trying to bring my learning back 
into my organisation (through interventions, articles and workshops) or as the thesis 
interventions.  
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Coghlan and Holian (2015: 3) describe action research as an “emergent inquiry process 
engaged in an unfolding story, where data shift as a consequence of intervention and where it 
is not possible to predict or to control what takes place.”. It is said that “excellent action 
research” (Reason, 2004: 270) evolves in and through time, reflexively in the moment and 
through periods of associated and disassociated reflection; prioritising “reflection in action” 
over “reflection on action” (Anderson et al, 2015: 68). Referring again to Figure 21 it may 
appear that the flows captured in the Figure were independent, in fact, I continued to connect 
organisational learning and transformation with personal learning and transformational 
learning (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010) throughout the period of the research and long after the 
research was completed.  
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Figure 21 - Research, Interventions and Impact through Time 
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Chapter 5 – The STORY 
 
This Chapter describes the history and drivers that influenced the direction that my research 
commenced from and goes on to explain why the research focus was adjusted. It tells the 
research story in two phases; Phase 1 supported by the literature described in Chapter 3 
describes the research journey up to a change of research direction and focus as a reaction to 
the analysis performed. Phase 2, also informed by the literature in Chapter 3, describes how I 
integrated literature and research into organisational interventions to facilitate personal and 
organisational development. In Figure 20 I attempt to visualise this shift in focus through time 
as the process of iterative analysis/research cycles shifted my attention and how my contextual 
and situational awareness grew thereby setting the scene for the action story part 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 22 - Research Focus Through Time  
5.1 Story Part 1 
In the period before Phase one, through the DBA and my own research into management and 
organisation, I had come to appreciate in the literature that leadership theories had evolved 
from looking for, or developing traits, to something more suited to the organisational 
environment where that leadership was practised; regarding organisational culture I had come 
to believe that certain organisational themes would stand out and began to anticipate that these 
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themes and leadership traits would come together to reveal certain areas where developmental 
options would be revealed. I had not at that stage spent much time looking at authenticity in 
leadership as I was not aware of the challenges that my organisation appears to have in this 
regard. 
5.1.1 Influences On JWC Organisational Culture And Leadership 
The NATO Military Structure is made up of soldiers, sailors, airmen and women from the 29-
member nations and military organisations do not exist as microcosms but are responsive to 
strong national demographic influences; what is considered as good leadership practice in one 
situation may not be considered so for another nation and so forth. My 300-person practice is 
representative; it is a diversely populated mix from 15 of the NATO member nations and there 
are national and service tensions evident that influence how international military leadership is 
enacted. The JWC is composed of a mix of Nations and services (Army, Navy and Air Force) 
embedded within a strict hierarchy reinforced through the application of C2. Military 
organisations generally tend to be proud stable bodies whose success is often attributed to the 
application of formal processes that are trainable, repeatable and somewhat intractable (Meijer, 
2012). They have strong organisational cultures that are notoriously difficult to change (March, 
2008). Militaries seek out and strive for uniformity and do so by “emphasizing core values that 
become an integral part of military culture and experience” (Redmond et al., 2015: 14). Many 
organisations have evolved their organisational cultures to adapt to the times yet in most cases 
for military entities formal hierarchies and “chains of command” remain prevalent. Hardly 
surprising given that military C2 practices have evolved through hundreds of years’ worth of 
military operations and doctrine development. Ironically the JWC, the site of the research, is 
charged with “transformation”; it is meant to innovate, develop new concepts, to challenge 
former processes and reliance upon hierarchy yet it seeks to do so through the same practices 
and processes that are applied to the rest of NATO.  
NATO organisational structures are relatively fixed and very difficult to change requiring NAC 
approval and whilst NATO invests heavily on creating commonality within formal processes 
how these organisations operate internally, how work actually gets done, is determined by 
things that are far less tangible. So, in spite of the commonality structurally and procedurally 
within NATO HQ’s, individual HQ’s still tend to have different cultures and consequently 
work differently; an example is the HQs that have identical mandates, the Joint Force 
Commands in Brunssum and Naples (see Figure 2). When I asked people who had worked at 
both these HQs, of their day to day experiences, I was consistently told that they were totally 
 
 
 
100 
different in the way things got done. One staff officer remarked that “the way they worked 
was poles apart” and here we start to feel the pervasive influence of organisational cultures; 
same structures, same processes, but so dependent upon the individuals filling the positions in 
the command. Individuals with life stories, personal histories tempered through service and 
national influences, all of which have a profound impact on the leadership practices within the 
organisation.  
National operational caveats, driven by political and geopolitical aspirations, provide a good 
example of how nationality impacts the organisation. Germany for example, described as “the 
poster child for caveats” (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012: 76), has an approach whereby their 
soldiers are the most constrained, being unable to deploy into certain areas. The US, on the 
other hand, have far fewer constraints placed upon them and consequently, end up in the most 
challenging operational environments. The coming together of these national cultures into a 
multinational setting is challenging in many areas as Schein (2010:397) points out “Cultural 
diversity breeds more communication problems, especially at hierarchic boundaries because 
the rules of deference and demeanour are so highly variable around the world and across 
occupations.” As we have already seen in Chapter 3 deference and demeanour are highly 
relevant for an organisation dependent upon C2. 
Service tensions (challenges in operating “jointly” independent of the service) are often also 
very evident and these tensions create significant challenges for leadership. How a Turkish 
Army sergeant anticipates and reacts to leadership is very different from how a Norwegian Air 
Force sergeant expects to be led. Hofstede et al (2010: 61) remarking that power distance, the 
extent by which those lower in an organisation expect and consent to power being unequally 
distributed, is shaped by the origins of the individual with Northern Europeans being less likely 
to accept high power distance than those in southern Europe (Ibid: 82). What people from Asia 
believe is important in an organisational setting is not always what northern Europeans might 
consider an organisational norm. These aspects, grounded in Chapter 3, and to be 
contextualised within the story in Chapter 5, will show how the JWC measured the current 
organisational culture and determined where it wanted to be instead. These surveys were both 
internally created (by me through the DBA program) and externally created (through an 
independent consultancy) and revealed areas of perceived weaknesses as well as strengths. 
Leaders identified and then espoused the sort of culture they wanted to see, they created and 
published a set of JWC values (Appendix D); to inform behaviours and leaders were asked by 
the commander to “live the values”.  
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In order to operate effectively, an organisation may strive to operate in such a way that national, 
service and the establishment in which they serve do not create unnecessary tensions or 
organisational confusion. Leadership then, if it is to be effective should strive to find a way to 
operate within the sweet spot of these cultural influences. It follows that the establishment, the 
organisational influences, have more ability to be shaped by leaders than national or service 
influences that are largely predetermined historically.  
.  
 
 
 
Figure 23 - Overlapping cultural influences  
 
Dauber et al., (2012: 2) in discussing a “configuration model of organisational culture” describe 
organisations as a feature of the “dynamics relationships between four central and recurring 
organisational characteristics”; strategy, structure, culture and operations as described in 
Chapter 2. The JWC’s strategy is evolving as a response to a changing world (predominantly 
the reduction in activities in Afghanistan and the rise in tensions due to a resurgent Russia), its 
structure is being modified to try and be more responsive in allocating resources to task, climate 
in terms of adopting, where we can, more effective operations through policy and procedural 
alignment and finally through intentionally shaping our organisational culture and all these 
efforts are dependent upon effective and appropriate leadership.  
 
 
 
 
102 
5.1.2 JWC Operating Environment 
As explained within the Chapter 2 describing the research context the external environment of 
the JWC is dynamic and evolving. The JWC mandate falls under the strategic commander who 
is tasked with NATO Transformation. This sets the environment under which JWC operates 
and alongside this transformational mandate other external influences are impacting our 
organisation. The model below was introduced in Chapter 3 and it has been contextualised to 
create an organisational model for the NATO JWC.  
 
Figure 24 - JWC Alignment: Contextual Model  
5.1.3 JWC Mission 
The operating environment impacts the mission of the JWC, sets the focus of the commander 
and should align all other organisational constructs to support and ultimately deliver the 
mission objectives. In the military context, missions are filtered down from the very top of the 
organisation (in NATO’s case the NAC) and the organisations receiving these missions have 
very little room to negotiate, they are expected to get them done.  
 
5.1.4 JWC Organisational Structure 
Structures can be described as “the manifestation of strategic orientations and regulate 
information flows, decision making, and patterns of behaviour”, it means that “levels of 
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hierarchy and control” are located within this domain (Dauber et al., 2012: 7). O’Toole et al.’s 
(2008: 39) posit that an individual’s agency within an organisation is limited by the very 
structures of that organisation. They go on to say that this phenomenon is “exacerbated 
hierarchical organisations found in the armed forces with their emphasis on rank and chain of 
command.” The structure also has a symbiotic relationship with the procedures, policies and 
rules utilised, the “climate” of the organisation (Schneider, 1996).  
 
5.1.5 JWC Organisational Climate 
Organisational climates are defined by the policies and procedures in place, are overt and 
intentionally normative in nature; they are descriptions, often written, about how things are to 
be done. An organisation’s climate then lends itself “to direct observation and measurement” 
(Schein, 1990: 109). Schneider et al. (1996: 9) offer a model where he states that “Climate and 
culture are interconnected. Employees’ values and beliefs (part of culture) influence their 
interpretations of organisational policies, practices, and procedures (climate).” Climate refers 
to a specific context (in this situation this is what you do), it is both specific and temporal and 
is according to Denison (1996: 640) at risk of being “subject to direct manipulation by people 
with power and influence”. Cultures on the other hand, are more generalised, historical 
“collectively held, and sufficiently complex to resist any attempts at direct manipulation” (Ibid: 
644).  
 
5.1.6 JWC Organisational Culture 
Underpinning these critical organisational components of mission, structure and climate is the 
organisational culture. The values and beliefs that exist in the minds of the people in the 
organisation. As mentioned in the context the JWC has defined values (Appendix D) that 
espouse innovation, support, inclusivity and accountability and has made great efforts in 
publicising and promoting these on order to try and reinforce and embed these values in the 
staff working upon Schein’s (2010: 18) claim that “culture has a normative effect upon 
organisations”. Informed by the literature then I set about trying to determine how the JWC’s 
culture looked across a broad number of themes already presented in the context and the results 
of this internal analysis can be seen below as Figure 25: 
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Figure 25 - JWC Organisational Culture Snapshots 
What I believe is interesting here in Figure 25 is that the shape of the curve remains consistent, 
over a 3-year period, whatever the mix of people surveyed. Organisationally we have the same 
peaks and troughs, I informally briefed the JWC Chief of Staff (COS) on what the results of 
the surveys; expressing that they were revealing, fairly consistently, a pattern (low “feedback” 
scores, low “appreciation” scores, high “commitment”, high “respect” scores). It was from 
evidence like this I started to develop my interview process and questions.  
5.1.7 Interview Construct 
Utilising semi-structured one to one interviews with 18 senior leaders and managers I attempted 
to provide an environment where the leaders and managers can reflect and talk about any 
relationships between culture and their leadership. To be transparent here I disclose that I fully 
expected and wanted to hear an explanation of the shape of the graph; I wanted them to ponder 
and describe any changes for them personally, between themselves at the senior levels and also 
with each other as they go about their leadership. With the agreement of the interviewees, the 
interviews were all recorded and then the recording transcribed. The transcriptions enabled me 
to make a deeper analysis, decipher, codify the data and, importantly to revisit the text on the 
basis of new themes emerging.  
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Half of my interviewees were from the very top layer of our organisation (Command Group) 
and I refer to these as the “leaders” (positional, a noun rather than performance, a verb) and 
half of them who operated as direct reports to the Command Group (Branch Heads) and I refer 
to these as the “managers”. The nine “leaders” represented all on the command group that had 
been in JWC more than a year. They were not screened in any other way than being in the role 
of senior decision makers with some corporate knowledge.  
The managers (Branch Heads) had all also been at the JWC for more than a year and through 
the culture awareness workshops described in Chapter 2. Potentially there were 20 candidates 
at this level in the organisation I selected nine so as to have some balance to the leader-manager 
ratio. Everyone I asked agreed to participate and signed consent forms. I was interested in 
analysing their experiences of the leaders and their perceptions of their leadership practice. I 
wanted to understand how they experienced leadership in the organisation. I factored in their 
availability and, based upon “insider knowledge” selected individuals who would not be afraid 
to speak their minds. These individuals had performed strongly over their respective pre-JWC 
tours and in some cases within JWC had been selected for special assignments. The selected 
managers were well respected amongst their peers and leaders, trusted agents, often called upon 
to lead specific missions, they were highly respected by the leaders for their capabilities. They 
were, in effect, the JWC’s “tempered radicals” (Meyerson and Scully, 1995) knowledgeable, 
confident, vocal and robust enough to tell their story.  
Where possible, as this filtering allowed, I mixed nationalities and service but not gender. We 
have no females currently operating at this level in my centre. The spread is shown below in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Demographic Spread of Interviewees 
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I determined based around the staff’s rotation period (typically two years) that I would not be 
able to show my research or finding to the participants, this was understood and accepted by 
all the people who took part.  
 
5.1.8 Interview Considerations 
As well as using the literature as I prepared for the interviews I thought about the military 
context and so decided to utilise the NATO “best practice” techniques for successfully 
interviewing military personnel (Thordsen et al., 2012). The interviews were unhurried leaving 
time for the respondents to gather their thoughts, I also tried very hard to use “silence” and left 
where appropriate gaps to allow the respondent time to reflect and formulate their response 
(Kline, 1999). Cunliffe (2011: 664) reminds us that research involving interviews, particularly 
semi or unstructured ones, is “relational” research and positions the researcher as being “an 
integral part of meaning making” and urges researchers to be aware of the influential role the 
researcher plays in the process. I decided that the interviewees may be more comfortable being 
interviewed in their own offices rather than mine and so all interviews were performed in 
locations where they should have been more at ease than in a different place. In order to release 
myself from the burden of remembering or writing the actual words used I recorded the 
interviews and I listened to the recordings twice, highlighted text and noted down key themes.  
I followed the methodology related to ethical research and took great care to try and ensure that 
no harm came to the participants (Mercer, 2007). I was not so careful around securing my own 
safety and was not prepared fully for the polarising effect researching my own leaders seemed 
to have nor the impact upon me personally as I describe in more detail in Chapter 6. As far as 
the researched were concerned I was able to follow the processes described in the methodology 
and methods Chapter. I maintained all data securely and stripped the data of anything that 
would identify where the data originated from. When feeding back to the organisation the 
findings I was careful to talk only in generic terms so that only those who had provided their 
insights, that were now useful as feedback, were aware that they were responsible for the data.  
Timing the research was a challenge; the JWC is required to perform much of their output, the 
training of staff from other HQ’s, in various locations away from the site in Stavanger, Norway. 
This meant that I had to stagger interviews based on their availability and workload and in 
some cases, this led to weeks between some interviews and several months between the first 
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and final interviews. The downside to that approach was that I was then performing the 
interviews within a different context for the interviewees; the upside was that it allowed me to 
start to analyse the data and start to see patterns in their responses. In any case, as I reflected 
upon this situation it was clear that I was unable to do anything about it. I decided therefore to 
utilise the time between the interviews to type up recordings, review my interview notes, 
analyse the transcripts and review my journal. This decision influenced heavily the change of 
research direction that was to come as part way through the interviews as I became aware of 
something that appeared to be emerging was more prevalent and consistent than the themes I 
had expected to find and I cover that in more detail later in this Chapter.  
 
5.1.9 Interview Process 
During the interview introductions, I followed a prewritten script that explained my personal 
interest in the topic and my desire to encourage some sort of organisational development. I 
tried hard to remain transparent throughout the process and hoped that would bring out the 
same from the participants. Walsham (2006: 322) warns that participants “may be less open 
and honest with the researcher in cases where he or she is perceived to have a vested interest.”  
According to Braun and Clarke (2008: 83) the theory associated with the analysis of interviews 
involves starting to look at the transcriptions and data with no preconceived ideas of what 
themes will emerge, “a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing 
coding frame,” thereby ensuring that the analysis performed is driven by the data and not from 
the “researcher’s analytical preconceptions”. I did not find that this was practical in my case 
and as I highlighted in the methodology chapter my own preconceptions, reinforced by being 
data-driven, were not easily put aside. Other researchers claim that generating themes is not as 
a result of following “mechanical or scientific” processes, but rather that it involves 
interpretation through exploration of the data. The themes that emerge “will depend on what is 
important to the people you are studying; what is interesting to you and your project; what you 
think is going on.” Tacchi et al. (2003: 42). Given that I had already a number of themes that 
had emerged through the internal surveys I was already expecting to see some themes strongly 
represented in the interview and following the transcript analysis. 
 
5.1.10 Interview Analysis  
Given the challenges I had with interviewee availability exposed in 5.1.8, I determined to 
analyse my notes from the reflexive journal (Table 10) and the transcripts between interviews 
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and start to fill out the thematic grid (Appendix F). The grid was consequently already 
populated with some themes that my own early internal research had exposed and then 
enhanced with themes that the literature review had informed me were likely to feature. I refer 
to these in this thesis as the “themes” so as to differentiate from other unexpected higher-level 
topics which were later revealed. In addition, prompted by an awareness of the serendipitous 
nature of management research, I left empty rows across this grid for new themes to be revealed 
through the interviews. In following the approach described by Wainwright and Waring (2008: 
92) described in Chapter 2 as themes were mentioned, or as new ones emerged, I made note of 
the theme and how relevant that theme appeared to be for the interviewee. My intention in this 
part was to try and identify and record the presence of themes within the interviews that had 
already been revealed through my own workshops and through staff surveys whilst capturing 
any new themes that emerged.  
As I completed my fifth interview and subsequent analysis I started to become aware that 
themes I had expected to hear about, that I had been already prepared to reconfirm within the 
thematic grid, did not feature as often, nor were they as important to the interviewees, as I had 
assumed. There was little in terms of correlation with the themes that both my literature review, 
and my own experiences, suggested would be present. Indeed, within their individual 
descriptions, themes I had anticipated were sometimes not mentioned at all, or if they were, 
they seemed to be lower in significance to the topics they instead wanted to emphasise, 
examples of which can be see within the thematic grid at Appendix F. Themes reported in these 
early interviews appeared to be highly individual and, in many cases, unique as can be seen in 
Appendix C (themes emerging column) although several of them that were not unique and 
resonated with more than one person are shown below by topic. 
5.1.10.1  Walking The Talk  
In terms of the alignment of the words leaders used and the subsequent deeds observed it was 
recognised as being an important feature for our organisation. One leader even announced that 
he had edited his signature block to account for how important authenticity and coherence was 
for him: 
L8 – “I put in my signature block “say what you do and do what you say! So 
everybody can see that and I try to stick to that.” 
Despite it being known that walking the talk was important though it was evident that it was 
not being observed as the following examples from the interviews show: 
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L2 – “for people, it’s just talk right now, need to get to action, deeds not 
words (repeated 3 times), real disconnect what we are doing and what we 
think we are doing, know do gap” 
 
M6 – “Being aware is not the same as acting on it. There is definitely a 
piece missing about leading by example. If you want certain behaviours you 
have to live by it. Do as I do and do as I say. You must live by what you say, 
because if you don’t it’s a credibility issue again.”  
 
These statements reinforced a growing awareness in me that both leaders and managers knew 
how important it was to be authentic and yet were not being observed as walking the talk.  
5.1.10.2  Too old to change  
Many of the leaders who claimed to know how important it was to be authentic and that they 
had changed along the way were also claiming that the time for change had passed them by or 
that there was nothing in it for them to adopt different leadership behaviours. This again 
reinforced my thinking towards a lack of authenticity:  
L5 – “Certain structures of behaviour are fixed, I do not pretend to change 
my behaviour.” 
 
L9 – “We are mostly over 50 and a cynical (mentioned 7 times during the 
interview) bunch”  
 
Another manager not only hinted at the relative seniority of the leaders and managers but also 
raised the issue I introduced in Chapter 3 (3.1.5) which was the sometimes polarising impact 
of nationality.  
M8 – “It’s not relevant for us. I am sceptical about the survey and cynical 
about the results. Many people here are at the end of their careers with too 
much deference to National lines rather than military chains of command.” 
5.1.10.3  Leadership Is Power 
Many managers and leaders seemed to connect leadership and power in such a way that orders 
and commands were indications of leadership in action. Many claimed to want empowerment 
and autonomy and yet others stated the opposite.  
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L6 – “What I am sometimes missing is that an order is an order and that 
we are really used to follow or to give orders and that a timeline is a timeline 
and not a basis for a new discussion.” 
 
M9 – “As a marine I might say “I need YOU to do this, can you do it?” or 
I might not ask that, just say “Get it done!” The ability for somebody to say 
“no I don’t want to do something for personal reasons” and there’s no 
repercussions to it amazes me.” 
 
Several of those interviewed recorded they most fulfilling leadership moments was when they 
had the most direct power as shown by the quote that follows: 
M1 – “Missing the “old days”, I was a platoon, company, battalion 
leadership commander, my Battalion was 700” 
5.1.10.4  Leadership Is Based On Traits 
A fourth aspect that resonated with my literature review was that some clearly felt that certain 
traits defined leadership and that “perfect leadership” could be taught and somehow stayed as 
relevant, in some cases for more than 30 years.  
L4 – “Well in my younger days you were educated that there is something 
which makes up a perfect leader. It’s best practice, part of officers training 
and education since the beginning.”  
 
Commanders act in one way, the others expected to act within another set of behaviours:  
 
L5 – “I expect the commander to give orders, the Chief of Staff to organise.” 
 
Finally, a trait that came up a number of times in the interviews was that leaders were 
sometimes considered to be somewhat distant and unavailable. Managers felt that there 
was not enough contact with the staff and that leadership by walking around was a trait 
that leaders should display:  
 
M2 – “Across the board we don’t see enough of the leaders wandering the 
corridors.” 
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This was a rather challenging, occasionally dark time for me personally, as it unravelled what 
I thought I knew. The knowledge I had experientially, from the literature and expected to be 
reinforced through the study was found to be lacking. My way ahead remained unclear for 
several weeks as I tried to make sense of this. What was clear to me was that there was a 
disparity that seemed to be emerging and that my interview technique and content was not 
allowing sufficiently what appeared to be hidden, to reveal itself.  
5.1.11 Interview Evolution  
This somewhat “strategic” pause though enabled me to realise that there was more in the 
transcripts and analysis than I was first prepared to see. The themes that I had from earlier 
experiences and surveys were there, but there was something else too, something more 
prevalent yet undiscovered. After some time and my stepping away from the search for themes 
I came to the realisation that my questions searching for themes was perhaps hindering the 
exposition of other organisational attributes, what I refer to as “topics”. After a break of some 
weeks, I returned to the analysis and whilst re-analysing the transcripts I started to sense 
something that drew me out of the detail and into the general, away from specifics and towards 
broader trends. This defocusing was initially counter-intuitive to me and I found myself 
troubled that I was no longer able to articulate what I didn’t know in terms of what I wanted to 
know. Looking at the data again as though it was new, as though it was the first time (Cunliffe, 
2004) revealed new topics and provided different data, some of which was irrelevant for this 
research, but some which would not have emerged had I continued to search for the themes I 
was hoping to find. I intentionally made the decision not to religiously follow the prepared 
questions but rather allow the interviewee the room for manoeuvre to explore issues that were 
on their minds. This enabled some topics that might have remained hidden to emerge and 
occasionally these new topics provided a rich vein of discussions and pointers for action. 
As I reflected again on the five interviews that I had performed already it became clear to me 
that by following a thoughtfully crafted “open-ended” interview script and following the 
questions dogmatically I was having unintended consequences. The approach generated 
diversions in, or stopped altogether, the flow of the discussion and the flow of the information. 
It also became evident that some of the leaders and managers just wanted to be heard; I felt that 
many of the interviewees seemed to have prepared what they wanted to get off their chest. Any 
attempts to follow the semi-structured process I had intended to follow was unable to prevent 
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a diversion to something that they felt just needed to be aired or shared. Consequently, although 
I still explored each area of interest looking for themes I did so more as the conversation 
evolved; instead of me guiding the interview I purposefully enabled the interviewee to take the 
lead. As a conscious reaction to the new emerging themes, I determined to widen the envelope 
of the interviews to broaden the perspective to try and determine whether there was consistency 
in the results that had so far emerged through the process. Theses evolved questions are shown 
below: 
 
• Did the organisational culture alignment process affect your leadership? 
• Did the organisational culture awareness process affect how you 
communicate? 
• Did you observe changes in the leadership of your peers? 
• Did you observe changes in the leadership of leaders (if a manager) or 
managers (if a leader) 
• Did you observe changes in the way you communicate with your peers? 
• Did you observe changes in the way that leaders (if a manager) or managers 
(if a leader) communicate? 
 
I had not at this point given up all hope of discovering organisational and leadership themes 
but as I mentioned in section 5.1.10 I was also by now fairly sure there was something else 
lurking beneath the surface. As the follow-on interviews were performed I still “ticked off” the 
themes that were covered and only if they had not been explored through the interview did I 
then raise them.  
 
So despite continuing to hold a strong personal view that leadership and culture are related and 
that certain themes would reveal themselves as being a help or hindrance to an organisational 
culture change programme, I needed to put that to the back of my mind and look more closely 
at what was being presented, to ask myself what was really going on here. Through the thematic 
analysis, and part way through the interviews, an unexpected and much broader organisational 
topic emerged; that there appeared to be a fundamentally different view of leaders as they saw 
themselves compared with that seen through the eyes of the managers.  
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5.1.12 Aggregating the Feedback 
When aggregating the feedback and trying to make sense of the thick descriptions emerging 
organisational dissonances become profoundly evident. Predicted themes gave way to 
unexpected topics. I offer three examples of the several that could be used to exemplify this. 
Taking for example the theme of communication, leaders typically claimed that they and the 
organisation had become better at it: 
L2 - “I think it’s a huge, huge leap forward probably one of the most 
significant things that we have done, there is a common language across 
the organisation, things that are understood the same way by everybody” 
“It’s been really exciting to see a common language across the Joint 
Warfare Centre. With the culture shaping process that we’ve gone through 
for the past year or so has been really good for me personally because it has 
given us all a common language to speak.” 
 
Another interviewee also expressed the view that a common language was beginning to 
emerge in a way that had not been predicted or intended: 
 
L3 – “In the language we started to use and it was not given as a 
requirement to use a certain language at a certain point but people started 
using certain language which is now during the process we already went 
through as the organisation……………..this is a kind of common language 
we have created and it develops it develops from the day-to-day business. 
 
Another respondent identified that the senior leadership team were now giving feedback 
that others in the organisation were responding to: 
 
L9 - “I think the senior leadership is doing well, and telling people that they 
are doing a good job, in a credible way, I think they are very good at what 
they do.” 
 
At first glance there seems to be a compelling view of development and growth; until their 
direct reports, the managers’ responses are considered where some of their responses were in 
sharp contrast to the leaders’ version of reality:  
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M7 - “There is definitely a change in communication but I’m not sure it’s 
all for the better, if you really want people to care you need to talk to people 
directly not send an email, not make a phone call, and you need to seriously 
listen to what people have to say, not just to pay lip service” 
 
Not only does this quote challenge the claims of the leaders, it also starts to reveal a perceived 
lack of authenticity. This is reinforced other managers: 
 
M3 - “I hear them speaking a lot of good speak but it’s not believable and 
that actually makes the whole situation worse” 
 
Another manager talked about the apparent lack of consistency in the approach of the 
senior leadership team: 
 
M6 – “I think they have tried to adjust, ..........there is something missing I 
thing between the Senior Leadership something not quite gelling at the 
moment, I’ll be honest with you, I can ‘t put my finger on that, I am not 
sure whether it is a Leadership style, I don’t know whether it’s National 
issues, I don’t know whether it’s personality but there seems to be, to me 
the Command Group is not just sort of gelling as it right at the moment and 
I am not quite sure why that is, so yeah there is definitely something not 
quite working, is my observation.” 
 
So despite the leadership team appearing to be congratulating themselves their observers said 
little that validated meaningful change. Some of the managers’ comments were particularly 
focused on the mismatch between what leaders thought they were doing and how their 
behaviour appeared to others: 
 
M4 - “If you want certain behaviour then you have got to live by it, you 
know you can’t criticise staff for a lack of communication and be guilty 
of it yourself. The humility bit comes into that again, to say look I am 
aware of what our weaknesses are and we will jointly work on that, I get 
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that, but they have got to be in a position to do that, do as I do and do as 
I say.”  
 
There also appeared to be an issue with the way in which the members of the senior 
leadership team interacted with each other: 
 
M5 - “The relationships between the command group aren’t always 
productive and that’s because they are not having those, you know those 
professional behaviours that you expect, you must live by what you say 
because if you don’t it’s a credibility issue again.” 
 
One interviewee offered the opinion that the change in language, prompted by the 
culture change programme, actually had a detrimental effect on the organisation: 
 
M3 - “I hear them speaking a lot of good speak but it’s not believable 
and that actually makes the whole situation worse, it’s really that simple, 
there is a mismatch I think, personally, between, at JWC at the moment 
between what is being said and what is being done.” 
 
Others commented that they had not observed any discernible changes, either in the 
way that the senior leadership team perceived their role or on their actions: 
 
M7 - “I’m not really clear on what has changed from the Command 
perception. Being aware is not the same as acting on it.” 
 
Reassuringly some of the more enlightened leaders appeared to be conscious of this 
authenticity challenge with one remarking that: 
 
L1 - “It’s not just about walking the walk, it’s how we as leaders’ act, 
what shadow we cast........... I may be one of the people who has a stop 
gap between knowing it and living it.” 
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In a similar revelation and contextualisation one leader revealed the importance of words 
matching deeds but then seemed to attribute the inability to act accordingly, to match the deed 
to the word, to the hierarchy:  
 
L8 – “You know it kind of goes back to words and deeds and actions you 
know right now if there is somebody out there may have a good idea on 
how to do something differently that creates a more positive 
environment, but that idea still has to be hierarchically endorsed and so 
there's a kind of a dichotomy of what we want to do, versus how we are 
organised or how we are comfortable with the organisation.” 
 
Many of those interviewed reported in one way or another we had an organisational issue 
regarding leaders being perceived as not “walking the talk”; according to the managers, 
what leaders were saying was not what was observed or experienced, what was being 
“espoused” was not that which was “in use” (Argyris, 2010). Following the completion 
of all interviews and now looking at all the data I was able to produce Appendix C – the 
Consolidated and Aggregated Interview Results. In order to summarise the individual 
responses in this Appendix, I produced Table 7 below. This table is a high-level 
amalgamation of the data and is used to introduce my interpretation of the rich picture, 
the “thick” description (Ponterotto and Grieger, 2007) of the things being reported from 
the 18 interviews. The white boxes in the table represent the questions that were raised 
through the interviews, the colour boxes represent other topics that emerged, informed 
the findings and subsequently redirected my further research and action.  
 
CONSIDERATION LEADERS MANAGERS ANALYSIS 
INTERPRETATION 
Affected my 
leadership 
Eight out of nine 
leaders reported 
they had changed 
their leadership 
approach. 
Seven out of nine 
managers reported 
they had not 
changed their 
leadership 
approach. 
The culture awareness 
programme aimed to 
provide the same 
process, information 
and experience to both 
groups (some sessions 
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were even mixed) and 
yet very different 
responses coming 
through the 
interviewee’s 
responses.  
Observed affect in 
the leadership of 
peers 
Eight out of nine 
leaders reported 
they had seen 
positive changes the 
leadership approach 
of their peers. 
Only one manager 
reported a positive 
change in their 
peers. 
The leaders reported 
they had changed their 
approach to peers, the 
managers indicated 
they had not. Why 
would a group just one 
managerial level lower 
not be affected when 
the layer above claims 
it had?  
Observed affect in 
the leadership of 
subordinates (if a 
leader) 
Only four noticed 
minor changes in 
the managers. 
N/A Most managers 
claimed that they had 
not changed and the 
leaders confirmed it. 
This seemed to be 
coherent.  
Observed affect in 
the leadership of 
seniors (if a 
manager) 
N/A All nine stated that 
the leadership was 
worse than before. 
All managers claimed 
that leadership at the 
layer above them had 
not improved. This 
seemed to be coherent.  
Affected the way I 
talk to people 
Eight out of nine 
leaders reported 
they had changed 
the way they 
communicated  
Seven out of nine 
managers reported 
they had not 
changed the way 
Patterns emerging of 
leaders claiming to 
have changed in other 
areas too, the 
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they 
communicated. 
managers reporting 
that they had not.  
Observed affect in 
the way others talk 
to each other 
Around 50% of 
leaders reported 
they had noticed 
changes in others. 
Six out of nine 
reported they had 
not noticed 
changes in others. 
Patterns emerging of 
leaders claiming to 
have changed in other 
areas too, the 
managers reporting 
that they had not. 
Knew it all from 
before 
Around half of the participants reported 
that they already knew the things that 
came up during the culture change 
process regarding leadership. 
I did not ask a 
question about 
whether they knew it 
from before but many 
of them felt that they 
needed to tell me this 
was not new to them. 
Where I found this 
relevant is that despite 
claiming the 
“knowing” from 
before, still eight out 
of nine leaders 
claimed to have 
changed. It raised a 
question for me that if 
they knew it all from 
before why weren’t 
they acting on it?  
Themes emerging 
Various and 
seemingly 
individualised. 
Many talked about 
when they were “in 
Several talked 
about “not walking 
the talk”. Some 
wanted more 
clarity and 
The themes that did 
emerge did not do so 
with the regularity I 
was expecting; there 
are some themes that 
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Command”. Some 
talked and bringing 
the “theory” to life.  
direction. Others 
wanted more 
autonomy and 
freedom. 
occurred often enough 
to be worthy of 
further investigation 
but only after the 
more prevalent 
“say/do” gap was 
investigated. 
Relationship with 
researcher 
Various and recorded. I do not believe given 
the consistency in the 
data that my personal 
relationships with the 
interviewees 
significantly affected 
the results.  
 
Table 7 – Aggregated Data and Interpretation  
There appeared to be a significant delta between the leaders and managers with an apparent 
lack of consistency not only with how they saw the organisation, but also how they saw 
themselves within that organisation. It was this realisation and awakening that shaped the rest 
of my research and intervention. When one is perceived to act in ways that are contrary to how 
they say they act, we call that inauthentic, disingenuous or lacking in sincerity and this can 
influence significantly trust relationships in organisations. The same leaders espousing that 
JWC needed to be inclusive, innovative, supportive and accountable; their own created values 
(Appendix D), do not appear to be authentic and do not consequently have the trust of the 
people they were meant to lead; this perceived gap cannot have been helping the organisation 
develop at all. It was clear that working on one or two of the organisational themes that had 
been identified would not have the same impact or potential to create longer-term “Mode 2” 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 9) learning and development and enable a shift in the organisation 
in line with Figure 20.  
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5.1.13 Evolving the Methodology 
It was clear to me that I not only needed to adapt my investigation and research but also my 
way of relating with the researched. Schön (1992: 54), describes the researching process as 
“artistic” in the way that research practitioners are required to interpret unique research 
contexts. He warns that rigour can be difficult to prove and advocates balancing the “technical 
rationality” of rigour with the “skilful performance of problem setting and judgement”. Striking 
that balance is said to open the door for researcher/practitioners to engage in the “swampy 
lowlands” where messy, confusing problems are said to incapable of resolution through 
technical solutions (Ibid). A researcher/practitioner is often left with something of a dilemma; 
do they remain on the high ground, defined by relatively unimportant nebulous issues that are 
resolvable utilising “research-based theory and technique” or do they rather “descend into the 
swamp”; a complex messy area where important “wicked” (Churchman, 1967) issues solvable 
by arguably “non-rigorous inquiry” (Schön: 1992, 54). I considered myself to be working now 
deep inside our swamp.  
I found myself to be not content with just trying to better understand our leadership and culture 
(a clear fit with ethnographic research), I also wanted to be part of taking that new 
understanding, even if just a small portion of the whole, and using it, evolving it. Cogenerating 
actionable knowledge in the moment that might have been lost in the more passive approach 
associated with ethnography. My own research had brought me deep into the swampy lowlands 
and I reflected long and hard on how to cultivate something useful for my organisation. It was 
clear to me that Phase 2 of the research was going to be different than Phase 1, more focussed 
upon outcomes and impact yet grounded fully and making sense of the research and analysis 
performed in Phase 1. Action research is a methodology where “both researchers and 
practitioners alike are engaged in creating with each other an ‘action guiding’ sense from within 
their lived and living experience of their shared circumstances.” (Shotter, 2006: 601).  
5.1.14 Main Findings from Phase 1 
As I reflected upon the interviews, the individual themes I had expected to emerge lost 
some of their relevance and I started to defocus and take a wider look at the data. Whilst 
the analysis and interpretation of the interviews did reveal that many of the cultural 
themes claimed to be associated with leadership in an effective organisation were 
important, that importance was not as widely reported as other topics disclosed. For 
example, within the literature review I learned about and expected to hear much more 
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about, the impact of national and service differences and the influences they can have in 
an organisation. This theme was disclosed as can be seen from two extracts below:  
 
 L5 - “We are all coming from different cultures, I knew that but 
didn’t consider that it would be so challenging.” 
 
L7 – “……the importance about having a healthy culture in an 
organisation and how that relates to how individuals are trying to 
be sensible, trying to behave properly, even though there are from 
birth cultural differences.” 
 
It is a subject that I have found to be almost ‘off limits’ for discussion in 
international organisation like ours, but the reality is that staff become aware of 
service influences and national influences too late in their tour to be able to adapt 
with many deciding that change is all too difficult: 
 
M4 – “……..we don’t change the style of information or the style 
of leadership when we change from National business to NATO 
business” 
 
And on the subject of service influences one of the interviewees stated:  
 
M8 - “I already have my Marine Corp ethos. We try to hold 
ourselves to a different leadership standard than any other 
services.” 
 
Four of the 18 interviewees mentioning this was not the response I had anticipated and I had 
expected the themes that the literature and my own analysis had predicted to be more widely 
expressed. What was instead expressed, and what became so obvious once it had been 
identified, was the much more prevalent diversion in views of leaders contrasted with the 
managers. This is exposed in the three examples below:  
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• Leaders claimed that a new organisational language had evolved, that 
they were communicating differently, listening more intently; yet the 
managers reported that this was not the case. 
 
• Several of the leaders stated that they had learned nothing new whilst 
going through the organisational culture awareness process and yet at the 
same time each of those leaders claimed to have changed. So if they 
knew it, why weren’t they living it?  
 
• Despite the leaders for the most part claiming to have changed almost 
every Branch Head (manager) stated that they had seen no change at all 
in the leaders with several stating that things had become worse.  
 
That these rather different perspectives were repeated with some consistency across the 
leader/manager interviews came as a surprise to me. It was beginning to become increasingly 
clear that the leaders and managers had a rather different and yet, from their level, a fairly 
consistent view of leadership behaviours. In terms of changes in leadership behaviours, the 
leaders claimed that they had, in some way, changed their leadership through the culture-
shaping process; the people they managed saw little of this with many claiming that it had 
actually got worse. Most noticeable when contrasting the general perspectives, the high-levels 
views from the leaders and managers, which is apparent in Appendix C and is summarised in 
Table 8 below:  
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Table 8 – High-Level Views  
This colour coded snapshot reveals the dissonance between the leaders who almost exclusively 
thought that the changes were positive and the managers who were equally convinced that 
things had become worse. There was a significant gap between what was being said by the 
command group, the leaders, compared with what was being observed by the branch heads, 
their managers, and the emergence of these apparent gaps resulted in my second significant 
literature review. As this more general, meta-theme emerged I started to investigate the 
literature regarding “say/do” gaps. This literature helped me to understand better the 
phenomenon which in turn sent me back into the literature to investigate authenticity in 
leadership. That eventually led to the authentic leadership development intervention, reported 
in the story part 2 to follow, that was designed to enable new leadership practices to emerge.  
 
L
E
A
D
E
R
S
M
A
N
A
G
E
R
S
Considered leadership & culture change positively
Considered leadership & culture change negatively
Indifferent or undeterminable
Observed  
language change 
in peers
Observed 
leadership change 
in leaders (if a 
manager) or 
managers (if a 
leader)
Affected my 
leadership
Affected my 
language
Observed 
language 
change in 
leaders (if a 
manager) or 
managers (if a 
leader)
Observed 
leadership 
change in 
peers
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5.1.15 Summary 
It is sometimes claimed that organisational research can be less about discovering anything 
new but rather understanding something that is already there “in plain view” (Shotter, 2006: 
589) but is not yet articulated, described or conveyed. Whilst my research, following a more 
ethnographic approach initially, revealed a number of interesting dichotomies, it did not help 
to explain them nor solve them. I felt that researching the emerging more general topics, rather 
than the original themes I was expecting to find, might have a greater benefit to the 
organisation, and the individuals in it. Bell and Thorpe (2013; 142) provide an adequate 
warning of the “messy, serendipitous and unpredictable” nature of management research but 
still, the realisation that something else was going on in addition to what I was looking to find, 
struck me by surprise. It was an awareness that came from “being prepared to catch a glimpse 
of such new possibilities” whilst at the same time resisting the temptation for “seeking 
explanations, conducting analyses, offering interpretations, or formulating hypotheses” 
(Shotter, 2010: 279). I continued to review the data a second time to verify whether these 
“glimpses” were more than a localised snapshot or representative of something more prevalent.  
My initial research position, informed through a number of staff surveys and my own lived 
experience of my context created an understanding in me that leadership and culture are both 
influenced by or appraisable on the assessment of a number of organisational themes. My 
understanding was found to be incomplete. I anticipated the disclosure of a number of key 
themes to be revealed that would help me to co-create a systematically generated organisational 
improvement plan and while I continue to believe that there would be merit in addressing some 
of these themes, there was a more compelling phenomenon revealed. Table 8 shows the 
aggregated dissonance between the leaders and the managers in regard to how they considered 
leadership development through the organisational culture awareness program. What seemed 
clear is that the leaders felt that things had got better, that they had changed at their level; the 
managers, on the other hand, felt things were worse and that they had not experienced a change 
in the organisation nor themselves. 
Action research is often associated with some uncertainty and “fuzziness” (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2010: 144), the journey away from fuzziness to clarity (see Figure 22) is achieved 
through “spirals of action research cycles.” (Ibid: 146). McKay and Marshall (2001: 69) 
indicate that at its core, action research is “research enabled problem solving”, performed 
through “two separate but interconnected and interacting cycles”. My own cyclical journey is 
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based on the model presented in the methodology Chapter from McKay and Marshall and 
adapted to my own context as shown in Figure 26 later in this Chapter. 
5.1.15.1  Logical Process Description  
Interpreting Figure 26 (p.123) involves appreciating that the logical flow as depicted by the 
numbers and indicated by the use of the solid lines; some baselining was performed (1), it 
triggers a research question regarding culture and leadership (2), that sends me into the 
literature (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3), that inform my own understanding, my methodology, interviews 
and analysis (4), that provides evidence of some themes emerging but not the ones I had 
anticipated from earlier baselining (1), that made me reflect and then adapt my interviews, 
analysis and reflections (6), that led to the emergence of a more prevalent dissonance (7) 
sending me back into the literature on the sources of perception gaps (8.1) and leadership 
authenticity (8.2) culminated in the authentic leadership development interventions (9) that 
were designed for individual and organisational development that would impact the new 
baselines (10) that closes this action research feedback loop.  
5.1.15.2  Temporal Process Description  
Although depicted in detail across a timeline in Figure 21 (p.96) the reality was rather less 
structured. Temporally researching leadership and culture were not disassociated, as I refer to 
in the literature leadership and culture are closely related; “two sides of the same coin” 
according to Schein (2010: 3). Hence when I was researching leadership, organisational culture 
was always there, and when I was researching organisational culture, I was regularly also 
learning about leadership. Consequently, it was not possible to decompose this research so that 
the logical and temporal flows were consistent. Instead, significant amount of time was spent 
tracking back (as shown through the dotted lines) where new information was reflected upon, 
researched and acted upon; sometimes “in the moment” as a reflexive iteration akin to a 
personal awakening and at other times following a more intentional engagement with the 
academic literature.  
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Figure 26 - Action Research Process Model adapted from McKay and Marshall (2001).  
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In story part 2 I reveal the how the discoveries from part 1 informed a new stream of leadership 
research that culminated in the development of interventions designed to address some aspects 
of leadership that were revealed as potentially limiting our organisational effectiveness. Story 
part 2 is more strongly associated with the planned and intentional “action” of action research 
and provides evidence of the bridge I tried to create from research theory to practical relevance. 
New literature is included as the story unfolds. 
5.2 Story Part 2 
In trying to decide upon an action research intervention I took note of Argyris (1976: 370) 
statement that double loop learning won’t come from “lectures, reading or case studies” as this 
will only promote change at an “espoused” level and not at the “in-use” level. And when the 
success of these leaders over their years has been down in part to these embedded “in-use” 
theories then unlocking them becomes problematic. Challenging the norm, discarding standard 
practices and diverting regimented processes is not a feature of C2 and yet this is the very 
behaviour required for double loop learning to occur (Ibid). Action research is said to enable 
the development of “practics” (Susman and Evered, 1978: 599) that are claimed to provide the 
researcher “with know-how such as how to create settings for organisational learning, how to 
act in un-prescribed non-programmed situations, how to generate organisational self-help, how 
to establish action guides where none exist”. Practics provide the researcher with the 
wherewithal to create organisational learning vignettes, scenarios and experiences.  
5.2.1 Preparing the Intervention 
I went back into the literature and relate that second phase of review in Chapter 2 to investigate 
the phenomena repeatedly raised by the Branch Heads that although Command Group had 
espoused changes in their leadership that change was not observed or demonstrated to the 
managers. Argyris and SchÖn (1974), Avolio et al., (2004) and George et al., (2011) all describe 
“espoused” and “in use” theory in detail and explain how, in an organisation, leaders can be 
unaware that they are being considered somehow inauthentic.  
 
According to Dijkstra and Van Eijnatten (2005: 40), a theory of action is based upon “practice-
directed research” with three main requirements: 
• A description of the current reality (where are we now – the reality as 
described by the interviewees). 
• A preferred new “reality” based upon some solutions. 
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• A description of the actions possible to close the gap between these 
“realities”.  
 
Cadle et al. (2004) provided me with an insight that would help me develop the interventions 
first stage, by using my own experiential leadership life story, exposing my own learning and 
vulnerabilities; I would hopefully encourage them to do the same. By modelling new ways of 
behaving, of action, change can be generated in the moments of conscious connection between 
current contexts and previously leadership behaviours. These moments offer “uniquely new 
beginnings for genuinely innovative changes” (Shotter, 2010: 273). Avolio and Gardner (2005: 
320) say, “one’s sincerity is therefore judged by the extent to which the self is represented 
accurately and honestly to others, rather than the extent to which one is true to self” and 
representing self, requires that one first truly understands oneself.  
5.2.2 Intervention Format 
Jackson and Parry (2010: 139), when talking about approaches to leadership development, state 
that “mixing short ‘featurettes’ and small-group and large-group discussions” provides a 
learning platform that works well with adults (Meier, 2000). Shotter and Cunliffe (2003, 17) 
also reinforce the use of peer relational vignettes stating that “meanings are created in the 
spontaneous coordinated interplay of peoples responsive relations to each other”. They go on 
to claim that it is possible to reframe leaders thinking in the moment when meaning is reflected 
upon and rewritten “seamlessly, almost simultaneously as a work of “practical authorship” 
where meaning is “created in a relationally responsive way” (Ibid: 19).  
Senior leaders and managers in my organisation are not usually very forthcoming about 
exposing their doubts or weaknesses, years of training in a hard organisation has seen to that. 
The data I collected through the surveys and interviews though showed me over and over again 
that they are however deeply respectful of other leaders and managers (see graphs Figure 25). 
It occurred to me that the best way to have leaders reflect is for them to do so in a trusted peer 
group. In research terms I realised that the right person asking the right questions is critical and 
at least as important as finding the ‘right’ answer” (Antonacopoulou, 2009: 428; Berger, 2014; 
Grint, 2008; Marquardt, 2014) and this appears to be especially the case when senior leaders 
are to be encouraged to examine their own leadership history and development. Who does the 
asking is also a factor as I discovered. 
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George et al., (2011: 172) identify a number of questions to help leaders rediscover or reconnect 
to their authentic selves and I used one of these as I considered an action intervention within 
my practice; “Which people and experiences in your early life had the greatest impact on you”. 
Sparrowe on the other hand (2005: 447) proposes that re-exposure can be created through a 
reflection upon “three stories of when I was at my best”. Using Shamir and Eilam’s (2005: 
412) “guided reflection” I prepared sessions where they were encouraged to identify, expose, 
reflect and revalidate their leadership story and I describe that in more detail below.  
5.2.3 Authentic Leadership Development Process 
Action researchers “assume that specific historical interests drive current social practices” 
(Ozanne and Saatcioglu, 2008: 425) and since leadership is a social practice, it is not a far 
stretch to link current leadership practices with specific historical leadership experiences. 
Action research is about researching the historically informed present with a purposeful eye 
towards a better future (Coghlan and Holian, 2015: 6). Military leaders are, through training 
and selection, action-oriented problem solvers, and as Shamir and Eilam (2005) point out 
action-oriented leaders tend not to display reflexive attributes. I wanted to encourage these 
proud, mature “leaders” to be ready to tell their leadership “life-story” and furthermore for it 
to be discussed and challenged; to create an environment where at least reflection could occur. 
According to Shamir and Eilam (2005: 410) “life stories are continuously constructed and 
revised, the ‘lessons of experience’ can be learned not only close to the experience but also 
much later.” Alongside these historically bounded way points I also wanted them to become 
better connected with the present, the “here and now” leadership environment and so I asked 
them to reflect upon and describe to others our context, and to consider how this matched or 
not what they have experienced before. I did so by exposing them to and discussing slides that 
are shown later in this Chapter. 
In first stepping through the vignettes using a critical look my own leadership development 
over many years I modelled the behaviours that I would later ask of them, to reflect upon the 
circumstances of their own leadership story and to do so from fresh eyes, as a disconnected 
observer wanting to understand even more about “then and there” and how that might inform 
the “here and now”. I encouraged them to discuss leadership and even to consider what would 
ideal leadership for our context look like. They explored these factors in detail; what leadership 
was, and what it was not; contrasted transactional and transformational and asked them to 
discuss where would we be if this was a scale. I acted only as a facilitator through the reflection 
in order for it to be as non-threatening as possible for them to be open and authentic. I 
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engineered the space for them to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and openness in order to 
“find an ‘internal compass’ and become more authentic leaders” (Shamir and Eilam, 2005: 
412). This, and demonstrations like this, helped the JWC Commander to lead, while I 
facilitated, staff workshops and leadership development sessions. 
5.2.4 Authentic Leadership Development Prompts 
 
 
 Creating the context – asking the 
question (Marquardt, 2005) 
I wanted the group to consider where we 
would normally exist on a transactional – 
transformational scale aware that our 
customer is ACO and our senior HQ is 
ACT charged with very different 
missions. The consensus was that we 
would need to be able to adjust. I then 
asked them to think about what style of 
leadership. may support that operating 
mode most effectively.  
 
 Step 1. Small featurettes and group 
discussions (Susman and Evered, 1978) 
I asked the group to discuss in pairs 
whether they felt that leaders are born or 
made. Then we shared as a group. I then 
introduced the slide on the left as some 
data revealing that up to 70% of a 
leader’s ability to lead come from 
experience. The slide then builds to talk 
about what drives our behaviours and 
also posits the question are we still 
“works in progress” as far as leadership 
is concerned? 
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 Step 2. Self-exposure and open 
mindedness (Gardner et al., 2005)  
I then use my own leadership story to 
show how events shaped me, and how 
some of the learning from those events 
was very useful at the time but other 
things I have unconsciously continued to 
do might get in the way of me being an 
even more effective leader. Reminding 
them of the values they created I then 
asked them to do the same, to reflect on 
key moments in their development that 
informs their leadership today. 
 
 Step 3. Iterative critical thinking and 
Empathy cycles (Berkovich, 2014)  
Using the prompting questions on the 
slide to the left I asked them to share their 
stories with the person next to them. To 
think deeply and describe the occasions 
and what happened, what it meant to 
them and how going through those times 
informed their leadership. Then the 
people would stop as the sharer and 
become the listener. As these discussions 
started to tail off I then brought the group 
together and invited them to share more 
openly. For “homework” I asked them to 
think about what they now recalled, was 
still relevant or might it be getting in the 
way.  
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 Step 4. Self-exposure (me), care and 
contact, self-exposure (them) 
(McCauley et al., 2006) 
Finally, and within a “mode 2” (Huff and 
Huff, 2001) learning environment I asked 
them to consider their leadership 
contribution and legacy. I ask them to 
consider a timeframe much longer than 
the two or three years they will stay at the 
JWC. I ask them to take stock of how 
they would be remembered now, and 
how they might prefer to be remembered. 
I then provide them with a call to action 
to encourage new behaviours to start to 
evolve.  
 
In creating a process, I utilised the work introduced in Chapter 4 of George et al., (2011), 
Sparrowe (2005) and Shamir and Eilam (2005) to develop a guided reflection phase. In that 
phase, I encouraged them to identify, expose and revalidate their leadership story. Many were 
incredibly proud of their days as company or battalion commanders and found it very easy to 
bring these to mind; these were profound departure points from which to continue the 
exploration. “Knowing their authentic selves requires the courage and honesty to open up and 
examine their experiences” (George et al., 2011: 168). It requires personal humility and the 
willingness to feel vulnerability, to be ready to see a reflection in a “mirror” that they may not 
like to see, to hear uncomfortable feedback that may expose them to addressing safety 
mechanisms they were unaware of and that have kept them safe (Argyris, 2010).  
 
5.2.5 Authentic Leadership Programme Delivery 
As a response to the activities performed prior to, and during, the research period, the 
Commander of the JWC decided to run developmental sessions of his key personnel. 
Consequently, bi-annual group sessions at the levels of Command Group and Branch Heads 
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(termed the “leaders” and “managers” respectively in this thesis) were held. These sessions 
were attended by 20 or so each time and lasted two days; the first half of day one facilitated a 
review of where we were (utilising feedback I provided on the interpretations of the research 
so far (Appendix C) and the organisational heatmap (Appendix B), the last half of day two 
being a consolidation and look ahead to the next six months. That provided me two half days 
to engage these groups in an authentic leadership development intervention previously 
described in 5.2.4. Groups would be organised in a “horseshoe” seating arrangement where no 
desks were present. Seating would be random (although I never saw the Chief of Staff not sat 
next to the Commander) and during the reflection parts (step one leading to step 2) I would 
have some low subtle music playing in the background. I would look for signs of readiness in 
the group for them to move on and when most looked ready I would turn down the music to 
silent and invite them to share their thinking in a one – one setting (step 3). This would take all 
of the afternoon of the first day as the group sharing that followed always created a rich 
discussion. At the end of day one I would ask them to think about their past leadership story 
and what that means for the future. 
During the morning of day two the participants were first asked in a group setting if they had 
discovered anything new, either during the session the day before, or as a consequence of their 
reflections at home. Without exception, people shared their new insights providing me with a 
platform to proceed to step four. This step was again worked through one – one and then group 
shared, at the end of this step I asked them to write down on a paper what they would commit 
to doing differently from then on, as far as I could see everyone had written something to 
themselves.  
5.2.6 Authentic Leadership Development Impact and Outcomes 
A broad-spectrum reflection on the legacy of the thesis is described in Chapter 7 yet at this 
point, as the story of the leadership interventions conclude, I wanted to pause and look the 
impact and outcomes for the organisation, and some of those working within it; looking first 
internally and then externally to the JWC. As a reminder at the outset of the research, I stated 
that this research would be focussed on the delivery of outcomes of this action research 
investigation could be considered along three lines of development: 
• to co-create the conditions for leadership development in my organisation 
(internal to JWC) 
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• to bring about organisational development through the research process 
(internal to JWC) 
• to contribute to actionable knowledge that may be beneficial for leaders and 
managers in similar organisations considering organisational change (external 
to JWC) 
5.2.6.1  Internal Within JWC  
The authentic leadership and organisational culture alignment process is now part of a wider 
activity that is detailed in the JWC’s “One Team Organisational Culture Plan” (Kucukaksoy, 
2015), and the JWC has the only successful NATO Organisational Culture program to date 
(Fenning; 2017). So it seems that the research performed left the JWC with a development plan 
that others have improved upon and that is now enshrined in policy and embedded in the 
organisation (Sewell, 2016). The JWC now has its own ability to survey across the organisation 
and compare consistently; I created the initial survey during the DBA period and that survey 
evolved further through the thesis period. I included this as Appendix A. This provides the 
JWC with the ability to produce an annual organisational heatmap (see Appendix B) that allows 
the organisation to look into specific areas, by Branch (the level of my managers in the thesis), 
of focus across the mission, structure and culture domains. Table 9 below shows the JWC 
heatmap that shows how specific parts of the organisation are faring against organisational 
themes and how they compare with other functional areas allowing the organisations to learn 
from stronger performing areas and identifying areas of weakness to inform future 
organisational development activities.  
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Table 9 – The 2014 JWC Organisational Heat Map 
The JWC tested and then formalised in June 2016 a new organisational structure that aligns the 
organisation on the outputs they deliver by drawing upon existing capabilities in strong 
functionally organised groupings. This new “matrix management” style organisation 
challenged our C2 arrangements and it was foreseen that operating within this new paradigm 
would likely require different mindsets and behaviours if it is to be able to operate successfully. 
It may necessitate the ability to apply a different type of leadership and the ability to influence 
without the comfort of formal hard power as reinforced by C2.  
Since leaving the organisation a new change champion has taken the organisation to higher 
levels of alignment and organisational learning, spin-offs from my surveys, heatmaps, and so 
forth continue to allow me to believe that I left a meaningful legacy even though letting this go 
and passing over the baton was a little more painful than I imagined. The JWC’s new 
organisation development role within this structure is tasked, inter alia, with maintaining and 
delivering the leadership development and cultural awareness program. This new role in the 
JWC also now conducts, for the first time, exit interviews, learning from, instead of losing, 
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knowledge. The organisational development officer, Mr Paul Sewell, continues to run sessions 
and write articles for a process that is now embedded within the JWC (Sewell, 2017). 
5.2.6.2  External to the JWC 
It is clear to me that impacts generated from within this action research may not be reproducible 
in another setting, they are uniquely bound within the context comprising the researcher, the 
research and the ever-changing environment in which they all operate. That being said two 
other ACT commands have recently embarked upon an organisational development initiative 
and both the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and the NATO Joint 
Force Training Centre (JFTC) are looking to follow the same process I developed during my 
research period and influenced strongly through my DBA learning. They have asked to use the 
surveys, create heatmaps and have suggested that the authentic leadership development 
sessions I developed become part of their team building and engagement strategy.  
Externally some of my work has also created some high-level attention. In 2014 (informed 
from my DBA studies) I recommended that NATO HQ sponsor a NATO-wide organisational 
culture assessment and in the 2016/2017 academic year for the NATO Executive Development 
programme (NEDP) a cohort was given a group project to review all NATO organisational 
culture initiatives. This cohort was tasked to make an assessment through this 9-month 
programme of their validity, success rate and come up with a set of recommendations for all 
NATO bodies that was presented to a wide audience at NATO HQ in Brussels. In that report 
(Fenning et al., 2017), the point is made that the JWC has the only successfully integrated 
organisational culture change that is embedded into organisational learning. It also points out 
that this was an example of a “bottom-up” change programme with a former NEDP participant; 
that person is me and the report that came from this 9-month group work provided as a culture 
change process that was presented to the Secretary General for consideration for use across all 
NATO. Three extracts from the “Towards One NATO: Culture Matters” (Fenning, 2017) 
confirming the impact and my part in that are shown below: 
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Extracts from ““Towards one NATO: Culture Matters” (Fenning et al., 2017) 
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Relating outcomes to a specific intervention is clearly subjective and using this analysis to 
derive specific interventions is controversial. Consequently, I will really never know with any 
degree of certainty if the interventions were the catalyst for change. Yet some evidence exists 
to link outcomes and change to the authentic leadership development process. I include a 
number of quotes below that come from Appendix C in regard to the question regarding any 
personal effect on leadership as a consequence of the leadership development process. One of 
leaders stated that the leadership interventions were important and indicated the relevance of 
working with the most senior team: 
L1 - “One of the most significant things we’ve done.........senior 
leadership buy-in is vital.” 
 
Others expressed personal change to include aspects like slowing down, taking the 
pace off the frantic workload, they indicted a more reflective state of being.   
 
L2 - “Yes, purposeful listening, slowing down to understand.” 
 
L3 – “Yes, it left an imprint and I probably have changed my 
behaviours.” 
 
L5 – “I think I'm now better in adapting to my counterparts.” 
 
L6 – “I try to do things a little bit differently.” 
  
L8 – “Yes, I try and use all the tools, methods, good practice we 
have learned”. 
 
L9 – “I hope it affected me. Personally, it has made me who I am 
here, walking the corridors. Getting around and talking to people.” 
 
The managers were not so sure with many saying that their leadership had not changed. Two 
exceptions were noted though with one indicating they were heard more and the thers stating 
that they had seen leadership changes at a personal level: 
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M1 – “Yes -allowing non-native speakers to lead.”  
 
M6 – “Yes, on a personal front.” 
 
Clearly, there were other influences at play that were impacting their experiences fuelling this 
leader/manager gap that I was trying to enable them to close and for some, this did appear 
impactful.  
For example, although most of the leaders were fairly sceptical in the beginning there was a 
significant shift as the sessions evolved for most of the participants in the workshops, with one 
of the leaders telling me that for the first time in his experience at the JWC they “felt like a 
band of brothers”, I come back to that “band” later in the thesis. Still, there were others who 
openly stated that they were at the end of their career and too old to change now, they 
participated but it seemed they did so under duress, they appeared to be somewhat trapped.  
Argyris (2010) claims to take the journey to avoid “traps” means eliminating “the pathologies 
associated with formal hierarchy” pathologies that “perpetuate power disparities, and that 
undermine the self-worth of those who have little formal power.” By developing authenticity 
in leaders, it seems that power is something that will feature less and less within 
transformational organisations (Abrashoff, 2002). Its application carefully considered rather 
than being a constant feature of organisational life, after all, some feel that “Power over others 
is weakness disguised as strength” (Tolle, 1997), and so many of the leaders I asked revealed 
that their leadership high point was coincidental with the moments when they had the most 
power. It seems only the most senior or enlightened officers realised the irony in that “the more 
power one accumulates, the less it should be used” (George and Sims, 2001).  
It is equally difficult to attribute personal changes in leadership behaviour to one moment or 
another but what was clear is that these sessions become valued. I was asked to also include 
them in sessions with other staff members at all levels of the organisation and so every three 
months or so another group of twenty would go through this exercise. Anecdotally, through 
feedback from some of the staff, I knew well in JWC it appeared that some of the leaders did 
appear to follow what they had written in step 4 (5.2.4) of the authentic leadership development 
process. Some had even reminders on their office walls. For others though, behavioural 
changes, if they were there at all, went unnoticed. Reassuringly however, was a posting from 
one of the leaders who was not interviewed as he joined later but who did participate in the 
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authentic leadership development sessions entered the following unsolicited input on my 
“Linkedin” profile.  
“Garry’s planning and implementation of the comprehensive, multi-year 
transformation of JWC’s international organisation serves as a case study 
in change leadership. Garry studied the team’s identified shortfalls and 
found root causes; he explored and analyzed multiple courses of action to 
organisationally solve those issues; he proactively and rigorously 
communicated his progress, incorporating feedback from all echelons every 
step of the way; he implemented the final plan in a way that facilitated 
physical, hierarchical, emotional, and professional transitions with minimal 
disruptions to the organisation’s mission and effectiveness and to our 
individuals’ abilities to contribute and to derive satisfaction from their work. 
I treasure my notes from experiencing this process first hand and will 
replicate Garry’s methods and style when leading change in the future.” 
Organisationally the JWC continues to welcome newcomers with organisational culture and 
leadership briefings and workshops that set from day one of a tour the framework under which 
these new leaders and managers will operate. They pay specific attention to the leadership 
behaviours that should be associated with the JWC values (Appendix D) and annually 
leadership related questions are included in the all staff survey. This survey is used to set the 
direction of the organisational improvement plan that my research instigated, but more 
importantly, that continues to run even though I left the organisation (Sewell, 2017). Only 
recently the Chief of Staff of Allied Command Transformation wrote a testimony to the 
outcomes of my research and organisational development activities.  
Outside of the JWC others noticed what was occurring and I was asked to not only perform 
these authentic leadership development sessions in our higher command at ACT, but also to 
teach this subject on the NATO executive development program (Morrone, 2016). I have also 
been asked to develop a week-long module for a new NATO Academy being constructed which 
will, for the first time, try and expose military leaders to multinational military leadership as a 
transfer of knowledge rather than just a transfer through experience.  
My most recent evidence of outcomes came from a testimonial that Air Marshall Sir Graham 
Stacey KBE provided as a “To whom it may concern” letter, it reads: 
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“It is my pleasure to forward a statement regarding impact and legacy 
associated with Garry's organisational research that was performed with 
NATO ACT over a 4 year period from 2013 to 2017.  
Whilst his choice of DBA thesis was not influenced, nor sponsored by, 
NATO, Garry continually delivered learning into the organisation 
throughout this period; sharing academic knowledge translating that into 
organisational and personal change interventions.  
He led a major organisation culture change project within my organisation 
and developed, and then executed, team and leadership development 
sessions that, to date, hundreds of staff have benefitted from and will 
continue to benefit from.  
I have personally experienced his ability to engage on the subjects of 
leadership and culture at major conferences where he never fails to provoke 
new thinking in senior audiences. His collaborative interventions based on 
solid academic groundings provided a strong legacy which has had 
organisation-wide influence; his authentic leadership and organisational 
culture awareness sessions were also embedded in NATO's executive 
development program.  
I was delighted to have been able to provide Garry with a platform to 
practice his knowledge and impressed with the organisational results that 
continue to be delivered.” 
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Chapter 6 - PERSONAL REFLECTION 
 
In this Chapter, I disclose my personal learning journey and position myself in and alongside 
the research. I explain my relationship to the research, express my motivations, fears and 
disclose the many open questions that still remain. I reflect critically on how I developed as a 
researching practitioner, a scholarly leader. I move on to look at those my research somehow 
affected and explain how my research unfolded in ways that I had not initially considered, 
where joint production (Frankham and Howes, 2007: 628) became a critical component of the 
research and the action. Action research is about sensitive but purposeful movement across the 
insider/outsider continuum, it is about tempering active involvement with reflexivity and 
integrity. Above all, as I discovered, it is about balance (Greenwood and Levin, 2007: 65); 
balance around illuminating and then working through paradox (Broussine and Vince, 1996; 
Luscher and Lewis, 2008) and balance regarding the translation and connection of theory with 
the reality of practice. Indeed it was the intention of bridging the rigour – relevance gap that 
attracted me initially to the DBA programme and observing the impact of translating academic 
knowledge into something useful, something “interesting” (Bartunek et al., 2006) for my 
practice. From my perspective I have come to appreciate that action research can be considered 
as a kind of service, it is about the translation and integration of academic knowledge to be 
made digestible for busy executives who might never have the energy nor time to wade through 
an academic paper (Bartunek et al., 2006).  
“Why should anyone who has not been involved directly in my research be interested in it?” 
prompts Coghlan and Brannick (2010: 149) to ask of oneself. An action researcher then needs 
not only to ensure that the research is of interest, that it is relevant, but also that it is practical 
and by ensuring that these three aspects are considered, a connection between research and 
relevance can be achieved. This Chapter then describes my research journey from an objective 
stance as “looking in on” to more subjective and participative approach characterised by “being 
part of” (Anderson et al., 2015). Brannick and Coghlan, (2010: 5) paint a picture of action 
research as an integrative, iterative process that encapsulates “three voices and audiences”; they 
go on to relate these as first, second and third person. Action research could be considered then 
as being concerned with research for me (as a learner), for us (other leaders in my practice and 
me) and for them (my organisation and beyond) and it is with this in mind that I reflect further 
in this Chapter.  
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6.1 First Person Related  
6.1.1 Who am I as a Researcher? 
Antonacopoulou (2010: 219) suggest that engaging in “reflexive critique” is a distinctive 
attribute of practice-based researchers and it is with this in mind that I now reflect upon my 
own reflexive learning, things that came to mind uninvited but affected me in the moment when 
they did; and I also record my conscious reflections as I look back on almost eight years of 
study. I expose my own challenges in identity and the constant dilemma of being deeply 
intimate and part of the context I was researching, to being a curious observer being 
disconnected from the researched. In this Chapter, I try to reveal how I needed to consider my 
own “personalities”; as an employee, a researcher and perhaps even an “internal consultant” 
(Coghlan and Casey, 2001).  
My formal role was one as the head of an IT planning team working on providing technical 
solutions to user requirements within a training centre. As a side effect of carrying out my 
research, I was asked to perform in a newly created role as the head of an “organisational 
development team” that was tasked with planning and then implementing a major restructuring 
and realignment of the JWC. Whilst I was unable to decide whether this was a punishment or 
reward it does highlight that insider action researching may have unforeseen consequences 
(Moore, 2007). My research then was performed as an “insider”, embedded into the 
organisation where my formal role had very little to do with the research topic. My research 
was a somewhat selfish initiative to see if I could I could test myself at the highest level. I often 
wonder if it was all worth it, as a mature student approaching 50 when I started, completely 
self-funded and with no hope of recovering my personal financial investment, I wonder if the 
strains it placed upon my family were reasonable. Certainly my projected timeframes were a 
gross underestimation and I wonder what I will make of this in five or ten years’ time. I did it 
for me, but the price was not only mine to bear, I did not appreciate enough, despite the 
warnings from the University before embarking upon this journey, that I was also signing my 
friends and family up to a long-term disturbance too.  
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6.1.2 My Research Period Life Context 
I have no intention of dwelling unnecessarily of the circumstances of my personal life but I do 
need to record a sense of what the DBA and thesis demanded of me and my significant others 
as I went through the process. My initial estimates regarding how long the thesis research and 
writing would take were woefully inadequate. The change of approach from having multiple 
and phased deadlines as part of the taught modules and the requirement to self-motivate also 
took me by surprise. Indeed, I had several very low points where I considered giving it all up; 
I recall reading that it might be possible to stop within the thesis stage and receive an MBA 
and I was very close to trying to exercise that option a number of times. Just to put that into 
context I joined the UK Royal Navy in 1978 and have never given up on anything before, never 
been close. Two self-study degrees (one at Masters level), various physically and mentally 
challenging times in the forces, transitioning into civilian life, and never felt the palpable desire 
to give in before, but I did within the thesis period, more than once. In this time, I also went 
through a job change, opting for a serious cut in salary and increased workload. I went through 
two moves to different countries altogether and my wife being within hours of dying due to 
peritonitis after she had been operated on for colon cancer.  
The thesis took a very serious amount of effort and in all honesty, had I known what I was 
letting myself in for in 2010 I would not have applied. Now that I am approaching the end and 
can see light at the end of the tunnel I feel better able to convince myself I did the right thing 
but that doesn’t stay for long. A DBA is a very demanding route and the spill over regarding 
the time I had with friends and family continues to haunt me from time to time, and as I 
mentioned before, does it really ever end? I should perhaps also have paid a little more attention 
to Jackson and Parry’s (2010: 150) warning that researching leadership is like a lifelong 
apprenticeship, explaining that “in academe, the apprenticeship is effectively a life sentence 
because you can never truly master your subject – especially when it is something as nebulous, 
as contestable, and as fascinating as leadership.” I wonder whether the action research activities 
that I found myself initiating and embedded into will really have an end.  
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6.1.3 When Will It Stop? 
 
 
As I was a performing the literature review 
for action research I was reminded of a book I 
had read many months early in the early stages 
of my research activities. In that book 
(Brannick and Coghlan, 2010) is a text 
describing action research that reads “it 
comprises of iterative cycles of gathering data, 
feeding them back to those concerned, jointly 
analysing the data, jointly planning action, 
taking joint action and evaluating jointly, 
leading to further joint data gathering…) 
(Ibid:5). At the side of the page, I had 
scribbled “So when does it stop?” I had no idea 
at that time that this question would still be in 
my mind 6½ years later and still being as 
relevant as it was then. Once you have 
embarked upon an action research journey 
stopping does seem rather difficult, at least it 
does in my case.  
 
 
 
6.1.4 Come To Think Of It, When Did It Start? 
If knowing when to stop was challenging, trying to work out where the actions and 
interventions started was harder still. Frankham and Howes (2007: 620) make the point that 
the “action” already starts during the setting up and planning phases of a research project; that 
even during supposed observational activities the organisation was already shifting. This was 
especially apparent during the interviews or during follow-on discussions thereafter. I certainly 
did not anticipate where the research would end up, I did not predict accurately all the themes 
before they emerged but I did expect there to be some. What I didn’t expect to find, and missed 
or overlooked altogether, was the emergence of a more comprehensive organisational 
espoused/in use phenomenon. This discovery took my research into an altogether unanticipated 
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direction. Iterating back to the literature though there were warnings that I could have paid 
more attention to; Bell and Thorpe (2013: 59) for example warn researchers of the possibility 
of this occurring describing the “serendipitous nature of the research process which means that 
interesting empirical phenomena often arise opportunistically”.  
The requirement to operate at different levels with multiple roles also took its toll. For example, 
I needed to perform the energy-sapping role as a “political entrepreneur” far more than I had 
imagined; I had to “re-sell” (Greenwood and Levin, 2007: 58) the project over and over again 
as the political context shifted when supportive leaders were dispatched and new, more 
sceptical leaders replaced them. I had to learn about and then engage in “backstaging” 
(Coghlan, 2007: 298) in order to remain deeply cognizant of the “organisation’s power 
structures and politics” in order to keep the research and my own career safe. Personal rotation 
within my practice is so prolific that none of the leaders I interviewed are at the centre by the 
time I submit my thesis and as it turned out neither am I. It was an ethical risk I identified prior 
to my research that I assumed would simply not apply in my case, I was happy in my work and 
perhaps naively never expected to become otherwise. It has quite simply been the most 
demanding thing I have ever done.  
6.1.5 Approach to 1st Person Learning 
My initial approach to “first person” learning was through a reflective journal that I created 
from merging Kolb’s experiential learning cycle and Schein’s cycle of observation, reaction, 
judgement and intervention (ORJI) models (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010: 19-28). This 
template was completed during and/or after interviews and other significant events to enable 
me to capture not only my post-event reflections of the actual event (what was said, who said 
it, when and where) but also to record my own thinking and the impact my presence and 
behaviour was having during these interactions. Coghlan and Brannick (2010: 148) advise 
action researchers that personal learning is enabled through reflection throughout the research 
period. I maintained this throughout the research period and the template is shown below.  
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Table 10 – Reflexive Journal 
Although I found the reflexive journal helpful to use during and immediately after each 
interview, my ongoing reflections tended to be most insightful when I was not deliberately 
reflecting but were when I was rather disconnected (consciously) from the research per se. I 
found that some of the connections and questions that were raised in me did not come whilst I 
was embedded in the organisation, neither when I was performed detached researching 
academic papers, but rather when doing something completely unrelated. I found that 
dislocated moments provided fertile periods for learning and growth. I would make connections 
when cycling to work, washing the car or whilst doing some other activity. Typically, I did not 
need to stop what I was doing and reach for my journal and it was during one of these moments 
that I realised the changes I had influenced as soon as I announced that I was starting the 
research, I changed in that moment in other peoples’ eyes; for better or worse, the context had 
shifted and as it did I realised that I would also never be the same. It became so very clear to 
me that the action (in action research) starts long before any planned intervention takes place.  
This new awareness drove me back into the literature regarding my methodological approach, 
I questioned myself and needed to understand where I was now positioned within the research 
and context. I investigated the connections between ethnography and action research. As the 
research progressed I certainly found it increasingly difficult to remain true to “ethnography” 
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as a methodology, becoming aware that I was not only shaping the context but also the 
emergent analysis. In fact, I reflected that I drifted from a pure ethnography in the very early 
stages of my research, certainly as the interviews unfolded and clearly in the coffee shop 
conversations that followed sometimes weeks or months after the interviews took place. I 
reflected that I was shifting into insider action research as an “interventionist, as contrasted 
with the insider research that focusses on observation and analysis only and does not aim to 
change anything” (Coghlan, 2007: 296). Reflection is something I purposefully try and do now 
and increasingly I find myself making time for “reflection on reflection” hoping to lead to a 
higher level of learning, learning that can be context independent, “mode 2” (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2008: 9) or “meta-learning” (Coghlan, 2007: 301). Even as I make final changes to this 
thesis I recall some months ago I blocked out in my diary an hour a day, with no end date, and 
marked it with “time to think” to remind me daily of the need to reflect and learn. I disclose 
some of the key personal learning and development areas in the paragraphs below: 
6.1.6 How I Now Lead 
The whole subject of authentic leadership went from something of a fascination for me to 
something I found myself doubting. Although initially, I found descriptions of authentic 
leadership enticing, in the end I struggled a little with the descriptions of authentic leadership 
and them being somehow likened to transformational leadership. For me there is no direct 
correlation between leadership style and authentic leaders, individuals can be equally authentic 
as a transactional leader as one could be as a transformational leader. What appears to matter 
much more than any specific trait is the congruence between what a leader really holds true 
and considers to be important about leadership and allowing that to inform and ultimately guide 
their behaviours. Authentic leaders have a strong instinctive orientation in relation to doing the 
right thing, a sort of leadership compass (George and Sims, 2007) but that compass can only 
point consistently and authentically when there is coherence between what is said (heard) and 
what is done (observed). Clearly being authentic is being true to oneself, so in that case, why 
cannot transactional leaders be considered as being equally authentic? (Avolio and Gardner, 
2005: 329); surely one can be totally authentic as a transactional leader. I had to park this 
concern for the sake of my research but it remains an area of concern for me.  
Despite concerns over transformational/transactional labels I believe that my own leadership 
style developed through almost 40 years of military service and C2 from one that tended 
towards the transactional to something more akin to transformational. Indeed, when I reflect 
upon C2, and the way that it is inappropriately applied at the individual level, I find it to be 
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deeply transactional in nature, so transactional in fact that I no longer see “transactional 
leadership” as leadership at all; instead I consider transactional leadership as management and 
in the military management is profoundly affected by C2.  
6.1.7 How I Now Communicate 
I have also adapted the way I communicate. My communications are now much more likely to 
be based upon creating a collaborative environment, a thinking space (Kline, 1999) and, where 
at all possible, I try to practice the art of “humble inquiry” (Schein; 2013). My own propensity 
to ask questions has really increased and although this remains a conscious activity, for now, I 
find with increasing regularity I am able to ask questions more naturally and have become 
much more curious, more critical and reflective. I am far more likely to enable my team to go 
their own way even if I have some reservations, I reinforce the point that getting things wrong 
is usually a prerequisite for eventually getting it right and I ask myself, and others, whose 
“right” is it anyway?  
Apart from asking so many more questions, of myself, and others, I have also learned to 
become more credible and acceptable as a source of knowledge. In presenting an argument I 
came to realise experientially that the careful use of academic literature, rather than voicing my 
own opinion, was highly effective. It was a revelation to me in terms of my ability to get a 
message across. “Without data you’re just another person with an opinion” goes the saying 
attributed to W. Edwards Deming. This appears to be even more beneficial in hierarchical 
bureaucratic organisations who place so much attention on someone’s rank and status. It also 
allows you to take the emotion away from the discussion and remain much more objective. 
You do not “own” the information or point of view as much when you are telling someone 
else’s story and this appeared to make a very big difference in my organisation. 
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6.1.8 What I Worry About Still 
Ethically, I have been left with a bit of a conundrum; “do no harm” proffers Mercer (2007) but 
is that really achievable within management research predicated upon organisational change? 
It seems inevitable that there are always going to be some winners and losers. I suppose time 
will tell and until then I will continue to wonder if I somehow undermined my organisation or 
some of those trying to lead it. Perhaps my research and interventions created discomfort in 
some and even resentment in others. I am confident that the organisation has changed but I will 
not know if the change was for the better and neither will I know that the catalyst for change 
was due to my research. It is clear I will never be sure and sometimes I am really ok with that, 
at other times it sits very uncomfortable with me and I am not always sure I left a positive 
legacy.  
 
Looking back, I was probably subject to some manipulation and I certainly wondered if in 
some cases I was being “told” things in order for me to transfer these themes to the senior 
leaders. I had the ear of the Commander and Chief of Staff in a way that even their direct reports 
did not have. Jackson and Parry (2010: 148) warn that leaders can have a “tendency either to 
want to tell you what they think you want to hear about leadership or to convey a good 
impression about their leadership.” and I think that occurred to some extent.  
Some important questions remain with me:  
• I wonder whether the layer under the senior leaders are actually ready 
“transformational” leadership?  
• Do the Branch Heads reflect the general atmosphere in the organisation 
or is it a localised phenomenon? 
• Do the Branch Heads see me as a conduit to get a message to the 
Command Group, am I being used? 
• Am I trying to sway the discussions so that my own standing in the JWC 
is improved, am I using others? 
• Am I ready to accept a perception of “failure” or loss of face? 
• Do the leaders use the interviews and conversations we have to improve 
their standing by using me as a conduit to the Commander? 
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• Do some of the leaders paint a bleaker picture because they are not 
content with my role as an insider researcher and want to discourage it in the 
future, am I disliked? 
• Do some of the leaders tell me what they think I want to hear, am I liked? 
 
6.1.9 Authentic Authenticity 
In my dealings with others I often had the sense that some leaders were not always being true 
to me or themselves, for example when going through the life story exercise I felt some were 
saying what they wanted to be heard rather than what they truly believed. For some the change 
seemed real and over time they did become more inclusive and cooperative, and this was 
remarked on by others who had observed these changes, others though seemed to be just 
playing the game. As Berkovich, (2014: 246) relates some leaders “generate and deliver “self-
narratives” that somehow fit to what is expected might instead bury the authentic self even 
deeper down”.  
I also wonder if my focus was on the right things. I started by thinking that it was the senior 
leaders who were failing to be authentic and yet as the research moved along I wondered 
whether it was, in fact, the layer directly under the senior leaders that were refusing or unable 
to notice the shift between what was espoused and what was in use. Then it occurred to me that 
the senior leaders may be convinced they have altered their styles yet that is not observed at all 
or experienced as an act. It is always easier to see the faults in others than the faults in ourselves; 
Argyris (1976: 367) indicates that people are rather better at detecting discrepancies between 
“in-use” and “espoused” theories in others than they were in themselves. I wonder if this could 
be applied to the managers who had been so consistent in their assessments of the leaders. It 
was a perplexing and uncomfortable period of time trying to focus on what could be causing 
this to occur; to identify the source of the perception gap; until I realised that I did not have to, 
there was personal and organisational learning to be had whichever way it was approached. I 
determined that it would not only be impossible but also almost certainly unhelpful to try and 
determine whose version of “reality” was most accurate and instead determined to research 
ways of reducing this perception gap. 
6.1.10 First Person Summary 
It struck me as ironic that what I had started to “look in at”, I was now “being part of” (Anderson 
et al., 2015) and as the research went on I found myself thinking of a saying from Heraclitus; 
“No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same 
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man.” A sentiment reinforced by Tulin (1997: 106) who describes “every moment of social 
life, every action, every reaction, is a produced moment”, a uniquely created experience 
redrawn in the moment as “a complex weave of ‘one time through/no time out’ occurrences” 
(Ibid.: 106 citing Boden, 1994). Interactions and conversations between the organisational 
members at the researcher then blend into a unique, single shot moments of “mutual learning” 
(Greenwood and Levin, 2007: 51).  
I found that by stepping away from the intense focus associated with detailed research was I 
able to notice a more pervasive and limiting phenomenon. From my initial intent to observe 
leadership through an organisational culture change programme and the themes that prevailed, 
I became aware of a more pervasive issue right in front of us and yet unseen. Just as one cannot 
unsee what one has seen (Moore, 2007), everything I learned will inform, consciously or 
otherwise what I now observe, pay attention to, think about, behave. I see leadership and 
organisational culture moments now in full vivid colour and still, I know that picture to be 
incomplete. I notice inauthenticity in others and myself and wonder if it would have been better 
to remain oblivious to these things.  
Researching leadership within your own organisation is certainly fraught with risk; gradually 
and irreversibly I start to notice and then see so clearly, what I learned to be ineffective 
leadership practices (Higgs, 2009). The research revealed things about my organisation and 
about myself that did not sit well with me. In the end, I started to see more and more evidence 
of poor leadership being tolerated, a blind eye turned, effectively giving permission for these 
behaviours to continue. As it turned out my research had an influence upon my decision to 
leave the organisation, accept a role outside of a military command incurring a significant loss 
in salary but for an agency that seems to be to be willing to live what it espouses. In my final 
interview with the Chief of Staff he remarked that they were sorry I was leaving but it was 
clear to him and the Commander “that you have outgrown this organisation”. I was again 
reminded of insider research as being an “original sin” (Moore, 2007) and the unintended 
consequences of looking deeply into the sensitive and usually hidden working of your 
organisation.  
 
I have evidence in the form of deep structural changes that my organisation changed, evidence 
in the form of personally written notes and “LinkedIn” references that individuals changed. In 
2015 I received the NATO Meritorious Service Medal – NATO’s highest award, an award that 
recognises my contribution to NATO and the JWC that reflects the period of my DBA study 
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and subsequent research. The award from NATO’s Secretary General HE Jens Stoltenberg 
specifically mentions leadership and contribution (Kucukaksoy, 2015). I reflected somewhat 
indulgently that I was not born with that for which I was now being recognised; I learned to 
develop that leadership, through experiences and more significantly through the DBA 
programme and through the research I subsequently performed.  
 
A question that haunts me as I finalise my research period is one on authentic authenticity and 
it applies to all three areas I now reflect on, 1st. 2nd and even 3rd person learning. For me, how 
much of my espoused “new ways of leading” are real and not transitionary, how much am I 
trying to prove that the DBA changed me, how authentic am I really being? These questions 
cannot be answered yet and not by me either, they stay with me though, like Pinocchio’s ever-
present cricket, whispering in my ear, who am I really?  
 
6.2 Second Person Related 
Leaving “self” aside for a while I now reflect on what the research may have meant for others. 
Ozanne and Saatcioglu (2008) make a case that a principal goal of action research “is to develop 
the capacities of collaborators” and here I think that the cycle of research and intervention 
through predetermined carefully considered action delivered. Antonacopoulou (2010: 219) 
challenges researchers to embrace both the “incompleteness of research practice and the 
importance of collaborative modes of engagement” and it is with this in mind that I approach 
my explanation of second person related reflection.  
 
Second person engagement and development is said to be “primary in action research.” 
(Coghlan and Holian, 2015: 5) and in the paragraphs below I prioritise the second person. 
Mercer (2007: 13) advises that it is better that insider researchers resist the temptation to tell 
their own stories, to make public their opinions with the interview process. Although I started 
off respecting that I found that some of the “action” ensuing came from the engagement and 
shared insights as the discussion flowed. Evidence of second person development and 
reflection emerged as one leader reflected upon his view of leadership abandonment compared 
with leadership delegation and trust. This cogenerated reflection appeared to create a liberating 
shift in thinking. Although I remained deeply conscious of the ethical and professional dilemma 
as the interviews took place. 
 
 
 
154 
The following extract comes from a discussion that evolved during one of the interviews with 
a senior manager: 
M 3 - “In the middle of the execution the Commander leaves the exercise, 
the Chief of Staff leaves the exercise, there’s a big OF5 problem deploying 
OF5’s to do stuff. Bottom line is, and this, I am trying to convey, we had four 
training teams deployed, all four of them were led by OF4’s so Lieutenant 
Colonels, two of them, sorry three of them, of the three of the Lieutenant 
Colonels had never done this before, never. So and the message is you 
leadership you don’t send out the OF5 level to help out, ok, you pin all 
responsibility on the OF4’s inexperienced, oh and by the way the OF4’s will 
have to deal with Three Stars, and the Senior Mentors and their training 
teams and all the other bits and pieces by the way, so you are happy to pin 
the responsibility on an inexperienced OF4 to deal with all these matters 
including the lead Senior Mentor Sir John and then you expect us to trust, 
you actually leave the exercise, when it comes down to the crunch you leave, 
physically. I got a lot of emails during the exercise ‘where’s the boss’, and I 
said ‘the boss has gone’, ‘ok where’s the second boss’, ‘well he’s also gone’, 
‘well who’s the boss then?’, ‘well beats me’, and we were left in a leadership 
vacuum. 
I You know when I hear that part of me can’t help but think, gosh that 
sounds like they must really trust the organisation. You know, in a way isn’t 
that what we want to see described ‘I am so comfortable with my team that I 
can go off now and do something else?’ 
R Arggh yeah, yeah, yeah you are right you could say that, and in 
principle every Commander should work towards the situation where he is 
not needed anymore because the system just works but the organisation 
becomes a little bit jumpy and edgy. What if something bad happens 
suddenly, we need to have the big daddy around to make the call. Or at least 
the big daddy to have appointed somebody to make a call and then not kill 
him afterwards if he takes a risk. I would have been happy to assume the 
responsibilities I would have no problem with that but nobody asked. I can’t 
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just go ahead and do it, but you are right in principle you could turn it into 
a good signal but people won’t believe you.” 
Towards the end of the extract above provides another example of suspicion and authenticity 
regarding leadership when he says “.............in principle you could turn it into a good signal 
but people won’t believe you.” Examples like the one above appeared often enough to make 
me wonder if the managers and leaders were really interested and ready to change at all. 
According to Denning (2007:86) “People are fed up with being commanded, controlled, 
compelled, directed, pushed, pulled, bullied, and browbeaten.”. Yet many of the staff I 
interviewed seem to want the opposite, they want to be told what the outcome needs to be, they 
seem to want to have sense created for them and at the same time they are seeking self-directing 
autonomy. Ironically when offered that autonomy their immediate response is not what might 
be expected. It was very clear from some of the interviews that some people within my 
organisation and preferred the type of organisation that C2 delivers. 
 
M3 - “A Command Group that is involved in areas in which they need to be 
involved in, where they provide early or timely guidance and intent, and then 
back it up with more guidance and intent as things evolve instead of just 
dropping them off, and not necessarily focus on the, purely on the outside 
world, but look in on our major outputs, be involved in the process, or give 
clear guidance that you won’t be, or give clear guidance of what you expects 
so it’s understood when somebody walks away they have the message, they 
know what to say, what to do instead of just leaving it vague, yeah I think it 
starts there, having somebody in this Head Quarters that enforces it, having 
an enforcer I think is always needed, you can’t always everybody be the nice 
guy, somebody has to be the one that struck the hammer, appropriately, for 
this environment.” 
I discovered that there was some literature regarding this phenomenon, with Bell and Thorpe 
(2013: 107) describing the outcome of an experiment to shift an organisation from 
“hierarchical, bureaucratic control to ‘concertive’ control in the form of self-managing teams.” 
When allowing members of the organisation to develop their own “system of value-based 
normative rules” they found that rather than things becoming less formal and bureaucratic 
things actually became more tightly controlled as workers imposed their own rules and 
regulations and since these were no longer “imposed from above” but from all angles then they 
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could not be avoided; “concertive control appeared to draw the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic 
control even tighter to constrain organisational members even more powerfully.” I wondered 
too if, at least in the back of their minds, they are afraid to engage with and embrace softer 
styles in case they might somehow lose the ability to switch to a harder style when they really 
needed to. George and Sims (2011) ask the question if leaders were able to make the shift to 
more transformational approaches “what happens when the context changes? Will consensus 
or affiliative leaders be able to shift to a more urgent style to address the immediate situation?” 
 
6.2.1 Organisational Silence 
Cultural leadership (be that supportive or not of the change) occurs at the “level of the 
mundane” (Bligh, 2006) and it is susceptible to what is not said or what is passively allowed 
to occur (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Verhezen, 2010). What is not said can be likened to 
what Argyris refers to as “off limits” and “undiscussable” (2010:188) and this phenomenon 
stifles any opportunity to change, learn and grow consequently leads to remaining “trapped in 
the status quo.” (Ibid: 188). An example closer to home came from a quote during one of the 
manager interviews and reveals how C2 shows up in our collective thinking and therefore 
affects our leadership and organisational culture.  
M9 - “If you are a Lieutenant Colonel down here, at least from my National 
Service prospective, if the General is interested in it, then I’d better damn 
well be fascinated in it. So, if this is something he wanted for the command, 
whatever I feel about it is irrelevant because I’m going to do it.” 
Coming out of a Command Group meeting, where there had been an important issue discussed 
but not settled and it was clear that there was no consensus, silence prevailed, no one spoke up 
in the group, yet I noticed passionate sidebar discussions start between a couple of the leaders. 
Before I started this research, I would have done the same; now as I heard the potential for a 
truly shared awareness disappear I felt great disappointment. The General stopped me in the 
corridor stating that it was great that it had triggered these conversations, I smiled and inside I 
was burning to tell him that these conversations should have been going on in the group, I kept 
quiet and by my actions reinforced further that “organisational silence” (Morrison and 
Milliken, 2000) prevailed and that our environment was one where “undiscussable issues” 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011, citing Argyris (1993) were abundant. Argyris (2010: 188) claims 
that “when we most need to learn, we paradoxically work hardest at shutting down 
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conversations, shutting down other people, and shutting down ourselves.” Covey (2004: 40) 
states that effective leader’s neither “deny nor repress conflict”; instead they consider it as 
fuelling growth, discovery and innovation. He claims that there can be no organisational peace 
“unless the provocative questions are brought out into the open and dealt with honestly.”  
 
6.2.2 Trapped 
Regarding 2nd person learning and as I mentioned in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 national and service 
histories were revealed profoundly and the demographical spread within our organisation also 
had a significant influence. But for a wrong turn, or a wrong decision or just through being in 
the wrong place and the wrong time, many of the senior managers could have been senior 
leaders, but they were not, and many felt that they knew so much better than those that had 
made it through the Branch Head (Manager) ceiling. Singer (2009) talks about the “super bowl 
effect”, leaders having been prepared through all their professional lives to lead in the field, 
and many of my interviewees looked back at particular power fuelled instances in time as the 
best part of their careers. These were clearly amongst the best times they could recall and 
doubtlessly helped create the leaders that I now interviewed. They struggle to let go of this 
(Singer, 2009: 81), so many of them talked with great nostalgia and enthusiasm about their 
days as “company” or “battalion” commanders. One of the leaders proudly described to me a 
drawing that he had been given by some of his soldiers; it was of a big silverback gorilla atop 
a mountain, the gorilla was having his back scratched by younger female gorillas as he surveyed 
his entourage. As he spoke his eyes appeared increasingly distant and the hint of a smile broke 
his typically stern appearance. It was so clear that this was a profound memory for him, one he 
was proud of, that he misses, and one that continues, even now I suspect to inform his 
leadership thinking, preferences and practices. “When I was a Battalion Commander” he 
repeated often evidently trapped in a leadership moment far, far away. Argyris (2010:180) lays 
at least some of the reason of organisations being “trapped” as being responses to earlier 
successes. Successes that inadvertently produce “a mind-set of uniformity and conformity” that 
to my mind is exactly what a C2 paradigm aims not only to encourage but to enforce. He goes 
on to claim that under these conditions “People become committed to the status quo. They 
become arrogant, reinforced by their previous success.”  
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6.2.3  Reflections on Research Rigour  
As 2nd person learning leads to the potential for 3rd person learning I also wanted to reflect 
upon the efforts taken to maintain an appropriate degree of rigour through the research. Rigour 
was considered following broadly the model in Chapter 4, Figure 20, utilising Coghlan and 
Casey’s (2001: 680) guidance. This guidance is repeated and then commented upon in the table 
below: 
Aspects of Rigour within an Action Research Approach 
Aspects (Coghlan and 
Casey, 2001) 
Evidential summary through the research 
Data generation, 
gathering, exploration 
and evaluation 
Semi structured interviews, created through organisational 
awareness, prior short surveys and academic literature evolving 
to loosely coupled dynamic discussions. Thematic analysis 
revealing and codifying pertinent themes related to organisational 
development.  
Research treads a path 
through “multiple and 
repetitious” research 
cycles  
Interview questions and style refinements, transcriptions read and 
reread upon the basis of emergent information. Themes 
developing in the moment subsequently researched and reflected 
upon. Planning and performing incremental interventions such as 
articles, emails, posters and workshop exercises (Sewell, 2013). 
Personal “assumptions 
and interpretations” 
aired, challenged and 
reframed  
My own “preconceived notions about issues, people and 
workplace reality” (Roth et al., 2007: 55) creating a narrow 
subjective and ultimately incomplete analysis. Selecting the 
themes to discuss produces and directs the narrative.  
Coghlan and Brannick (2010) prepare a researcher to minimise 
the impact of “preunderstanding” where a researcher may be 
experientially blinded due to familiarity with the context and the 
participants. Despite these warnings my focus on locating certain 
themes was incomplete.  
I was almost one third of the way through the interviews when I 
recognised that there was consistent evidence of a “say/do” gap 
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and at the same time I had to cast aside theories of organisational 
themes since there was little agreement on what they were nor 
why they mattered.  
Engaged in multi-
perception analysis that 
was “grounded in 
theory”. 
Coghlan and Holian (2015: 3) advise that action research evolves 
through the data, analysis and interpretations “as a consequence 
of intervention”, they go on to say that it will be neither possible, 
nor desirable, to attempt to control or predict this evolution.  
The perception of all 18 interviewees were accounted for and 
these perceptions were instrumental in leading me back into the 
literature. “Theories espoused” versus “theories in use” (Argyris, 
1996) were instrumental to helping me better understand better 
the situation and remained relater into research on authenticity as 
it applies to leadership (Avolio et al., 2004). Then on to the 
development of multi perception leadership reframes and 
enabling peer to peer “reality” checks (Avolio et al., 2004).  
Credibility judged on 
“useful” outcomes 
JWC “one team” organisational culture plan, new roles created, 
language and leadership training developed (Kucukaksoy, 2015). 
Content taken up by higher NATO HQ’s and integrated in the 
NATO Executive Development programme (NEDP). NEDP then 
set a group assignment to analyse all NATO organisational 
culture programmes. JWC was the only one that had survived and 
was “embedded” as an organisational development plan (Fenning 
et al., 2017). In September 2017 I was asked to speak and then 
provide a panel discussion on innovation, culture and leadership 
by the Supreme Commander of Allied Command Transformation, 
a French 4* General (Porkolab, 2017).  
 
Table 11 – Aspects and Evidence of Rigour 
Despite there being some evidence of being “trapped” though other experiences after the end 
of my research left me touched and enthused, for example when I was presented with my 
leaving present that went some way to confirming that second person learning did take place. 
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It was an aerial picture of Stavanger and many of the leaders and managers had written within 
the border of the picture, one of the senior leaders who seemed to have been able to benefit the 
most from the experience; he wrote “Garry, thank you for all the things I learned from you 
about leadership”. I chose to consider this as evidence that 2nd person learning did occur. 
6.3 Third Person Related 
It is important to appreciate that third person learning is an emergent side-effect from the 
aggregation and synthetisation of first and second person learning (Anderson at al., 2015: 170) 
and although these have been covered individually I have not yet described the learning from 
an organisational perspective. I now do so looking first at some of the things that might have 
got in the way. 
6.3.1 Why is it so Hard for Military Organisations to be Transformational?  
Schein (2010:17) provides us with an explanation as to why cultures influenced by C2 
paradigms might be so robust and resilient to change “The strength of that culture depends on 
the length of time, the stability of membership of the group, and the emotional intensity of the 
actual historical experiences they have shared.” I don’t imagine that an organisational culture 
shaped on battlefields wouldn’t score off the scale in most if not all of Schein’s attributes. It is 
perhaps then no surprise that militaries are often accused of being slow to transform (Cadle et 
al., 2004; March, 2008), unable to innovate and highly resistant to change, indeed my own 
experience as head of organisational development wrestling with a reorganisation has provided 
me with a rich first-hand experience of exactly that, and yet so many historical military 
successes, many made into incredible films and stories, are based on exactly the ability to 
innovate and transform rapidly.  
 
Some of the greatest military victories over thousands of years have been profoundly dependent 
upon innovation; Hannibal’s march over the Alps was unforeseen and Nelson at Trafalgar was 
certainly not following Standard Operating Plans (SOPs) of the day. What about the Royal Air 
Force’s Operation Chastise, the bouncing bomb; conceptualised in April 1942, demonstrated 
in July 1942, authorised to be built to scale in November 1942 and finally dispatched 16/17 
May 1943: incredibly rapid engagement and transformation. Step forward a few decades and 
reflect upon the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN), so critical for operations in 
Afghanistan, and it could also be considered as a great example of improvising, engagement, 
innovation and rapidly introduced transformation. So militaries are actually incredibly 
innovative organisations, they have to be considering that “no plan survives contact with the 
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enemy” an often-used quote in military circles attributed to Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the 
Prussian and German General Staff between 1858–88. Perhaps here lies a fundamental 
challenge for militaries generally in that so many military changes and innovations appear to 
need contact with the enemy first. They need to feel, it seems, an existential threat before real 
engagement, before innovative and transformational mindsets are really unleashed. What is it 
about military organisations that stifle their abilities to innovate without the requirement to be 
looking crisis directly in the eye? I try and answer that question in the following sections. 
 
6.3.2 Transactional/Transformational Tendencies 
Looking back at the transactional/transformational leadership comparisons there appears to be 
a relationship between transactional leadership and single loop learning and between 
transformational leadership and double loop learning (Argyris, 1976, Argyris and Schon, 1996; 
Bochman and Kroth, 2010). Challenging the status quo in any pervasive and persistent way 
involves thinking at another level, shifting from “single loop” to “double loop” learning. It is 
said that authentic leadership’s ultimate deliverable to organisations is “superior results over a 
sustained period of time” (George et al., 2011: 177) yet the price might be a little high for an 
organisation that rotates a significant proportion of their staff every two or three years, since 
short-term deliver of outcomes and crisis management do not need authenticity, they need clear 
unequivocal direction, a transactional approach to getting things done and in these terms C2 is 
clearly an attractive and appropriate approach. Jackson and Parry (2010: 31) “As with 
behavioural theories of leadership, the most effective leaders are successful at enacting the 
transformation and the transaction.” but being “transformational is just not rewarded in the 
military in general.  
If we look at mapping the military context upon the model introduced in Chapter 3 adapted 
from Bass (1990), Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) and Hargis et al., (2011) across it is a surprise 
that militaries are able to transform at all.  
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Table 12 – Transactional/Transformational Leadership Contrasted and 
Contextualised 
I believe that the nub of the problem is many in military and other hierarchical organisations 
connect C2 and leadership in error; they take organisational constructs (command and control 
and chains of command) an inadvertently try to apply this at an individual level, to people. The 
definitions of C2 described earlier in the thesis apply far less to people in organisations than the 
organisations themselves. What seems clear from the military context is that the application of 
C2 drives the staff to lean heavily towards encouraging a transactional style of leadership; a 
style of leadership that seems to me to be more aligned to management than leadership. 
6.3.3 How we will Know when an Organisation is Authentically Transformational? 
In Chapter 3 I introduced Grint’s (2008) model (Diagram 1) to show that complexity and 
decision making have a relationship and that while C2 has a very important place under certain 
circumstances, in others, like transformation, it can actually be a barrier. In the table below, I 
try and summarise and consolidate my readings and research to provide a gauge from which to 
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determine whether one if actually operating within a transactional or a transformational 
organisation and the key is to observe the behaviours of the leaders who cast their shadow so 
profoundly into an organisation.  
 
Table 13 – Observable Characteristics of Authentic Transformational Behaviours 
When a leader’s focus is on getting things done, where they hold a short-term perspective and 
believe that there isn’t much new to learn for themselves, then one could expect a transactional 
culture to proliferate. Conversely, when a leader is more focussed on understanding, starting 
with themselves, where they hold a long-term perspective beyond their own time in post and 
where they listen more than they speak, where they humbly seek out the holders of knowledge 
to enhance their own, then this might encourage and ensure a transformational culture to 
emerge.  
6.3.4 Organisational Learning 
According to Denning (2007: 38) effective leadership today is about an ongoing openness to 
dialogue, combining a fierce resolve with a continuing willingness to listen. Here the military 
might empower and spread the “courts martial principle” where the most junior staff member 
is invited to speak, and be listened to first (UK MOD, 2014: 33). It will require a courageous 
leader to press this agenda ahead and “courage is always an act, not a thought” (Marquardt, 
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2005: 53). The NATO JWC had the courage to act and as the only example of a successful 
organisational culture program that is now “embedded” into daily operations (Fenning et al., 
2017) it has made the journey I hoped my research would help facilitate. This journey can be 
represented visually in Figure 27 below (see Figure 20 in Chapter 4): 
 
Figure 27 - JWC’s Organisational Development Journey  
(Based on Coghlan and Brannick’s (2010, p. 103) - Focus of Researcher and System 
Continuum)  
Leaders and managers alike tend to want to leave their mark, to deliver something tangible that 
can distinguish them from their peers. Changing an organisation’s culture is a long-term 
engagement (Whelan-Berry and Somerville, 2010) and it takes a selfless and forward-looking 
leader to commit resources to something that neither they nor their replacements, will ever 
really see; to commit to some lasting legacy. Marquardt (2005: 16) suggests that effective 
leadership has much to do with what happens after a leader has left the organisation; are they 
missed, did they leave an organisation in a better place or with the capacity to get to a better 
place. In the next Chapter, I consider the outcomes and impact; and whether the action research 
did leave the organisation with an ability to learn, grow and improve.  
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Chapter 7 – ORGANISATIONAL REFLECTIONS, LEGACY and SUMMARY 
 
In this Chapter, I reflect upon the legacy of my research and summarise the journey. I reflect 
upon whether my research and actions left my organisation in a better place and also look to 
consider why the research was ineffective when that was the case. I also disclose how, although 
the research at the outset was very much focussed on a military context, the findings could also 
translate to other fairly formal organisations of which there appear to be many examples. 
Cameron and Quinn (2011: 812) “Large organisations and government agencies are generally 
dominated by a hierarchy culture, as evidenced by large numbers of standardised procedures, 
multiple hierarchical levels”.  
It is not lost on me that analysing the relationships between leadership and organisational 
culture and using this analysis to derive specific interventions is contentious. It is tempting, 
through the research, to create links and even possible to defend some of them as I hope I have 
done but certainty, repeatability and generalisability are not necessarily achievable when 
studying something as ephemeral as leadership and organisational culture. Cunliffe (2011: 656) 
reminds us that “social realities and knowledge are not durable in the sense of being replicable, 
generalizable, and predictive but instead offer contextualised understandings.” With Bell and 
Thorpe (2013: 68) indicating that “generalisability might therefore not be worth pursuing so 
enthusiastically.” 
Practice-based research can be thought to be successful when the focus of the research “moves 
beyond rigour and relevance” and instead moves towards organisational impact; a core theme 
of “practice-relevant scholarship” as described by Antonacopoulou (2010: 220). Assessing the 
validity of action research is to make an assessment regarding the validity of any outcomes. 
Validity then is judged upon the assessment of whether people, relationships and/or processes 
really changed as a consequence of the examinations, research and intervention (Ozanne and 
Saatcioglu, 2008). As I described in Chapter 6, I believe that I can confidently claim I changed 
through the process, my organisation certainly changed and I would like to believe therefore 
that a handful of the leaders also did so; for some though the process seemed to lead them to 
dig their heels just a little bit further into the ground. Thankfully this does not reflect the 
outcome generally which was considered successful enough to be being implemented 
elsewhere.  
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7.1 Legacy 
In reporting the 1st, 2nd and 3rd person learning in Chapter 6, I explained the impact to my 
practice and the people working with it. I explained that I believe strongly that there has been 
organisational and individual impact regarding leadership learning and personal growth. 
However, I remain cognizant that these changes could be fleeting and that the changes made 
are no panacea to our organisational challenges. I also wonder whether we could have 
developed even further, creating even more of an impact, in the next section I raise some of the 
issues that might have hindered development and impact. 
 
7.1.1 Why Was It Not Even More Impactful? 
Baumann (2008) claims that “The instinctive association of ‘unity of effort’ with ‘unity of 
command’ in the military mind-set makes it difficult for the military to consider alternatives to 
a hierarchically organised chain of command” (Ibid: 72). NATO operations can surely be 
commanded and controlled but can the same be said for NATO transformation, can 
transformation ever be commanded or even controlled at all? What is in it for a successful 
leader, many of them having reached the pinnacle of their career, most of whom who will 
depart the international military arena after two years, to learn a new leadership style anyway? 
Could Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the British military historian and strategist have been right when 
he claimed, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an 
old one out” March (2008: 113) puts it another way; “Perhaps the greatest problem for 
sustaining exploration is the way in which adaptation encourages patience with old ideas and 
impatience with new ones.” (Gerras and Wong: 2013).  
7.1.1.1 Closed Minds 
There is little doubt in my mind that for some of the people who had spent their entire lives in 
the militaries, civilians tend to be tolerated rather than truly accepted. For some my being 
civilian in a predominantly military organisation left me at a disadvantage, I felt that I was not 
considered equal to the leaders I was trying to influence and almost all of them felt “they know 
all that already” and could not learn from me nor anything I was offering. One example still 
sticks vividly in my mind that I experienced during the research period. The JWC Commander 
had called a social gathering at his house and there was an 80-20% military to civilian mix of 
attendees, quite reflective of our organisation. I was talking to one of the leaders, and over his 
shoulder, I saw the oldest leader we had enter the room and walk towards us. Since I had seen 
him and the other leader hadn’t I raised out my hand to greet the latest arrival. The new arrival 
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looked down at my hand and shook his head, “warriors first” he bellowed, and shook the 
hand of my surprised conversational partner first. The “bands” that bind these “brothers” are 
deep and wide.  
7.1.1.2 Structural Reinforcements of Behaviour 
Action research imposes on the researcher a “commitment to democracy” that appears to sit 
uncomfortably within a hierarchal setting so influenced by C2 (Nugus et al., 2012: 1947). 
Talbot and O’Toole (2009: 357) reinforce this dilemma posing the question “if subordinates 
are empowered to act in autonomous ways, how can commanding officers maintain control 
within their units?” Taking us back to the question of control and the militaries dependence 
upon it. Talbot and O’Toole (2009: 357) also claim that where a leader is positioned in the 
organisational structure strongly influences how these individuals lead, their leadership being 
“informed by their location within organisational structures, as well as by cultural cues that 
favoured rule following and obedience.” They go on to ask “is it reasonable to expect leaders 
to empower subordinates so as to facilitate their learning, when leaders are feeling 
disempowered by organisational structures, policies and cultures that stifle their abilities to 
make decisions?” (Ibid). There appears to be very little organisational and even less personal 
incentive for some of these leaders to embrace such change.  
 
7.1.1.3 Vulnerability Is Considered A Weakness 
Asking senior leaders in an organisation, as I did, to identify their “espoused theories”, and to 
compare them with their “in-use theories” is effectively asking them to show vulnerability and 
question openly their own leadership and this sharply contradicts their training and the 
behaviours rewarded during successful careers spanning in many cases more than 30 years. It 
takes a courageous and humble leader to ask for, listen to and act upon feedback from their 
peers and there is very little chance in a military C2 environment that they will hear from their 
peers, let alone their subordinates. I recently experienced this again during an innovation 
conference (Schiller, 2017) where the 4* General was eager to introduce a more innovative 
approach within his command, one senior southern European military member stated that in 
his country “no one ever spoke after the Boss had spoken, because that it was a sign of 
disrespect” and I watched as the 4* tried to make clear, humbly, respectfully, that he needed to 
know what was on their minds in spite of their history, he wanted to hear them but their culture 
and military history stopped it from happening. Those at the very top seem to know intuitively 
when to stop talking and start listening, they know that true attentiveness signals respect for 
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people of all ranks and roles, they are able to maintain a sense of curiosity, and even a degree 
of humility. Humility keeps pride in check, deters complacency and resists arrogance (Various, 
2012: 83), humility “is an attractive and powerful quality and a key ingredient of leadership”, 
but in organisations where humility is not rewarded at all, it is a real challenge trying to 
encourage it.  
 
7.1.1.4 We Are Just Not Ready For It 
Jackson and Parry (2010: 44) warn that striving to achieve what may describe as authentic 
leadership comes with some risk, reducing the agency of the followers and perhaps 
encouraging a dependency that leaders might typically want to reduce. They make the point 
that “Their quest for genuinely authentic, ethically sound and spiritually enlightened leaders 
maintains the leader-centric perspective which endeavours to solve leadership problems by 
focusing on the leader. Their followers, therefore, continue to play a marginal and incidental 
role.” (Ibid.). There is a risk of course that I inadvertently ended up reinforcing this even further 
by researching the leaders rather than the branch heads that would have been equally relevant 
for the organisation.  
It is not only individuals that have both “theories in use” and “theories espoused” (Argyris and 
Schön: 1996) but organisations too. My organisation went to great lengths to develop their 
values of being innovative, inclusive, supportive and accountable and published those around 
the notice boards, corridors and even as far as adapting recruitment interviews to align with 
what we espouse. I cannot help but wonder how others would describe our observed 
performance against these to identify our organisational “in-use” theories. I suspect we are not 
doing as well as we say we are and perhaps there are good reasons for this. Jackson and Parry 
(2010: 104) remark that it is not unusual for organisations to espouse empowerment and 
artefact levels (like value statements) yet continue to “maintain domination at the deep structure 
levels.”. These deep structures being reinforced through alternative artefacts like parking place 
allocation, seating places, who speaks when and other enforced or encouraged deferential 
behaviours. Schneider et al. (1996:7) suggest that “Changes in hierarchy, technology, 
communication networks, and so forth are effective only to the degree that these structural 
changes are associated with changes in the psychology of employees.” This is no easy task as 
exemplified by one of the leaders interviewed when he asked the following question during an 
interview: 
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L8 - “How do you empower people to lead in an organisation that 
is a hierarchical structure, because we are all comfortable with the 
hierarchy?” 
 
Yet it is clear from the success of organisations like McChrystal’s (2015) that C2 is not 
necessarily specific to military organisations, there are many “hard” organisations operating 
within relatively formal bureaucratic frameworks where hierarchies are not only observable 
but also applied and these can be likened to a C2 organisation. Cameron and Quinn (2011: 
2585) “found that the largest percentages of firms were dominated by a hierarchy culture” and 
claim that almost half of all organisations are profoundly hierarchical in nature. Holmes 
(2007:1995) also claims that formal power and structure is not as rare as some think, he remarks 
that “the great majority of workplaces are intrinsically hierarchical in structure”. During a 
recent international HR conference, I presented a paper based upon my research (Hargreaves 
and Anderson, 2015) and after the session was complete two members of the audience 
approached me to state that their organisations were also run within a C2 paradigm. I was 
somewhat surprised to discover that those organisations were associated with the NHS and 
national schooling.  
 
7.1.1.5 Authentic Leadership May Not Be The Answer 
Returning to the theme of leadership described as evolving traits (Jackson and Parry, 2010) it 
could be said that authentic leadership is just the latest leadership fad (Huczynski, 1993). Yukl 
(1999: 302) insists that although typological definitions are popular in the literature they have 
“limited utility for increasing our understanding of effective leadership” and are little more 
than “simplistic stereotypes”. Some authors believe that the act of striving towards becoming 
“authentic” is a sure way to ensure that it is never able to be reached (Berkovich, 2014: 245), 
and here I have some sympathy; if you are a more “transaction” leader and that is truly authentic 
within you, then how or why should a leader pretend to be something else – that seems to defy 
the descriptions of authentic leadership that tend towards a transformational style.  
7.2 Summary 
In 2012 and as a consequence of the JWC’s changing operational contexts (see Table 1) and 
the JWC staff members own feedback my organisation commenced an organisational 
development process that ended up as a complete organisational optimisation programme that 
including changing aspects of organisational structures and organisational cultures. This thesis 
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studies and reports my own organisation’s attempts to understand organisational culture in 
order to encourage a shift in leadership and to engage the JWC staff to supplement their highly-
developed ability to C2 an organisation with altogether softer approaches to leadership. Softer 
approaches are said to result in increasing levels of participation, collaboration and 
emancipation so as to set the scene for a sustainable organisational culture transformation. 
Ironically Nugus et al., (2012: 1947) make the point that emancipatory, participatory 
endeavours may struggle with organisations that exude hierarchy, bureaucracy and power 
distances. Leadership has the potential, perhaps the obligation, to change this. To exemplify 
and insist upon the application of personal feedback, coaching, express appreciation, value and 
to bring about organisational clarity around the organisation’s mission. Leaders are expected 
to behave in line with the aspirations they espouse and to translate and communicate 
organisational visions and goals so that organisational members can make sense of and align 
their behaviours accordingly (Weick, 2001). They are considerably more effective and 
believable when they do so authentically.  
Colin Powell, former 4* General and 65th US Secretary of State, makes the point that 
“Leadership is the art of achieving more than the science of management says is possible.” 
(Harari, 2003). Stanley McChrystal, another former 4* General suggests that Military leaders 
need to stop pretending they are the omniscient chess-master, controlling the destiny and 
movement each piece and rather transform to an end state where all the chess pieces are 
encouraged to think for themselves, to communicate together laterally as well as up and down 
the organisation and determine their own courses of action. McChrystal, now head of the 
McChrystal group, now leads an organisation that somewhat ironically claims to:  
 
“partner with you to change processes and behavior to make your 
organisation more adaptable. We take your company from a 
command structure and teach you how to communicate across 
silos and operate like a networked team of teams”  
 
and yet our own organisations are filled with people who do not appear at all ready for this. 
They appear much more comfortable being told what to do, in some cases how to do it and 
transformative thinking and action is somehow limited.  
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The rather unpalatable reality for those strongly attached to a C2 mindset is that organisational 
culture changes cannot be commanded nor controlled since they are subject to the values and 
beliefs of the members of the organisation. You can tell someone what to do, when and how to 
do it, but you cannot command nor control someone’s values or beliefs. On the other hand, a 
leader has ultimate control over their behaviour, what they actually do, and that seems to matter 
so much more than what they say. Schein (2010:104) posits that “every group, organisation, 
occupation, and macroculture develops norms around the distribution of influence, authority, 
and power” and so much of that development appears to be driven from what is observed rather 
than what is simply stated. When Stanley McChrystal joined ISAF as the 4* Commander he 
had become accustomed to eat only one large meal a day late in the evening. Over a period of 
months his close staff adopted the same behaviours, some enduring significant discomfort on 
the way, convinced that if it was somehow good for the general, it must be good for them. He 
did not command this change in their beliefs, he wasn’t even aware at the time that it had 
happened (McChrystal, 2015). What leaders actually do seem to be so important and much 
more important than what they say. When what is said, and what is done is coherent, then 
leadership is aligned rather than contradictory and that appears to make such a difference to 
those being led. It doesn’t seem enough though for leaders to wait until they have reached the 
highest levels of military office for them to lead in authentically, they need to lead like that 
before they retire and they need to inspire and engage managers below them to lead in such a 
way as to engage, inspire and nurture collaboration and commitment and you just cannot 
command nor control collaboration or commitment. It’s all about the leadership it seems; 
leadership as a verb and not a noun (Raelin, 2011).  
The thesis then describes an attempt to address this challenge directly and to bring about 
leadership and organisational change in an international and politically significant 
organisation. It was performed from within a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
military centre the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC); a centre said to be at the forefront and 
a catalyst for multinational military transformation through training and education 
(Kucukaksoy, 2013). It was research that commenced from a position of trying to better 
understand an organisation rather than to change it, that evolved into leadership research 
culminating with organisational and individual change at the core. The thesis describes how a 
research, intervention, research cycle addressed authentic leadership development and created 
through research is now a fundamental part of a newcomers on boarding package, has been 
used in our higher command and is now part of the NATO Wide Executive Development 
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programme that I now “teach” on. These interventions offer reflective themes to military 
leaders working in transformational multinational entities; themes that may also be relevant for 
others in hierarchically founded organisations and there appears to be no shortage of them. My 
hope therefore is that my research may also provide some insights for other hierarchical 
bureaucratic organisations and especially ones considering the introduction of softer 
approaches to leadership.  
During an ACT-sponsored innovation panel (Porkolab, 2017) I was briefing senior members 
of ACT on innovation and leadership and told them the story of how many of those I researched 
viewed the times when they were in Command as their finest moments, I noticed a lot of 
nodding heads in the audience. It seems everyone loved to be in Command, not so many were 
fans of being controlled. At the end of Gardner et al’s. paper (2005: 368) the authors remark 
that “the time has come to understand more fully how to develop authenticity in our leaders 
and their followers” and I hope that this thesis has contributed something to that perceived gap 
in understanding HOW we might start to create an environment where leaders and followers 
are afforded the time and stimulus to be able to reconnect, reflect, reframe and reinvigorate 
their leadership story. Looking back at the quote from Elkins (1998: 2) who said: “In the 
military, command and then control go together as hand and glove.” perhaps the time has 
come to consider taking the hand out of the glove a little more often.  
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Appendix A – Organisational Survey Questions 
• My workload is manageable  
• I am confident about my ability to do my job 
• Overall, the trial JWC structure has been an improvement for me 
• Overall, the trial JWC structure has been an improvement for the JWC 
• I feel that I have a good understanding of the trial structure  
• I have a clear understanding about my role in the JWC  
• I understand my responsibilities  
• I feel that I can make appropriate decisions myself  
• I have significant influence over what happens in my branch  
• The maintenance of specialist knowledge in the JWC is adequate  
• The maintenance of corporate knowledge in the JWC is adequate  
• The JWC has all the appropriate key functions in place  
• I spend too much time on tasks which do not fit within my branch or role 
• There are things that my branch/section should do but it is not able to 
do  
• Every member of our branch is actively engaged in the branch’s 
activities  
• Parts of my job would be better suited to a different functional area 
• The branch is as small as it can be while still being effective  
• The way in which work is assigned in my branch is logical  
• The structure of my branch is well designed  
• The workload is equally distributed across the branch  
• The functional areas within my branch are constructed to a minimum 
requirement  
• Parts of my branch’s functions could be provided as a service from 
elsewhere  
• Parts of my branch’s functions should be provided as a service from 
elsewhere  
• Key players from other branches are accessible when needed  
• Key players in our branch are accessible when needed by others  
• Communication is effective between the branches I interact with  
• Our tasks are clearly aligned to the mission of the JWC  
• The JWC’s functions are connected in the best organizational way  
• When working on tasks, my chain of command is clear  
• I receive clear direction for tasks from my chain of command  
• I receive timely direction for tasks from my chain of command  
• The JWC’s management construction is efficient  
• The work processes used within my branch are effective  
• The work processes used within my branch are efficient  
• The processes used within the JWC are effective  
• The trial structure has resulted in a more effective organization  
• The trial structure has resulted in more successful exercise delivery 
• It is clear who is responsible for implementing important tasks  
• The trial structure has resulted in a more successful delivery of 
transformation 
• In the JWC we have good interpersonal skills  
• In the JWC we have effective communication channels  
• In the JWC we are trusted  
• In the JWC we are committed to completing our tasks  
• In the JWC we are recognized for our efforts 
• In the JWC we have the support of our leaders  
• In the JWC our leaders and management live the ‘One Team’ values 
• In the JWC we offer support, even if it is not our specific role  
• In the JWC we are respectful of others  
• In the JWC we adapt quickly to new challenges  
• In the JWC we are always open to make improvements  
• In the JWC we listen to all levels in the organization 
• In the JWC we view mistakes as an opportunity to learn and grow  
• In the JWC we have a shared view of our tasks  
• In the JWC we apply our best efforts In the JWC we feel valued  
• The JWC is a positive, performance-orientated and energetic working 
environment  
• In the JWC feedback is a normal feature of our working environment 
• In the JWC there is a positive attitude to challenges   
• In the JWC there is a will to try new ways of doing things 
 
  
Appendix B – Organisational Hotspots 
 
L1 No – it validated it, 
Yes – absolutely, 
more conscious 
of what I say,  
Yes, common 
language No Some yes but mostly no. No
One of the most significant things we’ve done, 
takes time – the rocket – smoke and fire and it 
still sits there, then – it took too long 6 – 8 
months, senior leadership buy in is vital.
Close colleague, 
respectful, friendly, 
trusting. Big fan of the 
program. Same age.
M1
Yes -
allowing 
non-native 
speakers to 
lead
Yes – musk ox 
metaphor, 
Got better, much 
more open, frank and 
volunteering
Got worse, saying but 
not doing, 
Yes – OPRs lead in spite of CG. 
They trust.
None to worse, disconnected 
and watching from “ivory 
tower”, 
Wanted more D&G - mentioned 13  times, more 
trust – 34 times, walk the talk -  misses the “old 
days”, platoon, company,  battalion leadership 
“yes….my Battalion was 700”, wants leadership to 
“walk around” – 10 times, to lead the “musk ox ring”, 
say do gap - , wants to be consulted
Mutually respectful, 
friendly, trusting.
L2
Yes, 
purposeful 
listening, 
slowing 
down to 
understand
Yes a little bit 
maybe. I try to 
make the 
message stick,  
Not sure
Generally yes but it is not 
consistent, some really 
investing and others are stuck, 
Internal communications challenges, making 
time to “be there” for people, its just talk right 
now, need to get to action, deeds not words – 3 
times, real disconnect what we are doing and 
what we think we are doing, know do gap, we 
know communications is an issue but we 
haven’t do anything about it, it won’t stick until 
we operationalise it.    
Collegial,  respectful, 
friendly, trusting. Fan 
of the program. Same 
age.
M2
No not very 
much, I 
was 
already 
doing it. 
I don’t think it changed 
very much. 
Not really – seniors 
are all doing well, they 
are credible and good 
at what they do. 
Possibly but it’s hard to 
tell, 
No changes our current 
leadership is good at letting 
people know they are 
appreciated, 
Not that I have noticed
It’s just how it is, Nations send who they want, we 
already have a NATO code of conduct, I’m sceptical, 
it’s all too hard, and unnecessary.  Across the board 
we don’t see enough of the leaders wandering the 
corridors. |The way that superiors behave has a 
massive influence on the organisation as a whole. 
Fairly ambivalent, 
respects what I was 
trying to do. Friendly, 
passive. Older.
L3
Yes, it left an 
imprint and I 
probably 
have 
changed my 
behaviours
Absolutely, a lot, 
thinking about 
what others need.  
Yes, especially 
when working 
through tough 
issues. 
Yes, more trust and a common 
sense of purpose shown. 
It’s not just about walking the walk, it’s how we 
as leaders act, what shadow we cast. I may be 
one of the people who has a stop gap between 
knowing it and living it.  Out of our comfort zone 
– 3 times. It was about going from good to 
better, not throwing away what we had, building 
on it. 
Occasionally distant, 
highest rank 
interviewed, respectful, 
occasionally 
suspicious about my 
motives. Big fan of the 
program. Same age.
M3
No, I am 
not 
changing 
my styles 
or changing 
myself
No, my language 
changed over 7 years 
not the last 1. 
They are changing but 
not because of the 
culture process
I couldn’t see or observe 
direct  impact that I can 
correlate this. 
Old mature managers on their 
last military job, not a group that 
is easy to change
Not with this group, they are 
already there.
Knew this from before, no 
new concepts
Diversity is strength, saw culture shaping as a threat 
to this. Requirement to trust more. Sceptical – 7 
times. Cultural shaping sometimes is not a good 
thing.  What is the problem we are trying to fix? 
Come on – do we really have time for this? 
Mutual mistrust, 
frustration as he’s had 
some initiatives 
quashed, Non- collegial 
relation developed over 
many years. Same age.
L4
Yes, I think I 
have to say 
yes to that. 
Yes also in that, 
small elements, 
using different 
words.
Well I know changes have 
happened. Senior leaders are 
working a  bit differently now. 
Small elements 
but not 
substantial 
change. 
Nothing in the 
journey I hadn’t 
heard before
Trusted,  respectful, 
supportive.. Big fan of 
the program. Older.
M4
No, it 
developed 
anyway but 
no link to 
the culture 
shaping 
process.
No I haven’t seen any evidence of this
Leaders have not 
changed the way they 
lead. We don’t change 
the style when we go 
from National to NATO 
leadership settings.
Provided a useful benchmark but 
also a weapon – people held up 
for not applying the concepts. 
Not really. Yes. A lot of reminders but nothing new.
Any changes that were seen faded rapidly. 
Delegation is a real challenge. Recognised but 
helpless to do anything about it. Need to have much 
more 1-1’s from leadership – 3 times.  That’s just 
the way it is. 
Distant but mutually  
respectful. 
L5
I think I'm 
now better in 
adapting to 
my 
counterparts.
Yes, I create 
more open space 
for discussion 
and openness. 
Yes generally we 
have much more 
of a very personal 
interaction, so 
there is, I 
experience there 
is much more 
room for not only 
exchanging the 
current activities, 
but exchanging 
thoughts, way 
ahead, discussing 
pro and cons, 
Yes overall my impression is that 
there was a need for this kind of 
improvement because this is a style 
people feel more comfortable with in 
the language we started to use. 
There is more communications 
going on now.
There are several differences 
which are really obvious. More 
awareness if people are under 
pressure and stress.
Yes I think so. I 
hear stories of 
more feedback 
and better 
communications. 
People 
understand 
“what makes 
them tick”. 
It reminds me 
again of crucial 
leadership styles, it 
is common 
practice in my 
Nation.
Well in my younger days you were educated 
that there is something which makes up a 
perfect leader. Its best practice, part of officers 
training and education since the beginning. Be 
clear to everybody what your intent is, do into 
action so that you have got permanent feedback 
how your message is received, I know precisely 
what we are involved in but it’s also very good 
to listen to what is the specific part an individual 
is dealing with.  
Direct line manager. 
Trusting, respectful, 
and highly supportive. 
Fan of the program. 
Same age
M5
No my 
personal 
leadership 
has not 
changed.
No I don’t think the 
way I communicate 
has changed, I listen 
more perhaps. Use 
less UK metaphors 
that others don’t 
understand. 
No, I would say that 
relationships with 
peers are less 
harmonious and the 
language more 
polarised.
No they are 
disconnected, they 
should be delegating 
and empowering. 
No, I think at the working level 
people just get on and do what 
they have to do. Some have 
been COS’s, DCOMs etc. 
They tried to adjust, they just 
aren’t gelling, I don’t know if it 
is National issues. 
One can’t be quite as direct in dealing in the 
multinational environment as we can be in the 
national environment. Leaders are educated in 
different ways depending upon their Nationality.  
Need more delegation – 5 times. Good 
communications isn’t an event – its day to day, 
walking around – 9  times. There is a need for 
leaders to take a breath, to reflect – 11 times. 
Collegial, trusting, 
respectful, friendly. OK 
with the program. 
Younger. 
L6
I try to do 
things a little 
bit 
differently. 
Yes somewhat, 
German language 
is very very 
straight, easy to 
offend in a 
multinational 
environment. 
No I don’t think 
so It’s difficult to tell.
No, on my level absolutely ok 
between leaders.
I cannot answer 
for the time 
being
Platoon, Battalion, Regimental leadership – 7 
times. Certain structures of behaviour are fixed, 
I do not pretend to change my behaviour. I 
expect the commander to give orders, the Chief 
of Staff to organise. No difference in a 
transformational HQ to an operational one.  
What I am sometimes missing is that an order 
is an order and that we are really used to follow 
or to give orders and that a timeline is a 
timeline and not a basis for a new discussion.  
Remote and 
suspicious about the 
program. Likened to a 
religious cult. Tolerant 
but sceptical towards 
me. Not especially 
supportive unless 
being watched by 
highers. Older.
M6
Yes on a 
personal 
front. 
No, I don’t think so. 
No, do they know what 
needs to be 
communicated? Leaders 
need to concentrate 
externally and let the 
worker bees do what 
they need to do. 
I am not sure I’ve seen 
improvement in peers, I think it is 
the opposite. 
Got much worse, there is a 
lack of mutual understanding 
at the leaders group. 
Not empowered enough, massive reduction in ability 
to influence leaders. Being aware is not the same as 
acting on it. Leaders find it difficult to delegate - 3. 
There are cultural tensions between the Nations.  I 
want to be inspired, encouraged, I know what 
managing a resource is. They is definitely a piece 
missing about leading by example. If you want 
certain behaviours you have to live by it. Do as I do 
and do as I say. You must live by what you say, 
because if you don’t it’s a credibility issue again.  
Shared similar history, 
very collegial, 
connected, respectful, 
friendly, trusting. Fan of 
the program. Younger.
L7 Yes, 
Yes, at least we 
are talking more, 
definitely in our 
leadership group. 
More flexibility to 
express opinions 
and suggestions 
for somebody 
else’s 
responsibility. 
Yes in our planning meetings. I see 
at least examples of people 
checking up with colleagues. There 
is definitely more “we” than “I” now. 
Cool relationship but 
respectful of the aims. 
Occasionally cynical 
over my involvement. 
Older.
M7
Not a lot, 
not an 
awful lot in 
this case.
No I can’t say that it 
has
Yeah I think a very 
slight change, slight 
change, I wouldn’t say 
cataclysmic, some 
people more open and 
allowing input from a 
broader base.  
There might have been 
an initial shift but it 
never stayed. 
A couple of isolated examples.  
My respect for my peer group 
and superiors is greatly 
influenced by the way they work. 
I didn’t notice any change 
induced by the culture shaping 
in terms of the senior leaders, 
no. 
It was a good reminder as 
far as I was concerned.
We should all know and do this anyway. I have 
worked in NATO before and you know frankly, I am 
one of these guys, I don’t need direction, in fact I 
don’t like direction, I like the broader, go figure out 
what you need, just give me the boundaries. I think 
we need a little more clarity about our main efforts, 
agreement over our priorities. We have too many 
tribes here, divisional tribes, national tribes and no 
clear shared awareness. That has to start at the top. 
Collegial, infrequent 
contact, respectful, 
friendly. OK with the 
program. Same age. .
L8
Yes, I try 
and use all 
the tools, 
methods, 
good 
practice we 
have 
learned.
I say “OK, be 
rational first” I 
mean don’t put 
too much 
emotion in if it 
doesn’t make 
sense. 
Not really and 
this is an issue 
because I was 
expecting more, 
yeah,, I was 
expecting more 
coordination, 
more working 
collaboration.
I think that there is probably 
less tension when we meet.  
It does change a 
lot, the 
relationship, the 
way that we are 
talking to each 
other and the 
way we are 
interacting of 
course, some of 
them especially. 
We are all coming from different cultures, I 
knew that but didn’t consider that it would be so 
challenging. I’m not afraid to be quite straight I 
think it is my own responsibility to be straight. I 
put in my signature block “say what you do and 
do what you say! So everybody can see that 
and I try to stick to that. 
Collegial, respectful, 
friendly, trusting. Fan 
of the program. 
Younger.
M8
Personally 
little effect I 
would say.
I would say nothing of 
any substance.
I have no evidence of 
it, I haven’t really seen 
it. 
No, I don’t see much 
accountability in the 
leaders. 
There is not enough peer to peer 
co-ordination going on. 
You’ve been here long enough 
to know that there’s leaders 
themselves who might not 
have taken on the 
accountability measures I’m 
talking about but I think that’s 
one trend you can see 
throughout the building.
No clarity about the outcome of the program. “What 
is the problem we were trying to address?” People 
hang out in National bunches not functional 
bunches. The program was a commercially biased 
one and we are not the same, we are military. It’s 
not relevant for us. I am sceptical about the survey 
and cynical about the results. Many people here are 
at the end of their careers with too much deference 
to National lines rather than military chains of 
command. There needs to be a “JWC hat”, not a 
JED hat, not a JCID hat etc. We should put our 
organisation first.  
Tolerated given my lack 
of a uniform, 
suspicious, fairly 
dismissive of the 
program. Younger.
L9
I hope it 
affected me. 
Personally it 
has made 
me who I am 
here, 
walking the 
corridors. 
Getting 
around and 
talking to 
people. 
I try not to 
interject, I try not 
to interrupt, I try 
to hear 
everyone’s point 
of view. 
So for me I have 
seen a change in 
language without 
any shadow of a 
doubt and then 
the doing it.  
People are not just using the 
language, people are doing it. 
What I have seen is a real effort 
to embrace all of our individuals 
and bring them along.
I’ve seen change 
even in the most 
cynical people. 
There is 
openness to the 
concepts that I 
definitely see 
across the team.  
It was a healthy 
reminder
Frictions (- 7 times) lay at the leadership level. 
We are mostly over 50 and a cynical (-7 times) 
bunch. All nationalities look at leadership in a 
slightly different way. We need to do more as 
leadership, they is no consistent work ethic. 
Collegial, respectful, 
friendly, trusting. Fan 
of the program. Older. 
M9
No. I 
already 
have my 
Marine 
Corp ethos. 
We try to 
hold 
ourselves 
to a 
different 
leadership 
standard 
than any 
other 
service. 
None of it was earth 
shattering to me as a 
new concept or 
approach. No, no, no. 
No I can’t say that I 
have, with the 
exception of a couple 
of common phrases 
maybe. 
No nothing tangible
None – same ones lead, same 
ones hide, and nothing is done 
about it. I saw leaders nod 
agreement that there was an 
understanding that action would 
take place, so there was hope for 
me that something tangible, not 
just words, I want actions, and a 
lot of times that has never 
followed.  
I’ve been saying for years that 
there has been a lack of 
command guidance, intent, 
direction, it’s lacking. I don’t 
know first-hand but it seems 
broken to me. 
Yes, there was nothing that 
was new to me. 
As a marine I might say “I need YOU to do this, can 
you do it?” or I might not ask that, just say “Get it 
done!” The ability for somebody to say “no I don’t 
want to do something for personal reasons” and 
there’s no repercussions to it amazes me. We are all 
military and there should be some kind of baseline 
we are all operation off. I would always say that I 
have always pointed to the top, because they set the 
standard. Direction and guidance is missing – 9 
times. It starts at the top, clear, concise guidance, 
reshape the culture to function like a military one.   
The boss says “we need to fix this” and then nothing 
happens, so what does his word mean? 
Distant but also 
collegial, respectful, 
friendly. Tolerant if 
dismissive about the 
program. Younger.
Consolidated and Aggregated Interview Results. 
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Committee on Research Ethics 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
 
TITLE OF STUDY 
 
(The language of leadership through an organisational culture shaping journey.)  
An analysis on the impact on the interactions of senior leaders within a military HQ 
as they/we progress through a major organisational culture alignment process. 
 
Version Number and Date 
 
V.0.1  -  26th July 2013 
 
INVITATION 
 
I would like to invite you to consider participating in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being 
done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully 
and feel free to ask me if you would like more information or if there is anything that you 
do not understand. Please also feel free to discuss this with your colleagues, managers 
and relatives if you wish. I would like to stress that you do not have to accept this 
invitation and should only agree to take part if you want to. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
PARTICIPANTS FAQS 
  
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
I want to analyse the response of my organisation to an organisational culture shaping 
initiative that will take place within out highly structured and formalised organisation.  The 
culture shaping initiative is designed to increase the effectiveness of the JWC (Joint 
Warfare Centre) across a number of areas of concern following a JWC wide 
organisational behaviours survey.  Some of the areas of concern include lack of 
communications, stove piping, lack of coaching, insufficient value expressed to individuals 
and lack of an organisational awareness of what the JWC mission and visions are.  Since 
so many of these appear to be connected to internal communications I intend, at this 
point, to concentrate on researching a comparison with the language that is used by 
leaders pre/post the culture shaping journey.      
 
I am curious to know if the rhetoric and discourse changes as a result of the intervention 
and if the participants believe that the language used is a critical factor in the 
organisational culture shaping activity. 
 
2. Why have I been chosen to be invited to take part? 
 
You are in a position of senior leadership and you may also have influential leaders above 
you.  You have at least one year remaining at the JWC so that we can explore any 
changes over a reasonable period of time. You are part of up to 20 staff who may be able 
to help shed light on the importance of the language of the leaders in the JWC’s desire to 
become even more effective than we are today.  
 
3. Do I have to take part? 
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Absolutely not. Although the COM and COS have agreed that I should be allowed access 
to all staff and have approved the theme of the research they, and I, are clear that the 
participation is voluntary and that you are free to withdraw at anytime without explanation 
and without incurring a disadvantage. Results up to the period of withdrawal may be used, 
if you are happy for this to be done.  Otherwise you may request that they are destroyed 
and no further use will be made of them. 
 
 
4. What will happen if I take part? 
 
I will be observing our organisational culture attributes as the change journey evolves to 
try and make sense of any linguistic relevancies. Through informal semi structured 
interviews I will ask your insights and experiences regarding the journey in respect to 
changes in the stories, the metaphors, the language used and the way that language is 
delivered. Specifically: 
 
• I will be the only researcher and the primary aim will be to learn more about our 
organisation through observations and interviews. 
• The interviews may take place up to 4 times over the next 12 months and will 
take no more than an hour.   
• I ask only that you are honest during our discussions and that we both keep the 
details of the discussions private so that we do not accidently lead others to 
conclusions that are not their own.  
 
I will ask your permission to record the discussion for the only reason that I will be able to 
fully be present during our discussions and then be able to transcribe actual 
conversations accurately afterwards. The transcribed text will be offered to you before I 
use any of the descriptions for anything else. They will be stored on my work laptop which 
is password and identity protected and you will be identified by a random number so that 
only I will be able to identify who said what.  
 
5. Are there any risks in taking part? 
 
No. I will ensure your anonymity and confidentiality at all times. I will follow the University 
guidelines and our conversations and any observations will remain non attributable.  
 
6. Are there any benefits in taking part? 
 
There may be some limited side benefits. It may provide you with a useful period to reflect 
on language and culture in a multinational command and control environment. It may as a 
side effect improve your own language awareness and communications skills.  
 
7. What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
 
I will be available to you to discuss any concerns you have at any time during the 
research period and if I am not able to ease your concerns then you are free to contact 
the research project Principal Investigator Dr Lisa Anderson (l.anderson@liverpool.ac.uk) 
and she will try to help. If you remain unhappy or have a complaint which you feel you 
cannot come to the Research Governance Officer on 0151 794 8290 (ethics@liv.ac.uk). 
When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the name or 
description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researcher(s) involved, and the 
details of the complaint you wish to make. 
 
8. Will my participation be kept confidential? 
 
The record of my observations and the transcribed texts will be stored on my work laptop 
which is password and identity protected and you will be identified by a random number 
so that only I will be able to identify who said what and once a number of people have 
been allocated numbers I will also not be able to track who said what. I will retain a 
backup copy on a USB drive that is also password protected and wipes after 3 attempts to 
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access the drive without the correct password. I will ensure your anonymity and 
confidentiality at all times. I will retain the data for up to three years as a basis for my own 
personal reflection after the thesis is written. After that time the laptop will be wiped, 
reformatted and prepared for destruction IAW NATO procedures. The USB drive will be 
stripped of all recordings and transcriptions although I will retain the thesis intact.  
 
9. What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results are primarily related to my thesis work. Depending on what is found there may 
be value in sharing the results with other NATO commands and other military command 
and control entities. There will be no way to identify the participants in the research paper. 
Data will be kept no longer than five years after the study.  
 
10. What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
 
You are free to withdraw at any time, without explanation. Results up to the period of 
withdrawal may be used, if you are happy for this to be done.  Otherwise you may request 
that they are destroyed and no further use is made of them. 
 
11. Who can I contact if I have further questions? 
 
You can make contact with the Principal Investigator (Dr Lisa Anderson – 
l.anderson@liverpool.ac.uk who will be happy to try and answer any other questions 
you may have.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix F – Thematic Grid 
Themes as Predicted from the Research and Revealed during the Interviews 
Theme Example Interview Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teamwork 
 
 
 
 
“In the United States Army, there are two types of leaders, those that get to the top over the broken 
bodies of the people they have crushed on the way up and then there’s the ones that have built teams 
and co-opted and they are lifted up by their supportiveness” 
 
“The only team he felt comfortable with was his immediate Musk Ox team down there and he 
performed, we just had the exercise, he performed above and beyond expectation and it was such a joy 
for me to sit in the back and just watch this and just see all the others, ‘hot damn, he’s good’ ‘yes he is 
good’ because he was allowed to be good.” 
 
“I observe it, in every member of my team, a steep curve, not learning but they are getting more and 
more made sure they already were made sure but they are getting more and more made sure, I can see 
that now for, I am sure this thing affected our, provided them with some positive, knowhow as well, 
which completed their picture but I couldn’t see or observe direct impact that I can correlate this.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Managers 
 
Brief et al., 
1996 
“Communication and teamwork is all about in the Joint Warfare Centre.” 
 
“You know unless somebody is shooting at you and nobody is shooting at us so we don’t have to be 
barking and directive it’s more participative and team building environment I think.”  
 
“I am trying to get a personal development plan going for everybody in the organisation and I have a 
team who are producing that for me.” 
 
“It was a culmination of things so for me it was a teambuilding event I mean there is no question about 
that and it broke barriers.” 
 
 
 
 
Leaders 
Relationships “It's about using influence to guide people about where those governance problems lie and often they 
are not automatic about internal JWC management it's about where we sit in our support network as it 
were, our relationship with MOD Norway, our relationship with NCIA, our relationship with ACT and 
others.” 
 
Leader Chan, 2002 
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“I talking about my relationship with Colonel Bishop, my relationship with General Bergea at the time, 
my relationship with Victor Savannas, Michael Johansson, ACT, SHAPE, JFTC Brunssum, Naples.” 
 
“I think it has also to do with comradeship because formerly we are equal for example if you are a 
branch head amongst others you are, you could have a good relationship or you can be a rival if you feel 
to be in a rivalry but it has to be in a level of comradeship not as a boss.” 
 
“I would actually go as far as saying the relationship with the other Branch Heads has become more 
polarised over the year rather than more harmonious and so much of this is personality driven, clearly 
my personality fits into that equation as well.” 
Managers 
 
Communication “Communication is not only the language, communication is the cultures.” 
 
“The communication in all direction, lateral as well as up and down changed over time, so but it was not 
because of cultural shaping it was of getting familiar with the personalities, learning more about my 
people.” 
 
“It’s been really exciting to see a common language across the Joint Warfare Centre.” 
Managers 
 
Andriopoulos 
et al., 2008 
“They learned about leadership and a little bit more about the communications, those things like ‘ok 
people have different perspective’, they see their front lead, they know it now, they didn’t, or they 
haven’t so that is good”. 
 
Leader 
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Trust “It’s all about trusting people, loyalty, not looking at the outer paraphernalia but actually, and then take 
a risk, because I have also had the opposite. I completely missed it, I trusted somebody and that 
went completely wrong, so yeah you win some you lose some, but applying the very personal touch.” 
 
“I have had five international deployments, Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and stuff like that but when I 
came back from my second tour it suddenly became very clear to me that it’s not a joke when you say 
that you need to trust the man next to you in the fox hole, and you cannot let the man next to you in the 
fox hole down, and it’s just so ingrained in me that when I do stuff, and I recognise I’m sometimes a little 
bit over the top and I see that, but it’s all about, if I don’t do my job the next guy can’t do his job 
therefore we will fall apart and that cannot happen.”  
 
“It not only helped us in the way that we work together because of the behaviour because of a belief 
that there was a more effective means but it allowed us to build trust and build that common sense of 
purpose so it wasn't just about the concepts it was also about building the trust the organisation needed 
that would sustain the belief that we were all in this together now.”  
 
Managers 
 
Bijlsma-
Frankema, 
2001 
 
“I have fully trust in them and my feeling was they trusted me and that’s the base I can’t imagine to be 
better.” 
 
Leader 
 
Commitment “I think the point we made earlier and made often that we collectively that this is only going to work if 
the leadership is actively involved and sincerely committed and sincerely believes. Because if we are just 
paying lip service to it then, people are not stupid, no one in this organisation got here by being fool.” 
 
“The Chief and General Buller have committed their time, spoken openly and cast a definitive shadow 
there is now question in my mind they are committed to the well-being and health of this organisation.” 
 
Manager 
 
Blanchard, 
2010 
“I think first it's more commitment from the upper end because you need someone that doesn't fear to 
not to take responsibility that's not the point but that doesn't fear to fight.” 
 
“For me personally it's about seeing myself and I think that, you know most leaders develop an 
operating style and they have to believe in themselves and kind of commit to their operating style to 
make it work.” 
 
Leaders 
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“I don't know because it's not, we need to set aside some time to remind ourselves recommit ourselves 
and that's on a pretty regular basis and without making it doctrinaire you know somehow we've just got 
to say ‘remember these are the things that make us better’  
 
“The fact that this is even alive and kicking still is really a testament to leadership a testament to the 
commitment and a testament to the validity of the concept,” 
 
“It is just the fact that the key leaders were in a room together was it the fact that they were committing 
to something collectively was it the coffee breaks where they was there something else in there that is a 
byproduct of this journey that was impactful that we could.” 
 
Recognition Not really brought up 
 
 Senn and 
Hart, 2006 
Support “There’s the ones that have built teams and co-opted and they are lifted up by their supportiveness and 
it’s a relatively good thing to be promoted to Colonel in the United States Army and I think I’ve been one 
of the guys that’s built teams and helped me this is not the eagle belongs to all the people that I have 
ever worked with.” 
 
Manager 
 
Hu and Hang, 
2007 
“I mean they were all ready, intelligent, articulated, motivated young leaders and it’s hard to improve on 
something like that, I have seen it in other branches where people are more openly supportive of, in 
regards proactive information sharing.” 
 
“Now hear the individual commenting upon that I would even like to support you a bit more in the COS 
Huddle discussions.” 
 
“My observation is that it shouldn't be a surprise but from time to time it is a surprise that people have 
almost similar experiences what is helping them, what is supportive and what is not, but the way we 
shared and created more open discussion and openness amongst each other made it much easier.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Credibility “Certainly for two and a half years I’ve been here, where the floor plates are very aware that the 
relationships between the OF5’s aren’t always productive and that’s because they are not having those, 
you know those professional behaviours that you expect, you must live by what you say because if you 
don’t it’s a credibility issue again.” 
 
“I think the senior leadership is doing well, and telling people that they are doing a good job, in a 
credible way.” 
Leaders 
 
Senn and 
Hart, 2006 
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“No on the contrary, nothing has changed which is even worse because they say that they will change 
but they are not changing.” 
 
“I have a section that’s going out to these organisations, you need some military because there is a bit of 
credibility, some Head Quarters prefer it, but what you need is somebody who knows what it is.” 
 
 
Managers 
 
Accountability “A lot of the decision making processes that were taken nobody has got any accountability for it, so you 
know, ....... - gone. Where is the accountability for that decision and now we know there is an issue a bit 
later on, so again that it where I would deal with transparency.” 
 
“The fact that each of our Divisions tends to be more focused to some outward body rather than inward 
focus. What I think could be done to improve the functioning of the staff has to do more with the 
accountability function is probably the most important, I don’t see much of that.” 
 
“The DOM should be enforcing that but a tasker tracker is a symptom I think of a general lack of 
accountability throughout the building.” 
 
Managers Heskett, 
2011 
“I think the Nations that have OF5’s here will generally have higher expectations from their Military Staff 
than will the Nations that don’t have a OF5’s here. That is not a rule at all, you’ve been here long enough 
to know that there’s OF5’s themselves who might not have taken on the accountability measures I’m 
talking about but I think that’s one trend you can see throughout the building.” 
 
“It's the how we hold each other accountable how we support each other how we prioritise you know 
all of those kinds of things start to eat at the cultural progress that good intentions create.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Respect “The way that Superiors behave has a massive influence on the organisation as a whole, and on a 
personal level I try to live up to certain standards, I’m sure I don’t always achieve that, and I think that 
my respect for my peer group and superiors is greatly influenced by the way they work.” 
 
“I think it’s more along the lines of personal style and recognising that the personal style of respecting 
everybody as a contributor”  
 
“It doesn’t mean you can’t get angry with them or demand proper performance but you really have to 
be respectful of them as individuals and their individual talents.” 
 
 
Managers 
 
Kline, 1999 
Managers 
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“I think a renewed respect for the work that people do and everybody is part of the process. A renewed 
respect for attitude, for organisational atmosphere.”  
 
“I think I was intuitively respectful of people and their filters and their points of view.” 
 
“When I was a former commander in other positions as I was mentoring subordinate commanders I 
would tell them when you talk on the phone people listen not to your words but the way you talk on the 
phone if you are respectful on the phone they will learn to respectful if you are disrespectful and scream 
and yell they will learn to be disrespectful scream and yell.”  
 
“I think I've I try to be respectful especially not because we are all senior Officers but mainly we are all 
senior Officers I mean different age different experience and I am not considering that I am better than I 
mean one of my Norwegian colleagues or my English colleagues or my US colleagues we have all 
different experiences I think it helped me to take some to be a little bit.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Flexibility “They really want the organisation to be strong, healthy and positive for the future because the events 
of the last six weeks have clearly demonstrated, functionally demonstrated that we have to be a flexible 
organisation.” 
 
Manager 
 
Hallinger, 
2010 
“I have seen organisations where they were not so flexible and not so collaborative.” 
 
“I think also there has been some, let say, more flexibility at least in the leadership that I belong to.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Learning “If you were in the team now, you would see that, we are talking about this exercise, that exercise, how 
can we solve an issue that, it was like several years ago it was like you know talking about this and that, 
you know it was, it was not like positive but you know, complaining about this and that and that, 
nowadays everyone is talking about ‘how can we improve this? How can we improve this?’ 
Manager 
 
Harris and 
Ogbonna, 
2011 
Listening “If you really want people to care you need to talk to people directly not send an email, not make a 
phone call, and you need to seriously listen to what people have to say, not just to pay lip service.” 
 
“That is in principle of course a good thing because clearly people have been doing this, they have been 
listening and they want to chance, but the thing is if you don’t combine that with the right acts it 
becomes even more hollow and from my prospective.” 
 
Manager 
 
Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
by the 
interviewees.  
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“That had a huge impact on my because I’m quite a forceful person and I didn’t tend to listen to other 
people, I tend to speak and I didn’t tend to listen and for me it was a big eye opener and you know it just 
reinforces what you get told at home ‘just shut up, we’re talking, just listen to us for five minutes’ so it 
did make me stop and just say ‘look you know other people have got an opinion, you know given them 
the time to express that opinion’, and sometimes it’s good just to listen.” 
 
“The value of taking the time and really giving them the opportunity to make their case and so it’s 
patient listening and what I've benefited from that is that there are some brilliant ideas out there that 
just need a little bit of coaxing.” 
 
“So part of that is that be in the moment when you're have a one on one conversation but the other 
part is the listening effectively and asking those key questions to further develop the idea so that's 
probably the thing that sticks out to me as the most beneficial piece that I've learnt.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Empowered “We do stuff that in other places that is much higher grade’, so why are we are we seeing so much that’s 
wrong and in other areas if we just look at look at it slightly differently it’s great that we have that level 
of empowerment, it’s great that we’ve got so much freedom to maneuver, I mean for me personally I 
would hate being told ‘here’s your directional guidance, don’t move out of it.” 
 
“You can do that but then that goes back to my original analogy of leadership you can do that over 
broken bodies or you can make life long partners and really I see organisations that are empowering 
that empower their employers where you see initiative and innovation and great ideas.” 
 
Managers Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
by the 
interviewees. 
“I think that you know a couple of things that I think about in culture - culture changing and leadership is 
how do you empower people to lead in an organisation that is a hierarchical structure organisation and 
because the real challenge we have is we are all comfortable with the hierarchy.” 
 
“I just think that's probably just an interesting one to kind of think through given a military structure 
how do you tell everybody you know other than your personal conduct and perceptions how do you 
empower them to lead to a collective uplifting of culture?” 
 
Leaders 
 
Appreciated “I think it is the core thing there is that the individual feels appreciated, has the motivation, is happy 
about his whole situation both professional and private.” 
 
“Our current Senior Leadership is good at letting people know that what they're doing is appreciated” 
 
Leaders 
 
Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
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“So it has made me aware it’s made me think about that more I think more appreciative of everybody’s 
talents.” 
by the 
interviewees. 
Energized “It's important to keep certain levels of energy in work time.” 
 
“We have to give people some permission and guidance on how to expend their energy and we haven't 
really done that yet.” 
 
“I think so particularly given the pressure that everybody's under and right here right now there are 
more personality, challenges, that are going on out here because everybody wants the last bit of energy 
that this guy has and we are all (laugh) I think we're better positioned to respond to that now than we 
were six months ago.” 
 
Leaders Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
by the 
interviewees. 
Coached “If you want to improve the reputation of JWC you must let people grow professionally, that includes a 
degree of mentoring, coaching, training, as well as letting them demonstrate what they are good at.” 
 
Manager 
 
Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
by the 
interviewees. 
Innovative “There’s lots of ‘we have always done it that way ‘ mentality, and again for me that just suffocates 
innovation, I’m not saying that OF5’s have to be the sole drivers of all the good ideas.” 
 
Leaders 
 
Not initially 
predicted 
through the 
literature but 
emphasized 
by the 
interviewees.  
”Promote good ideas, don’t quash them because we haven’t got the staffing resources because that’s 
actually quite a poor excuse, it’s just stymied innovation and people’s appetite to take stuff on, you 
when you start pushing, loyal people to the point they don’t care then what have you lost, well you’ve 
probably lost a lot but you don’t know what you’ve lost because you never explored it.” 
 
“OK it’s good to be innovative if you work in the support branch, new ways of combining transportation 
and providing less work synergy , all that, being innovative in terms of exercise delivery on you know 
very stringent processes.” 
 
Manager 
 
 
Appendix G 
  Acronyms & Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Content 
ACO Allied Commander Operations 
ACT Allied Commander Transformation 
AMN Afghanistan Mission Network 
C2 Command and Control 
CFI Connected Forces Initiative 
COS Chief of Staff 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HQ Headquarter 
HRD Human Resources Development 
ISAF International Stabilisation Forces Afghanistan 
JALLC Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned 
JFC Joint Force Command 
JFTC Joint Force Training Centre 
JWC Joint Warfare Centre 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
NAC North Atlantic Council 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NEDP NATO Executive Development Program 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NNEC NATO Network Enabled Capability 
NRF NATO Response Forces 
OF(#) Officer (grade) 
OPR Officer of Primary Responsibility 
RTO Research and Technical Organisation 
SAGE Strategic Annual Guidance for Exercises 
SC Strategic Commands 
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
UN United Nations 
VJTF Very Rapid Joint Task Force 
 
